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A well-established characteristic of intestate succession laws 
in most American jurisdictions is that only the spouse of the de- 
cedent is required to share the inheritance with other classes of 
heirs, usually the issue, parents, or brothers and sisters of the 
decedent.' A recent study sponsored by the American Bar Asso- 
ciation (ABA study) has suggested that this characteristic of in-, 
testate succession fails to adequately reflect the distributive 
preferences of the de~edent .~ The ABA study proposes revision 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 87-101. Only nine of the fifty states depart 
from the general rule and in those states the sharing among classes is on a very limited 
basis. See infra text accompanying notes 102-03. 
2. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes about Property Distribution at  Death 
and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
319. The authors conclude that the distributive preferences of a decedent should be re- 
flected in the intestate succession law: 
Testamentary freedom should include the right not to have to execute a 
will in order to have accumulated wealth pass to natural objects of the dece- 
dent's bounty. Moreover, unless the statutory scheme invoked in the absence 
of a will conforms to the likely wishes of a person who dies without having 
executed a valid will, it creates a trap for the ignorant or misinformed. The 
alternative defensible rationale for adoption of a particular distributive pattern 
in an intestacy statute is that it serves society's interests. There are four iden- 
tifiable community aims: (1) to protect the financially dependent family; (2) to 
avoid complicating property titles and excessive subdivision of property; (3) to 
promote and encourage the nuclear family; and (4) to encourage the accumula- 
tion of property by individuals. If society's well-being requires a distributive 
pattern different from the determined wishes of intestate descendants, the de- 
cedents' wishes should be subordinated. But our society places high value on 
testamentary freedom. Thus, the preferred distributive pattern of intestate de- 
cedents should be given full effect and should be deviated from only if neces- 
sary to satisfy an overriding societal interest. To do otherwise would be con- 
trary to our concept of testamentary freedom. 
Id. a t  323-24 (footnotes omitted). 
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of American statutes to include a scheme of proportional sharing 
in the decedent's estate among heirs belonging to different 
classes. 
The principal proposal of the ABA study was that "siblings 
share in the estate with  parent^."^ This proposal was based on 
responses to a telephone survey in which respondents were 
asked: "Indicate the percentage of your estate that you would 
want to give to each survivor if you are survived by your father, 
your mother, and an adult brother and sister."' The distribution 
pattern of preferences by respondents for these relatives was 
split with about forty percent favoring distribution to one or 
both parents and about forty percent favoring distribution to all 
four. If we assume a general preference (based on a weighted 
average of the preference patterns in the study6) to distribute to 
the father-mother-brother-sister combination in fixed propor- 
tions of 2.5-2-1-1, then it may be assumed that a decedent sur- 
vived by the heirs listed in the survey question would want his 
or her estate of $13,000 distributed in the following way: $5,000 
3. Id. at  386. It  is interesting to note that the Statute of Distribution 22 & 23 Car. 2, 
ch. 10 (1670), on which American statutes are generally based, provides for joint sharing 
between the widow and a class of heirs, but it was thought to be unsatisfactory. In 1686 
Parliament provided for joint sharing between a mother and brothers and sisters when 
the praepositus died without wife, father, or children. 1 Jac. 2, ch. 17, 8 7 (1685). See T. 
ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 47 (2d ed. 1953). 
4. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, at  346. 
5. The distribution patterns found in the study were as follows: 
The Five Dominant Distribution Patterns for the 
Father-Mother-Brother-Sister Relation Set (Percent)' 
Distribution Pattern by Percent Percent of 
of Estate to: Respondents No. of 
Father Mother Brother Sister 
---- 
in Pattern Respondents 
100 0 0 0 7.3 55 
0 100 0 0 1.6 12 
50 50 0 0 31.9 239 
25 25 25 25 40.3 302 
0 0 50 50 7.1 53 
Other . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  11.7 
-
88 
- 
Total . . . . .  99.9 749 
*1 missing case. 
Id. at  346. Weighting each pattern by the percent of repondents in the pattern produces 
a weighted average distribution pattern as follows: 
Father Mother Brother Sister 
33.325 27.625 13.625 13.625 
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to the father, $4,000 to the mother and $2,000 each to the 
brother and sister. Intestate succession laws presently existing in 
thirty-nine states would ignore such preferences and distribute 
the entire estate to the parents. 
The ABA study did not investigate the preferences of re- 
spondents concerning shared inheritances among other classes, 
such as between issue and siblings or between issue and parents. 
However, it is evident that the totally exclusive inheritance by 
one class of heirs contains certain inadequacies and may require 
amendment in the direction of proportional shares to be distrib- 
uted among two or more classes of heirs. 
The purpose of this article is not to study further the dis- 
tributive preferences of decedents-for which there is certainly a 
need. Rather, it is to present some of the problems which arise 
when proportional shares are incorporated in a scheme of intes- 
tate succession and. to propose various techniques for dealing 
with these problems suggested by a study of the Islamic legal 
system, which has incorporated the idea of proportional shares 
in its intestate succession law. Therefore, the article begins with 
a description of the Islamic system followed by a survey of ex- 
isting American intestate succession laws. I t  then discusses the 
various techniques used in the Islamic system to accommodate a 
scheme of fixed proportional shares and suggests how they may 
be used in an American scheme. The conclusions of this article 
will be confined to problems arising in the construction of a 
scheme of proportional shares. There is no attempt to expand on 
the substantive conclusions of the ABA study concerning the 
proportions which should be allocated among the different clas- 
ses of heirs. 
The Islamic law of intestate succession proved a viable 
method for distributing decedents' estates for over a thousand 
years in the Islamic world and continues to influence, if not reg- 
ulate, the distribution of intestate estates there today. Islamic 
law-which is based on scholarly interpretations of the Qur'an 
and the traditions ascribed to Muhammad, as well as customs of 
the local culture-divided the heirs of an intestate decedent into 
three major classes: those who possess a right to inherit fixed 
shares (Sharers); those who take the remainder after distribu- 
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tion of the fixed shares by virtue of their agnatic6 relationship to 
the decedent (Agnates); and those who take a remainder portion 
only in the absence of living blood relatives among the first two 
classes (Blood Relatives). Minor variations exist among the dif- 
ferent schools of Islamic law7 and, within schools, among differ- 
ent legal  scholar^.^ However, in its finally evolved form, the Is- 
lamic scheme constitutes a fairly unified, albeit complex body of 
rules, the knowledge of which has been said (in a famous dictum 
attributed to the Prophet) to "equal one half the sum total of 
human knowledge!"O Despite its complexity, the essence of the 
Islamic scheme of shared inheritance among different classes of 
heirs may be summarized in a few pages.1•‹ 
6. The term "agnatic" characterizes the relationship through male descent or ascent. 
The agnatic granddaughter is the daughter of a son or of a son's son or of a son's son's 
son, etc.; the agnatic grandfather is the father of the father or of the father's father or of 
the father's father's father, etc. 
7. The four sunni schools of Islamic law are the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali. 
The law of intestate succession will be described for these fodr schools based on a 
Hanbali treatise of the 13th century, Ibn Qudama, Kitab al-Fara'id (Book of Distribu- 
tive Shares), in 6 KITAB AL-MUGHNI (1367 H., i.e., 1948 A.D.) [hereinafter cited as 
MUOHNI]. This treatise was chosen as a reference for Islamic law because of its impor- 
tance, not only as a source of Hanbali law (still used in Saudi Arabia today), but also as a 
comparative work. Professor Noel Coulson has written a comprehensive book on the Is- 
lamic law of intestate succession, N. COULSON, SUCCESSION I  THE MUSLIM FAMILY (1971). 
Although Professor Coulson does not cite any authoritative sources as a general basis for 
his work, a careful comparison of his work with the MUCHNI reveals that both expound 
essentially the same law. I have chosen to digest the MUGHNI in order to provide a more 
summarized account of the law, as well as to provide references to an original Arabic 
source in this area of the law. All translations from original Arabic are the author's. 
Arabic terms have been transliterated both in the text and the footnotes with a mini- 
mum of diacritical marks. 
8. Different Islamic legal scholars mentioned in this article include: Abu Hanifa 
(died 150 H.1767 A.D.), the eponym of the Hanifa school of Islamic law; Abu Yusuf (died 
182 H.1798 A.D.) and Shaybani (died 189 H.1804 A.D.), two disciples of Abu Hanifa; 
Malik (died 179 H.1795 A.D.), the eponym of the Maliki school of Islamic law; and Shafi'i 
(died 204 H.1820 A.D.), the eponym of the Shafi'i school of Islamic law. Some of the 
greatest disagreements concerning the law occurred between Abu Yusuf and Shaybani, 
both of whom belonged to the Hanafi school. 
9. Anderson, Recent Reforms in the Islamic Law of Inheritance, 14 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 349, 349 (1965). 
10. This description of the Islamic scheme is concerned solely with the distribution 
of the net estate of an intestate decedent to regular heirs and does not examine the 
individual's freedom to distribute his property by testamentary disposition, or impedi- 
ments to or conditions of inheritance, death-sickness, advancements, bequests, or the 
effect of slavery, illegitimacy, or guardianship on intestate succession. For a discussion of 
these subjects, as well as a more detailed description of the scheme of intestate succes- 
sion, see N. COULSON, SUCCESSION I  THE MUSLIM FAMILY (1971). 
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A. The Sharers (dhawu al-furud) 
In pre-Islamic times the intestate's wealth was inherited by 
his closest male agnatic relative; women were not considered 
useful in combat or in the defense of tribal territory and, there- 
fore, did not enjoy the same rights of inheritance as men." An 
important reform introduced by Islam was the assignment of 
fixed shares to certain female relatives of the decedent. The 
Prophet was determined to give females a share in intestates' 
wealth, and to this end he included three verses in the Qur'an12 
11. F. PELTIER & G.H. BOUSQUET. LES SUCCESSIONS ACNATIQUES MITIGEES 84-86 
(1935). 
12. THE HOLY QUR'AN 181-82, 235-36 (A. Ali trans. 1946): 
IV, 11 
God (thus) directs you 
As regards your children's 
(Inheritance): to the male, 
A portion equal to that 
Of two females: if only 
Daughters, two or more 
Their share is two-thirds 
Of the inheritance; 
If only one, her share 
Is a half. 
For parents, a sixth share 
Of the inheritance to each, 
If the deceased left children; 
If no children, and the parents 
Are the (only) heirs, the mother 
Has a third; if the deceased 
Left brothers (or sisters) 
The mother has a sixth. 
(The distribution in all cases 
Is) after the payment 
Of legacies and debts. 
Ye know not whether 
Your parents or your children 
Are nearest to you 
In benefit. These are 
Settled portions ordained 
By God; and God is 
All-knowing, All-wise. 
IV, 12 
In what your wives leave, 
Your share is a half, 
If they leave no child; 
But if they leave a child, 
Ye get a fourth; after payment 
Of legacies and debts. 
In what ye leave, 
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which ensured women a share in the estates of close family 
Their share is a fourth, 
If ye leave no child; 
But if ye leave a child, 
They get an eighth; after payment 
Of legacies and debts. 
If the man or woman 
Whose inheritance is in question, 
Has left neither ascendants nor descendants, 
But has left a brother 
Or a sister, each one of the two 
Gets a sixth; but if more 
Than two, they share in a third; 
After payment of legacies 
And debts; so that no loss 
Is caused (to any one). 
Thus is it ordained by God; 
And God is All-knowing, 
Most Forbearing. 
IV, 176 
They ask thee 
For a legal decision. 
Say: God directs (thus) 
About those who leave 
No descendants or ascendants 
As heirs. If it is a man 
That dies, leaving a sister 
But no child, she shall 
Have half the inheritance: 
If (such a deceased was) 
A woman, who left no child, 
Her brother takes her inheritance: 
If there are two sisters, 
They shall have two-thirds 
Of the inheritance 
(Between them): if there are 
Brothers and sisters, (they share), 
The male having twice 
The share of the female 
Thus doth God make clear 
To you (His law), lest 
Ye err. And God 
Hath knowledge of all things. 
Verse IV, 12 appears to contradict verse IV, 176 by giving the brother and sister 
each a one-sixth share as opposed to giving a two-thirds share to two sisters, and if there 
be a brother, a double share to him over the sister. The consensus reached in Islam to 
explain this apparent contradiction is that verse IV, 12 refers to uterines and verse IV, 
176 refers to germanes and consanguines. A recent study has suggested that, contrary to 
this explanation, both verses refer to germanes and consanguines, but the first deals with 
testate succession and the second with intestate succession. See Powers, The Islamic 
Low of Inheritance Reconsidered: A New Reading of Q. 4:12B, 55 STUDIA ISLAMICA 61 
(1982). 
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members in conjunction with the inheritance of the male 
agnates.13 These verses create a class of Sharers consisting of the 
husband, wife, uterine brother and sister,14 mother, -father, 
daughter, germane sister,16 consanguine sister,16 agnatic grandfa- 
ther, grandmother, and agnatic granddaughter of the decedent 
who inherit according to a fixed share scheme. 
The fixed share of an intestate's estate allotted to each heir 
of the Sharer class is summarized in Table 1. The fixed share 
varies as shown in Table 1, depending on the existence or nonex- 
istence of certain specified heirs. 
TABLE 1 
FIXED SHARES OF THE SHARER CLASS 
HEIR W I T H  WITHOUT SHARE 
(1) Husband" Agnatic descendant - 114 
(2) " - Agnatic descendant 112 
(3) Wife'" Agnatic descendant - 1 18 
(4) " - Agnatic descendant 114 
(5) Uterine Agnatic descendant - 0 
Brother or or  male agnatic 
S i ~ t e r ' ~  ascendant 
(6) " " - Agnatic descendant 116 or, if 
or male agnatic more 
ascendant than 
one, 113 
collec- 
tively 
13. It  is possible that women did have a right of intestate succession in Mecca 
before the Qur'anic reforms. See F PELTIER & G H BOUSQUET, supra note 11, a t  99-102. 
14. A uterine brother or sister has the same mother as the decedent but a different 
father. 
15. A germane brother or sister has the same parents as the decedent. 
16. A consanguine brother or sister has the same father as the decedent but a differ- 
ent mother. 
17. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  178(3)-178(6); QUR'AN IV, 12. 
18. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  178(4)-178(8); QUR'AN IV, 12. There may be one or 
more wives who share In the wife's share. 
19. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  166(20)-167(8), 183(10)-183(12); QUR'AN IV, 12. AC- 
cording to Malik and Shafi'i, if one or more germane brothers (or one or more germane 
sisters converted into residuaries by a germane brother) would be totally excluded from a 
share in the inheritance due to the presence of uterines (i.e., where they inherit with the 
husband and the mother (or grandmother)), he or they inherit equally with the uterines 
qua uterines. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  180(17)-181(17). 
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HEIR WITH WITHOUT SHARE 
(7) MotherZ0 Agnatic descendant - 1 16 
(8) " Two or more Agnatic descendant 116 
brothers or sisters 
(9) " Father Agnatic descendant Residue 
or two or more 
brothers or sisters 
(10) " - Agnatic 113 
descendant, 
more than one 
brother or sister, 
or father 
(11) Fatherz' Male agnatic - 1 16 
descendant 
(12) " Female agnatic Male agnatic 116 plus 
descendant descendant residue 
(13) " Agnatic descendant Residue 
(14) Daughterzz Son - Residue 
(15) " - Son 112 or, if 
more 
than 
one, 213 
collec- 
tively 
(16) Germane Sistera3 Male agnatic - 0 
descendant or 
father (or, 
according to Abu 
Hanifa, agnatic 
grandfatherz4) 
The published edition of MUCHNI indicates that the share of one-third is divided 
among the uterine brothers and sisters "equally, to the male the equivalent of the por- 
tion of two females" (bi as-sawiya li adh-dhakar mithl hazz al-'unthayayn). MUGHNI, 
supra note 7 ,  a t  181(10). But  two manuscripts of the work a t  Dar al-Kutub, the main 
library in Cairo, show that "two females" is an error in the text and should read "the 
female" (al-'untha). IBN QUDAMA, MSS 18(7) and 23(7) Fiqh Hanbal [classification of 
the two manuscripts] AL-MUCHNI. 
20. MUGHNI, supra note 7 ,  a t  176(4)-176(5), 177(11)-177(12), 179(20)-179(22); 
QUR'AN IV, 11. With the father alone the mother receives her Qur'anic share of one-third, 
but with the spouse and the father she inherits one-third of the remainder after the 
spouse. This results effectively in her being a residuary with the father and sharing in 
one-third of the residue. 
21. MUOHNI, supra note 7 ,  a t  177(3)-177(11), 177(15)-177(17); QUR'AN IV, 11. 
22. QUR'AN IV, 11. 
23. MUCHNI, supra note 7 ,  a t  166(6)-166(7), 168(12)-168(13), 168(16), 169(17); 
QUR'AN IV, 176. For inheritance with uterines, see supra note 19. 
24. MUGHNI, supra note 7 ,  a t  215(10)-215(11), 215(15). 
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HEIR WITH WITHOUT SHARE 
(17) Germane Sister Germane brother, Male agnatic Residue 
female agnatic descendant or 
descendant, or father (or, 
agnatic according to Abu 
grandfather (also Hanifa, agnatic 
according to Abu grandfatherze) 
Yusuf, Shaybani, 
Malik, and 
ShaWi2v 
- Agnatic 112 or, if 
descendant, more 
germane brother, than 
or male agnatic one, 213 
ascendant collec- 
tively 
(19) Consanguine Male agnatic 
Sisterz7 descendant, 
germane brother, 
or father (or, 
according to Abu 
Hanifa, agnatic 
grandfatherz8) 
Two germane 
sisters 
Consanguine 
brother, female 
agnatic 
descendant, or 
agnatic 
grandfather (also 
according to Abu 
Yusuf, Shaybani, 
Malik, and 
ShaWiZ8) 
One germane sister 
Consanguine 0 
brother 
Male agnatic Residue 
descendant, 
germane brother, 
or father (or, 
according to Abu 
Hanifa, agnatic 
grandfathers0) 
Agnatic 116 
descendant, male 
agnatic ascendant, 
germane brother, 
or consanguine 
brother 
25. Id.  at 217(22)-218(21). For identification of these jurists, see supra note 8. 
26. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  215(10)-215(11), 21505). 
27. Id.  at  166(6)-166(7), 166(15)-166(16), 168(12)-168(13), 168(16), 169(17), 174(3)- 
174(9), 175(11)-175(12); QUR'AN IV, 176. 
28. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  215(10)-215(11), 215(15). 
29. Id.  at  217(22)-218(21). 
30. Id.  at  215(10)-215(11), 215(15). 
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(23) Consanguine Agnatic 112 or, if more 
Sister descendant, male than one, 213 
agnatic ascendant, collectively 
germane brother, 
consanguine 
brother, or 
germane sister 
(24) Agnatic Father  or nearer - 0 
Grandfather3' agnatic 
grandfather 
(25) " " Male agnatic Father  or nearer 116 
descendant agnatic 
grandfather 
(26) " " Female agnatic Father, nearer 116 or 
descendant agnatic residue, 
grandfather, or which- 
male agnatic ever is 
descendant greater 
(27) " " - Father, nearer Residue 
agnatic 
grandfather, or 
agnatic descendant 
(28) GrandmotherS2 Mother or nearer - 0 
grandmother (with 
modifications 
according to Abu 
Hanifa, Malik, and  
Shafi 'P)  
31. Id. a t  177(3)-178(1). The grandfather differs from the father by inheriting as a 
residuary with germane and consanguine brothers and sisters. (Abu Yusuf, Shaybani, 
Malik and Shafi'i are in accordance, but Abu Hanifa maintains the exclusion of these 
collaterals by the grandfather). Id.  at  215(10)-215(11), 215(15), 217(22)-218(21). If the 
grandfather's share in the residue in the presence of these collaterals is greater than one- 
sixth of the total inheritance, it is computed without taking the one-sixth share into 
account (as will be more fully explained in the text accompanying notes 43-44 infra). See 
also examples in MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  227(9)-227(10), 227(19)-227(20). Therefore, 
his share becomes "1/6 or residue, whichever is greater" rather than "116 plus residue" as 
in the case of the father's inheritance with a female agnatic descendant and without a 
male agnatic descendant. See supra Table 1,  pp. 274-77. 
32. MUGHNI, supra note 7, at 206(1), 206(14)-206(15), 206(20), 209(9)-210(5). The 
Prophet gave the grandmother a one-sixth share. See id. at 214(4). Not all grandmothers 
are entitled to inherit as Sharers. On the maternal side only one line of grandmoth- 
ers-the mother of the mother and of the mother's mother and of the mother's mother's 
mother, etc.-participates in the inheritance. On the paternal side, the two lines of 
grandmothers stemming from the father and the father's father are admitted. Malik and 
his followers admit only the maternal line of grandmothers and the paternal line stem- 
ming from the father. Abu Hanifa and his followers and Shafi'i (according to one report) 
admit the maternal line of grandmothers and the paternal lines of grandmothers stem- 
ming from the father and every agnatic grandfather. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  208(3)- 
209(8). 
33. Malik and Shafi'i (according to Shafi'i's second statement on the matter) main- 
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HEIR WITH WITHOUT SHARE 
(29) Grandmother - Mother or nearer 116 
grandmother (with 
modifications 
according to Abu 
Hanifa, Malik, and 
Shafi'is4) 
(30) Agnatic Higher36 male 
G r a n d d a ~ g h t e r ~ ~  agnatic descendant 
(31) " " Equal male agnatic 
descendant 
(32) " " Higher female 
agnatic descendant 
(33) " " Lower male 
agnatic descendant 
in the presence of 
two or more higher 
female agnatic 
descendants 
(34) " " Two or more 
higher female 
agnatic 
descendants 
(35) " " - 
Higher male Residue 
agnatic descendant 
Higher or equal 116 
male agnatic 
descendant 
Higher or equal Residue 
male agnatic 
descendant 
Male agnatic 0 
descendant 
Higher or equal 112 or, if 
male agnatic more 
descendant or than 
higher female one, 2/3 
agnatic descendant collec- 
tively 
If the sum of the fractional fixed shares of the Sharers 
equals unity (i.e. = 1.0), the inheritance is divided in accordance 
with those fixed shares. If the sum is greater than unity, the 
share of each is proportionately decreased Thus, in the 
case of a decedent who leaves a father, mother, two daughters, 
tain that a nearer paternal grandmother does not exclude a further maternal grand- 
mother, while Abu Hanifa and his followers and ShaWi (according to Shafi'i's first state- 
ment) maintain the contrary in accordance with Ibn Qudama. MUGHI, supra note 7, a t  
209(16)-210(1). Furthermore, Malik, Shafi'i and the ashab ar-ra'y (i.e., the Hanafis) 
maintain that a paternal grandmother is excluded by a male agnatic ascendant through 
whom she is connected to the praepositus. Id. a t  211(4)-212(3). With this approach a 
controversy is raised over whether the other grandmothers take the whole of the grand- 
mother's share (one-sixth) as if the paternal grandmother were nonexistent, or only the 
share they would have taken had the paternal grandmother not been excluded. Id. a t  
211(20)-212(10). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. a t  169(15)-174(2). 
36. I.e., nearer in degree to the praepositus. 
37. MUGHNI, SUPM note 7, a t  184(7)-184(9). 
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and a wife to inherit a $13,500 estate, the mother takes a share 
of one-sixth (first category under Mother in Table I), the father 
takes a share of one-sixth plus residue (second category under 
Father), the two daughters each take one-third (second category 
under Daughter), and the wife takes one-eighth (first category 
under Wife). Since these shares total one and one-eighth (116 + 
116 + 213 + 1/8), the share of each is proportionately de- 
creased, so that the father actually takes 4/27, the mother 4/27, 
the daughters 8/27 each, and the wife 3/27. Their shares in the 
$13,500 estate are $2,000 (father), $2,000 (mother), $4,000 (each 
daughter), and $1,500 (wife). If the sum of the fixed shares is 
less than unity, the remainder of the inheritance after distribu- 
tion to those with fixed shares goes the Sharers who have been 
made residuaries and the Agnates. In the absence of fixed 
shares, the residuaries take the whole i nhe r i t an~e .~~  
B. Residuaries 
In addition to the sharers who may be entitled to a residu- 
ary interest, there are two classes of potential heirs to the resi- 
due of a decedent's estate after distribution of fixed shares to 
the Sharer class: Agnates ('asaba) and Blood Relatives (dhawu 
al-arham). 
1. Agnates ('asaba) 
The Agnates are the male heirs listed below among whom 
the first existing heirs in order of priority inherit the remainder 
of an estate to the exclusion of other A g n a t e ~ : ~ ~  
(I) sons; 
(2) nearest in degree of agnatic grandsons; 
(3) father; 
(4) nearest in degree of agnatic grandfathers, germane 
brothers, and consanguine brothers, with germane brothers ex- 
cluding consanguine brothers;40 
38. Id at 168(14)-168(15). But see rnfra text accompanying notes 43-44 (exception 
when the grandfather and one germane or consanguine sister are in competition with the 
husband and mother). 
39. MUGHNI, supra note 7, at 178(19)-179(19). 
40. Germane and consanguine brothers are not excluded by the agnatic grandfather. 
Id. at 215(16)-215(17), 217(22)-218(21). Abu Yusuf, Shaybani, Malik and Shafi'i are in 
accordance on this point. Id at 215(18), 218(2). Abu Hanifa maintains that they are 
excluded by the agnatic grandfather. Id. at 215(10)-215(11), 215(15). One situation exists 
in which germane brothers are considered as uterines. See supra note 19. 
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(5) nearest in degree of male agnatic descendants of ger- 
mane and consanguine brothers, with the germane's descendants 
excluding the consanguine's descendants of equal degree; 
(6) father's germane brothers; 
(7) father's consanguine brothers; 
(8) nearest in degree of male agnatic descendants of the fa- 
ther's germane and consanguine brothers, with the germane's 
descendants excluding the consanguine's descendants of equal 
degree; 
(9) relatives of the nearest in degree of agnatic grandfathers 
who inherit in the following order of exclusive priority: 
(a) germane brothers, 
(b) consanguine brothers, 
(c) nearest in degree of male agnatic descendants of 
germane and consanguine brothers, with the ger- 
mane's descendants excluding the consanguine's 
descendants of equal degree. 
Thus, for example, when a decedent leaves only an uncle, 
one son, and two grandsons, the son will take the whole estate. If 
the decedent also leaves heirs belonging to the Sharer class then 
the son will take a residuary interest after the distribution has 
been made to the Sharers. 
When two or more heirs are entitled to take the residue, i t  
is distributed generally in accordance with the priorities estab- 
lished for the Agnates. Consequently, when residuaries among 
the Sharers are Agnates or female Sharers inheriting in conjunc- 
tion with Agnates, the Agnates exclude all Agnates following 
them in order of priority. When a germane or consanguine sister 
inherits as a residuary with a female agnatic descendant, she 
takes an inheritance like that which her brother would have 
taken,"' and appears to exclude all Agnates who rank after her 
brother in order of priority. This would include the exclusion of 
the consanguine sister by the germane sister when a female ag- 
natic descendant survives the de~edent."~ 
Determining the share of a grandfather can become quite 
involved. For example, when germane or consanguine brothers 
or sisters inherit with the grandfather, the share of the grandfa- 
ther is determined by taking the maximum share of the 
following: 
41. MUGHNI, supra note 7, at 169(6). 
42. See, e.g., id. at 222(10)-222(11). 
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(1) one-sixth of the total estate as a fixed share; 
(2) one-third of the estate remaining after deduction of 
fixed shares not going to germane or consanguine brothers or sis- 
ters or himself; 
(3) a male's share of such remaining estate after a nominal 
division is made among the brothers and sisters and himself 
with males receiving double the portion of females; or 
(4) if the grandfather is in competition with the husband, 
the mother, and one germane or consanguine sister, an initial 
distribution of fixed shares is made to all, the shares are de- 
creased proportionately (by 'awl), and then the grandfather 
takes two-thirds of the collective entitlement of himself and the 
sister (8/27 of the total estate).43 
Once the grandfather has taken his allowable share, the 
shares of the germane and consanguine brothers and sisters in 
any residue remaining are determined as follows: (1) germanes 
exclude consanguines (except when the germane is only one sis- 
ter, in which case she takes a share to the extent of one-half of 
the total inheritance, if the remaining residue is that large, after 
which any remaining residue goes to the consanguines); and (2) 
as between a germane brother and sister or between a consan- 
guine brother and sister, the male receives double the share of 
the female.44 
Except for the case of the grandfather in competition with 
the germane or consanguine brothers or sisters, the residuaries 
who inherit share equally, but with the male taking double the 
portion of the female.4b If there are no residuaries who take and 
the sum of the fixed shares does not add to unity, each fixed 
share is increased proportionately (radd), except for the spouse's 
share which remains constant.46 However, according to Malik 
and Shafi'i, when there are no other residuaries there is no pro- 
portionate increase and the remainder escheats to the public 
treasury (bayt al-mal).47 
Thus, in the case of a decedent who leaves a father, mother, 
brother, and sister to inherit a $13,500 estate, the father is first 
43. Id. at 218(4)-220(2), 223(13)-223(18). 
44. Id. at 218(12)-218(14), and examples at 220(3)-223(12). 
45. QUR'AN IV, 11 (son and daughter); MUGHNI, supra note 7, at 171(5)-171(7) 
(granddaughter and grandson); id. at 175(15)-175(17) (germane brother and sister; con- 
sanguine brother and sister). For the mother and father, see supra note 20. 
46. MUGHNI, supra note 7, at 201(9)-202(3). Abu Hanifa and his followers are in 
accordance. Id. at 201(14)-201(15). 
47. Id. at 202(3)-202(5). 
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in order of priority and takes to the exclusion of the brother. 
The father also excludes the sister (first category under Ger- 
mane Sister in Table 1) and then takes a two-thirds share as 
residue after the mother takes her one-third (third category 
under Mother and third category under Father in Table 1). 
Their shares in the $13,500 estate are $9,000 (father) and $4,500 
(mother). 
2. Blood Relatives (dhawu al-arham)48 
If there are no blood relatives among the Sharers or Agnates 
surviving the decedent, the Blood Relatives of the deceased are 
entitled to share in the inheritance." The spouse is not a blood 
relative and will inherit his or her maximum fixed share. The 
Blood Relatives will inherit that part of the estate not going to 
the spouse, and if there is no spouse, they will take the whole 
inheritan~e.'~ 
Among the Blood Relatives, shares in the inheritance are 
generally determined according to the doctrine of tanzil, 
whereby each relative is put in the position (manzila) of the 
Sharer or Agnate (known generally as "ordinary heirs") with 
whom he is ~onnected.~'  However, in the Hanafi school, the 
shares of Blood Relatives are determined according to the doc- 
trine of relationship (qaraba), whereby each Blood Relative is 
considered in his direct relationship to the decedent and accord- 
ing to the ranking of the Agnates. 
a. Tanzil. Under the doctrine of tanzil the ordinary heir 
with whom a Blood Relative is connected for purposes of inheri- 
tance is determined as follows: 
(1) for descendants of the decedent, by tracing the line of 
ascent to the first ordinary heir;'= 
48. The term dhawu al-arham may be used generally to refer to all blood relatives 
but is used here to refer only to blood relatives other than Sharers and Agnates. See id. 
at  202(1)-202(2), 202(8)-202(10), 229(3)-229(4); QuR'AN,VIII, 75.  Therefore, "Blood Rela- 
tives" is capitalized when used in this restricted sense. For a list of these relatives, see 
MUGHNI, supra note 7 ,  at  229(4)-229(8). Malik and Shafi'i do not recognize this group of 
heirs. Id. at  229(11)-229(12). 
49. Id. at  229(8)-229(9), 229(20)-229(21). Abu Hanifa is in accordance. Id. at  
232(15)-232(16). Malik and Shafi'i do not recognize this group of heirs and give the in- 
heritance to the public treasury (bayt  al-mal). Id. at  229(11)-22902). 
50. Id. at  231(14)-231(20), 237(4)-237(5). 
51. Id. at  231(10)-231(16). The doctrine of tanzil elaborated in this study is that of 
Ibn Qudama, who differs in some particulars with others who espouse the doctrine. 
52. See, e.g., id.  at 233(1)-233(4). 
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(2) for descendants of brothers or sisters of the decedent, by 
tracing the line of ascent to the first ordinary heir;63 
(3) for ascendants of the decedent, by tracing the line of 
descent to the first ordinary heir;54 
(4) for brothers and sisters of ascendants of the decedent, 
by tracing the collateral line to their brother or sister who is an 
ascendant of the decedent and, if that ascendant is not an ordi- 
nary heir, by tracing the line of descent from that ascendant to 
the first ordinary heir;5b and 
(5) for descendants of brothers and sisters of ascendants of 
the decedent, by tracing the line of ascent to the brother or sis- 
ter of an ascendant of the decedent, then the collateral line to 
that ascendant, then the line of descent from that ascendant un- 
til the first ordinary heir is reached.b6 
A single existing relative from the Blood Relatives takes the 
entire inheritan~e.~' If more than one Blood Relative exists, the 
right of each to inherit is determined initially by the proximity 
of his relationship to the ordinary heir he represents. If relatives 
representing the same ordinary heir are in varying degrees of 
proximity to that ordinary heir, the nearer in degree exclude the 
more remote.b8 If relatives representing different ordinary heirs 
are in varying degrees of proximity to their ordinary heirs, the 
nearer in degree exclude the more remote, but only if they are in 
the same class of  relative^.^^ For this purpose the Blood Rela- 
tives are divided into four classes-descendants, fraternal rela- 
tives, maternal relatives, and paternal  relative^.^^ 
53. See, e.g., ~ d .  at  232(12)-232(13), 233(1)-233(5), 245(12)-245(16). 
54. See, e.g., td. a t  251(22)-252(4). 
55. See ~ d .  At 232(7)-232(15), and examples at  251(9)-251(19). 
56. See, e.g., ~ d .  at  233(20)-233(22), 234(2), 246(10)-247(13), 251(20)-251(21). 
57. Id. at  233(9)-233(10). 
58. Id. at  233(10)-233(13). 
59. Id. at  234(5)-234(7). 
60. Ibn Qudama knows of no one who has counted the classes and explained them, 
except for Abu al-Khattab, whose count of five leads to results which no one supports. 
Id. at  234(15)-234(18). From Khiraqi (a tenth-century scholar whose Mukhtasar serves 
as the basis for Ibn Qudama's commentary in Mughni) Ibn Qudama deduces that the 
classes are four. Id. at  234(19)-235(2). Ibn Qudama mentions that it is possible that the 
classes are three and that one is best, but later examples confirm his recognition of four 
classes. Id at  236(3)-236(7), and examples at 246(2)-246(6!, 248(15)-249(5). 
The relatives constituting each of the four classes respectively are the descendants 
of the decedent, the descendants of brothers and sisters of the decedent, the other rela- 
tives stemming from the mother, and the other relatives stemming from the father. See, 
e.g., id. at  235(2)-236(2). However, it appears that the paternal grandmother is consid- 
ered a maternal relative, for the purpose of this classificat~on, when her relatives exist 
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The inheritance is then divided among the ordinary heirs 
represented by Blood Relatives who have not been excluded. 
Each ordinary heir represented takes the share he would have 
received in competition with the other ordinary heirs repre- 
sented, and that share devolves on the relatives representing 
him.61 The share of the ordinary heir is distributed to his rela- 
tives as if he were the decedent and they his with certain 
exceptions: 
(1) Descendants of the decedent or of a brother or sister of 
the decedent inherit per stirpess3 the share of their ordinary 
heir, with two schools of thought on the manner in which the 
shares are divided. One school equalizes (man sawwa) between 
male and female and gives the male an equal share with the fe- 
male. The other school gives preference (man faddala) to the 
male and gives the male double the share of the female, unless 
the ordinary heir is a uterine brother or sister in which case the 
male takes an equal share with the female.64 
(2) The father and mother of the mother's father, inheriting 
alone, take shares of two-thirds and one-third respect i~ely .~~ 
(The distribution to higher ascendants related to the same ordi- 
nary heir remains unclear.66) 
(3) A brother and sister of an ascendant of the decedent, 
with relatives of the mother or maternal grandmother. See, e.g., id. a t  251(19)-252(4). 
Whether she is considered a maternal relative with other relatives is not clear from 
MUGHNI. 
61. Id. at  234(3)-234(7). The presence of the spouse does not affect the determina- 
tion of these shares, except according to one view not espoused by Ibn Qudama, whereby 
the existing spouse is considered initially in competition with the ordinary heirs for the 
purpose of determining the ratio of their shares. After the ratio is determined, the spouse 
takes his or her maximum fixed share and each group of relatives representing the ordi- 
nary heirs takes its share of the remaining portion in proportion to the predetermined 
ratio. Id. at  237(4)-237(10). 
62. See id. at  233(10)-233(13). 
63. Inheritance per stirpes is the taking of the share one's parent w6uld have taken 
had he been alive, and that parent's share is the one his parent would have taken and so 
forth on up the line. In the case here described, where two or more children are de- 
scended from the same parent, they take equally except where it is indicated that a male 
takes double the share of a female. 
64. See MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  238(15)-239(10), 243(6)-243(7), and examples at  
239(14)-239(22), 240(14)-240(17), 240(18)-241(2) (example of per stirpes devolution 
where the ordinary heir is a descendant of the decedent), 241(8)-241(12) (example of per 
stirpes devolution where the ordinary heir is a sister of the decedent), 241(17)-241(18), 
242(3)-242(5), 243(8)-243(10), 245(1)-245(5), 245(19)-246(4). 
65. Id. at  252(2). 
66. E.g., when the parents of the mother's paternal grandfather are in competition 
with the mother of her paternal grandmother. 
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who are not ordinary heirs and are either germane or consan- 
guine, take their shares equally according to those who equalize 
between the male and fem,ale. According to those who give a 
preference to the male, the brother takes double the share of the 
sister .'? 
(4) Descendants of a brother or sister of an ascendant of the 
decedent inherit per stirpes the share of their ordinary heir, or, 
if their ordinary heir is an ascendant of the decedent, they in- 
herit per stirpes the share which would have been taken by their 
own ascendant who is the brother or sister of'an ascendant of 
the decedent. According to those who equalize, the male shares 
equally with the female. Those who give a preference to the 
male give the male double the share of the female unless the 
ordinary heir is uterine, in which case the male takes an equal 
share with the female.6s 
Thus, in the case of a decedent who leaves two paternal 
aunts and a cousin who is the daughter of his mother's sister to 
inherit a $13,500 estate, the paternal aunts are put in the posi- 
tion of the father, and the cousin is put in the position of the 
mother. Neither excludes the other because the aunts are pater- 
nal relatives and the cousin is a maternal relative. Since the 
mother would have received one-third and the father two-thirds, 
the aunts each take one-third and the cousin takes one-third. 
Their shares in the $13,500 estate are $4,500 each. 
67. See MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  238(15)-239(10), and examples at  249(12)-249(17) 
(for maternal aunt and uncle). 
68. See id. a t  238(15)-239(10), 244(1)-244(6), 244(21)-244(22), and examples at  
239(14)-240(2), 245(1)-245(5), 246(2)-246(11), 247(9)-247(13), 249(8)-249(12), 251(5)- 
251(21). Per stirpes devolution, while not explicitly mentioned for this group of heirs, 
appears to be implied. 
When the ordinary heir is an ascendant of the decedent, it is not clear from Ibn 
Qudama what share the descendants of a brother or sister of an ascendant of the dece- 
dent take in competition with a relative who is an ascendant of that ordinary heir, e.g., 
when the sons of the mother's germane, consanguine, and uterine brothers are in compe- 
tition with the mother's paternal grandfather. The general rule is that the paternal 
grandfather excludes nephews, which would argue for the grandfather taking the whole 
inheritance. But in the absence of the grandfather, the general rule is that the germane 
brother's son takes to the exclusion of the consanguine and uterine brother's sons. This 
is not the case for the sons of the mother's brothers in the absence of her paternal grand- 
father. The sons are represented by their fathers for purposes of the rules of exclusion: 
the consanguine brother is excluded, the uterine brother is allocated one-sixth and the 
germane brother five-sixths of the inheritance, which then devolves to the sons of the 
uterine and germane brothers respectively. Id. at  245(3)-245(5). Query whether the sons 
of the mother's brothers are represented by their fathers for purposes of the rules of 
exclusion when in the presence of the mother's paternal grandfather, and if so, whether 
the paternal grandfather of the mother is represented by her father. 
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b. Qaraba. Under the doctrine of qaraba followed by the 
Hanafi school in lieu of tanzil, a Blood Relative inherits an in- 
terest in the intestate's estate according to his direct relation- 
ship to the decedent and according to the Agnate rankings. 
Thus, descendants exclude descendants of the decedent's par- 
ents, and the descendants of nearer ascendants exclude the-de- 
scendants of further  ascendant^.^^ Within each of the classes of 
descendants, the relatives who are nearer in degree to the dece- 
dent exclude the more remote.?O Where relatives of the same 
class are all equal in degree to the deceased, relatives who are 
closest in degree to ordinary heirs, who are their ascendants but 
not ascendants of the decedent, exclude the others.71 A division 
exists between the followers of Abu Yusuf and ShaybanP2 con- 
cerning the rules of priority and apportionment among the rela- 
tives not excluded in the application of the doctrine of qaraba. 
( I )  Abu Yusuf. Abu Yusuf directs that distribution be made 
per capita73 with the male taking double the share of the fe- 
male.74 When the class consists of descendants of the decedent's 
parents or higher ascendants, germanes exclude consanguines, 
consanguines exclude uterines, the issue of germanes exclude the 
issue of consanguines,and the issue of consanguines exclude the 
issue of uterine~.?~ If the relatives remaining after this exclusion 
are from both the maternal and paternal sides, the relatives on 
the maternal side take one-third and the relatives on the pater- 
nal side take two-thirds of the inheritance c~llect ively.~~ In this 
regard, descendants of great grandparents on either the mater- 
nal or paternal side are further subdivided into maternal and 
69. Id. a t  232(15)-232(20), Ibn Qudama does not explain the position of the as- 
cendants within this order except to say that Abu Hanifa himself gave precedence to the 
father's mother, the father's mother's mother, etc., over the children of the daughters. Id. 
a t  232(19). 
70. See, e.g., id. a t  241(21)-241(22), 245(12)-245(13), 247(5)-247(7), 249(6)-249(8), 
249(18)-249(19). 
71. See, e.g., id. a t  241(23)-242(2) (descendants), 245(13)-245(14) (descendants of 
parents), 246(10)-246(12), 247(8)-247(9) (descendants of paternal aunts and uncles), 
251(8)-251(9). 
72. See supra note 8. 
73. Le., according to their number ( ' ah  'adadihim). 
74. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  240(7)-240(9), and examples a t  240(14)-241(7) (de- 
scendants), 241(8)-241(20) (descendants of parents). 
75. Id. a t  244(6)-244(7), and examples a t  245(14)-245(16), 246(10)-246(12), 248(5)- 
248(6), 249(21)-249(23). 
76. See, e.g., id. a t  248(5)-248(6), 249(21)-249(23), 251(15)-251(16). 
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paternal relatives and given a collective share of one-third and 
two-thirds respectively of the collective share of their side.77 
(2) Shaybani. Shaybani's approach differs from that of Abu 
Yusuf. For the class of descendants he directs that the estate be 
divided initially between the male and female ascendants of the 
heirs a t  the first generation under the decedent differing in sex. 
The females are allocated a share for each heir claiming through 
them and the males are allocated a double share for each heir 
claiming through them. The collective shares of the males and 
females are then further subdivided among the males and fe- 
males of the next lower generation under each of them differing 
in sex, and the subdivision continues in like manner until the 
heirs take their shares, the male taking double the share of each 
female under each subdivision. If there are no generations be- 
tween the heirs and the decedent which differ in sex, distribu- 
tion is made per capita with the male taking double the share of 
the female.78 
For the class of descendants of the decedent's parents, 
Shaybani directs that the estate be divided initially among the 
brothers and sisters of the decedent, who have heirs claiming 
through them, according to the normal principles of distribution 
to these relatives but with each brother and sister counting as 
however many heirs claiming through him or her. The subse- 
quent distribution of the share of each brother and sister to 
their descendants is made in the same way as the decedent's es- 
tate is distributed to his descendants, except that male and fe- 
male issue of uterines are allocated equal shares.79 
Within the class of descendants of the decedent's grandpar- 
ents or higher ascendants, germanes exclude consanguines, con- 
sanguine~ exclude uterines, the issue of germanes exclude the is- 
sue of consanguines, and the issue of consanguines exclude the 
issue of uterines80 If the relatives remaining after this exclusion 
are from both the maternal and paternal sides, the relatives on 
77. See, e.g., id. at 251(8)-251(9). Further subdivision for descendants of higher as- 
cendants is implied. 
78. Id. at 240(10)-240(13), and examples at 240(14)-241(8). The text does not refer 
to more than one division among males and females at a generation between the heirs 
and the decedent, but implies a successive subdivision for each generation differing in 
sex. 
79. Id. at 243(5)-243(7), 244(6)-244(9), and examples at 241(8)-241(19), 243(4)- 
243(5), 243(11)-243(18), 245(7)-245(8). 
80. Id. at 244(6)-244(9), and examples at 246(10)-246(12), 248(5)-248(6), 249(21)- 
249(23). 
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the maternal side take one-third and the relatives on the pater- 
nal side take two-thirds of the inheritance c~llect ively.~~ In this 
regard, descendants of great-grandparents on either the mater- 
nal or paternal side are further subdivided into maternal and 
paternal relatives and given a collective share of one-third and 
two-thirds respectively of the collective share of their side.s2 The 
subsequent distribution of the estate is not described explicitly 
by Ibn Qudama but appears to be the same as for the class of 
descendants of the decedent's parents. 
Thus, for example, in the case of a decedent who leaves two 
paternal aunts and a cousin who is the daughter of his mother's 
sister to inherit a $13,500 estate, all three are descendants of 
grandparents, but the aunts are nearer in degree to the decedent 
and therefore exclude the cousin. Each aunt takes one-half the 
$13,500 estate. 
Finally, if the decedent dies with no blood relative, the pub- 
lic treasury (bayt al-mal) takes the share of the inheritance not 
going to a surviving spouse.s3 
The particular fixed shares which were ordained in the 
Qur'an are unimportant to U.S. intestate succession laws since 
they depend on social and historical factors peculiar to Islam 
and are not suited to American culture.84 However, some of the 
techniques used to distribute shares to various heirs in the Is- 
lamic system may shed some light on how to approach problems 
of refining the American system of intestate succession. Before 
examining these techniques, the intestate succession laws pres- 
ently existing in the United States will be examined to deter- 
mine the extent to which they use the concept of fixed shares. 
81. See supra note 76. 
82. See supra note 77. 
83. But see supra note 49 (exceptions of Malik and Shafi'i). I t  should be noted that 
an heir who has a dual relationship with the decedent inherits as a separate individual 
under each title. MUGHNI, supra note 7, a t  252(5)-252(7), and examples at  186(7)- 
186(19), 252(9)-252(20). According the Shafi'i, Abu Yusuf, and reasoning by analogy from 
the word of Malik, there is an exception for the case of a grandmother who is two grand- 
mothers to the decedent. They claim she will inherit only as one grandmother. Id. at  
210(11)-210(17). 
84. The distribution of a double share to the male over the female is not only 
counter to our ideas of propriety but actually contradicts fundamental notions of fairness 
expressed in the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Nevertheless, in Islam 
the duty of the husband to provide for the support of his family without any set-off from 
the wife's earnings, as well as other duties, justifies the unequal division of wealth. See 
Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, a t  386 for the finding that the surviving spouse 
should inherit the entire estate in preference to the decedent's family of orientation. 
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Each state in the United States has enacted a statute that 
lists the persons who are or who may be heirs to part of an intes- 
tate decedent's estate and the amounts each inherits. Although 
the list of heirs who may be entitled to some portion of the dece- 
dent's estate is relatively similar from state to state,sb there are 
significant differences in the portions of the estate the heirs re- 
ceive when certain individuals survive the decedent and others 
do not. Each state has adopted some form of fixed share distri- 
bution to determine the respective shares of each class of heirs 
entitled to participate in the estate. 
Under existing intestate statutes there are two patterns of 
sharing among classes. The first pattern, which exists in all 
states, involves sharing among a surviving spouse and other clas- 
ses of heirs according to various fixed share schemes. The second 
pattern involves sharing among other classes of heirs when there 
is no surviving spouse. Sharing according to the second pattern 
occurs only in nine states.s6 
A. Sharing Among Surviving Spouse and Other Heirs 
The differences among the state intestate inheritance laws 
primarily involve the existence of a spouse who may receive a 
85. All states list the following persons who may be entitled to part of the dece- 
dent's estate: 1) the spouse, 2) the decedent's issue, 3) the decedent's parents, and 4) the 
decedent's brothers and sisters. In virtually all states these heirs take in order of priority 
to the exclusion of all others. If none of these heirs exists, differences begin to appear 
among the states concerning the next persons to inherit: (1) eight states (Arizona, Ha- 
waii, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin) name the 
decedent's grandparents (Hawaii adds great-grandparents; Ohio adds next of kin and 
step-children; Wisconsin adds nieces and nephews and next of kin); (2) sixteen states 
(Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wyo- 
ming) name grandparents, and aunts and uncles (Pennsylvania adds children and 
grandchildren of aunts and uncles; Illinois adds great-grandparents and next of kin; 
Utah adds next of kin); (3) seven states (Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Virginia) name grandparents, aunts and uncles, great-grandpar- 
ents, and great-aunts and great-uncles, and in some cases further kindred; (4) eleven 
states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon- 
tana, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont) merely add "next of kin" to the 
list (Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota also add nieces and nephews); (5) seven 
states (Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia) 
and the District of Columbia add some combination of all these heirs (in Utah, issue of 
parents and grandparents take by right of representation; in the District of Columbia, 
great-grandparents, great-uncles, and great-aunts are not included; West Virginia in- 
cludes the spouse's kindred). 
86. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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statutory fixed sum or a statutory share in conjunction with 
other heirs. The spouse's treatment in the different state stat- 
utes directly affects when and how much the other heirs will re- 
ceive. In the following discussion, the states will be divided into 
three categories depending on the classes of heirs with which the 
spouse shares the inheritan~e.'~ 
1. States i n  which spouse shares only with surviving issue 
In seventeen states the spouse inherits the entire estate to 
the exclusion of all other heirs when the decedent dies without 
issue." Among these seventeen states there are three basic pat- 
terns of distribution when both a spouse and issue survive the 
decedent. In two states, Arizona and Montana, the spouse inher- 
its the entire estate even if there are surviving issue.89 In four 
other states-Colorado, Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin-the 
spouse inherits a fixed dollar amount from the estate and the 
remainder is divided between the spouse and issue according to 
a designated fraction.OO In several cases the practical effect of 
87. The discussion in this section focuses primarily on the shares that particular 
h e m  inherit through intestate succession, including the effect of the existence or nonex- 
istence of an heir on the distributive share of another. When distinctions affect the dis- 
tribution scheme, this discussion will distinguish between different types of heirs within 
a particular class, such as between issue who are issue of the surviving spouse and those 
who are not. Community property variation, illegitlrnacy, and simllar distinctions have 
all been omitted in order to simplify and help clarify this description. 
88. The states are Arizona (ARIZ REV STAT ANN •˜ 14-2102 (1975)), Arkansas (ARK 
STAT. ANN 61-149 (1971)), Colorado (COLO REV STAT •˜ 15-11-102 (1973)), Florida 
(FLA STAT ANN •˜ 732.102 (West 1976)), Georgia (GA CODE ANN $ 8  113-902, -903 
(1982)), Illinois (ILL ANN STAT ch. llO1/z, $ 2-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (Probate Act 
of 1975, •˜ 2-I)), Kansas (KAN STAT ANN 59-504 (1983)), Minnesota (MINN STAT. 
525.16 (1975)), Mississippi (MISS CODE ANN •˜ 91-1-7 (1972)), Montana (MONT CODE 
ANN •˜ 72-2-202 (1983)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT ANN 5 45-2-102 (1978)), Ohio (OHIO 
REV CODE ANN 2105.06 (Page 1976)), Oregon (OR REV STAT 112.035 (1983)), Ten- 
nessee (TENN CODE ANN •˜ 31-203 (Supp. 1983)), Vlrginia (VA CODE •˜ 64.1-1 (Supp. 
1983)), West Virginia (W VA CODE •˜ 42-1-1 (1982)), and Wisconsin (WIS STAT ANN 
$ 852.01 (West 1971)). 
89. ARIZ REV STAT ANN 14-2102 (1975); MONT CODE ANN 3 72-2-202 (1983). 
Both states require that the surviving issue be the issue of the surviving spouse in order 
for the spouse to recelve the entlre estate. If thls requirement is not met, then in Arizona 
the spouse receives one-half the estate and the surviving issue receives the other half. In 
Montana, if there is only one survlving issue who is not the issue of the surviving spouse, 
then the soouse receives one-half the estate and the issue receives the other half. If there 
is more than one survlving issue who is not issue of the surviving spouse, then the spouse 
receives one-thlrd of the estate and the issue receives two-thirds. 
90. COLO REV STAT g 15-11-102 (1973); FLA STAT ANN •˜ 732.102 (West 1976); 
OHIO REV CODE ANN 2105.06 (Page 1976); WIS STAT ANN $852.01 (West 1971). These 
2671 INTESTATE DISTRIBUTION 291 
this scheme is to give the entire estate to the spouse when the 
statutory dollar amount exceeds the net worth of the estate, be- 
cause persons who die with wills tend to be wealthier than peo- 
ple who die ~ i t h o u t . ~ '  In the final eleven states in this 
group-Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missis- 
sippi, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Vir- 
ginia-the spouse receives a designated fraction of the total es- 
tate, but no fixed sum.92 
2. States in which spouse shares with issue or parents of 
decedent 
In eighteen states the surviving spouse inherits the entire 
estate only when no issue and no parents survive.B3 The spouse 
states list certain restrictions on the actual amount to be received. In Ohio, the spouse 
receives the first $30,000 if one or more of the surviving issue are issue of the surviving 
spouse. If none of the issue is issue of the surviving spouse, then the spouse receives only 
the first $10,000 of the estate. As for the designated share, Ohio gives the spouse one-half 
the remainder if there is only one surviving issue; if there are more, then the spouse 
receives one-third. In Florida, the spouse receives the first $20,000 plus one-half of the 
remainder of the estate unless one or more issue are not issue of the surviving spouse. In 
such a situation, the spouse receives only one-half the estate. Both Colorado and Wiscon- 
sin give the spouse the first $25,000 plus one-half of the balance of the estate. As in the 
other states, Wisconsin and Colorado give the surviving spouse less if there are issue of 
the decedent who are not issue of the spouse. Colorado gives the spouse one-half the 
estate, while Wisconsin gives the spouse one-half if there is only one surviving issue (not 
the issue of the surviving spouse) and one-third if there are more than one such issue 
surviving. 
91. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, at  324-25. 
92. ARK. STAT. ANN. $ 5  61-149, -201 to -302 (1971); GA. CODE ANN. 113-902, -903 
(1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110'/2, •˜ 2-1 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (Probate Act of 1975, 3 2-1); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. •˜ 59-504 (1983); MINN. STAT. 8 525.16 (1975); MISS. CODE ANN. 8 91-1-7 
(1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. •˜ 45-2-102 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. •˜ 112.035 (1983); TENN. CODE 
ANN. 3 31-203 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE •˜ 64.1-19 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE 42-2-1, 43- 
1-1 (1982). Illinois, Kansas, and Oregon give the spouse one-half of the estate if there are 
surviving issue. Georgia, Minnesota, and Tennessee make distinctions based upon how 
many issue survive. Minnesota and Tennessee give the spouse one-third of the estate or 
an issue's share, whichever is greater. Georgia gives the spouse one-fifth or an issue's 
share, whichever is greater. Arkansas, Virginia, and West Virginia all give the spouse her 
elective dower or curtesy share when there are surviving issue. 
Arkansas' distribution scheme is unique because it requires the spouse to be married 
continuously for more than the three years preceding the intestate's death to be entitled 
to the entire estate. If married for this three-year period, the spouse receives the entire 
estate, provided that there are no surviving issue. ARK. STAT. ANN. 61-149 (1971). In 
Mississippi, the spouse shares equally with the surviving issue. New Mexico gives the 
surviving spouse one-fourth of the estate and the surviving issue the other three-fourths. 
93. The states are Alabama (ALA. CODE •˜ 43-8-41 (1982)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. 
13.11.010 (1972)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 45-273a(b) (West 1981)), Del- 
aware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, •˜ 502 (1979)), Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. 8 560:2-102 
(Supp. 198211, Idaho (IDAHO CODE •˜ 15-2-102 (197911, Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. 8 29-1-2-1 
292 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
shares the estate with either issue or parents, but issue take to 
the exclusion of parents. The distinction between this group and 
the first is that parents have a greater likelihood of receiving a 
share in the decedent's estate because they can inherit a portion 
of the estate along with the spouse. As in the first group, three 
basic patterns exist. In fourteen states-Alabama, Alaska, Con- 
neticut, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylva- 
nia, and Utah-the spouse receives a fixed dollar amount and 
also shares in a fixed proportion of the remainder as designated 
by statute.94 Two other states-Delaware and North Caro- 
lina-follow a similar fixed amount scheme but draw distinc- 
tions between real and personal property.95 In the final two 
(Burns 1972)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, 2-102 (1964)), Maryland (MD. EST 
& TRUSTS CODE ANN. •˜ 3-102 (Supp. 1983)). Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. $ 474.010 (Vernon 
Supp. 1984)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. •˜ 30-2302 (1979)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. •˜ 561:l (1974)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. 3B:5-3 (West 1983)), New York 
(N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW •˜ 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. 
STAT. 29-14 (Supp. 1983)). North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE $ 30.1-04-02 (1976)), Penn- 
sylvania (PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, 8 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1983)), and Utah (UTAH 
CODE ANN. •˜ 75-2-102 (1978)). 
94. ALA. CODE •˜ 43-8-41 (1982); ALASKA STAT. •˜ 13.11.010 (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. •˜ 45-273a(b) (West 1981); IDAHO CODE •˜ 15-2-102 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18-A, •˜ 2-102 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN 3 3-102 (Supp. 1983); MO:ANN STAT. 
3 474.010 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. •˜ 30-2302 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 3 
561:l (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. •˜ 3B:5-3 (West 1983); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW •˜ 4- 
1.1 (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE 8 30.1-04-02 (1976); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, 
2102 (Purdon Supp. 1983); and UTAH CODE ANN. •˜ 75-2-102 (1978). The fixed dollar 
amount varies from state to state as follows: Alaska, Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, and North Dakota give the spouse the first $50,000 of the estate; in Nebraska the 
fixed amount is $35,000; in Pennsylvania the amount is $30,000; in Missouri $20,000; and 
in Maryland $15,000. In each of these states the surviving spouse also receives one-half 
the remainder of the estate with the other half going to surviving issue or parents. How- 
ever, if there are issue surviving and one or more are not issue of the surviving spouse, 
the spouse inherits only a half fixed share of the estate and the issue receive the other 
half. Alabama, Connecticut, New York, and Utah also give the spouse a specific dollar 
amount, but it varies, depending on whether the spouse shares with issue or parents. In 
Alabama and Utah, the spouse receives the first $50,000, plus one-half the remainder of 
the estate if sharing with issue, but receives the first $100,000 plus one-half the remain- 
der if sharing with parents. In Connecticut, the spouse receives the first $50,000 plus 
one-half of the estate if sharing with issue, but receives the first $50,000 plus three- 
fourths of the estate if sharing with parents. All four states also have statutes providing 
that, if one or more of the surviving issue are not issue of the surviving spouse, the 
spouse takes one-half and the issue take the other half. In New York, the spouse receives 
the first $4,000 plus one-half the remainder of the estate if sharing with one issue, $4,000 
plus one-third of the remainder of the estate if sharing with more than one issue, and 
$25,000 plus one-half the remainder of the estate if sharing with one or both parents. 
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, •˜ 502 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. 8 29-14 (Supp. 1983). Dela- 
ware gives the spouse the first $50,000 plus one-half the balance of the personal estate 
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states in this group-Hawaii and Indiana-the spouse inherits 
only a fixed share in conjunction with either the issue or 
 parent^.^' 
3. States in which spouse shares with surviving issue, parents, 
or brothers and sisters of decedent 
The last major group includes ten states and the District of 
C o l ~ m b i a . ~ ~  These states give the surviving spouse the entire es- 
tate only if there are no surviving issue, no surviving parents, 
and no surviving brothers and sisters of the decedent. There are 
two basic subcategories in this group. In five states-South Da- 
kota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming-the spouse 
receives a larger fixed share when sharing with parents or broth- 
ers and sisters than when sharing with issue.B8 In the other five 
and a life estate in the real property, whether the spouse shares with issue or parents. 
(The fixed amount is omitted if one or more of the issue are not issue of the surviving 
spouse.) North Carolina gives the spouse the first $15,000 plus a child's share of the 
remainder of personal property or one-third, whichever is greater, and an identical share 
of real property. If the spouse is sharing with parents, the spouse receives the first 
$25,000 plus one-half the remainder of personal and real property. 
96. HAWAII REV. STAT. 560:2-102 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. 29-1-2-1 (Burns 
1972). Hawaii gives the spouse one-half of the estate whether sharing with issue or with 
parents. In Indiana, a spouse sharing with issue receives an issue's share or one-third, 
whichever is greater. If any of the issue are not issue of the surviving spouse, then the 
spouse's share in the real property is only a life estate in one-third. If the spouse shares 
the estate with parents, then the spouse receives three-fourths of the estate. 
97. The states are California (CAL. PROB CODE •˜ 224 (West 19-56)), Kentucky (KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. $3 391.010, .030 (Baldwin 1978)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
3 700.105 (West 1980) (also requires that there be no surviving nieces and nephews)), 
Nevada (NEv. REV. STAT. •˜ 134.050 (1981)). Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, 3 213 
(West 1970)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. $ 29-1-8 (1976)), Texas (TEx. 
PROB. CODE ANN. •˜ 38 (Vernon 1980)), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, $ 551 (1974) (also 
requires that there be no surviving next of kin)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 3 
11.04.015 (Supp. 1983)), Wyoming (WYO. STAT. 3 2-4-101 (1980)), and the District of Co- 
lumbia (D.C. CODE ANN. •˜ 19-302 (1981)). 
98. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 29-1-5, -6 (1976); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. •˜ 38 
(Vernon 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, $5 461, 474, 551 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
$ 11.04.015 (Supp. 1983); WYO. STAT. •˜ 2-4-101 (1980). South Dakota, Vermont, and Wy- 
oming give the spouse only a fixed share when sharing with issue, but when sharing with 
parents or brothers and sisters, the spouse also receives a fixed sum. South Dakota gives 
the spouse one-third or an issue's share, whichever is greater when the issue survive. 
When sharing with parents or brothers and sisters, the spouse receives the first $100,000 
plus one-half the balance of the estate. Vermont gives the spouse an elective share of 
one-third of the value of all the real estate of which the decedent died seised (one-half 
when sharing with only one of the surviving spouse's issue). When sharing with parents 
or brothers and sisters, the spouse receives the first $25,000 plus one-half the balance of 
the estate. Wyoming gives the spouse the first $20,000 plus three-fourths of the balance 
of the estate when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters. The spouse receives only 
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states-California, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, and 
Oklahoma-and in the District of Columbiaee the spouse re- 
ceives the same share regardless of the existence of any other 
class inheriting in conjunction with the spouse. 
4. Extended sharing with spouse 
In five other states-Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and South Carolina-the pattern of intestate succession 
does not fit into any of the three preceding groups. In each of 
these states except Louisiana, a spouse may be required to share 
the intestate estate with uncles or aunts, grandparents, great- 
grandparents, great-aunts and great-uncles, or even the "lineal 
ancestors" or "surviving kindred" of the decedent.loO In Louisi- 
ana, the spouse takes only if there are no descendants, parents, 
or brothers or sisters (or their  descendant^).'^' 
one-half the estate when sharing with issue. The other two states in this subcategory 
only give the spouse a fixed share, hut the fixed share is greater when sharing with par- 
ents or brothers and sisters. Washington gives the spouse one-half when issue survive 
and three-fourths when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters. Texas gives the 
spouse one-third of the personal estate and a one-third life estate in real property when 
sharing with issue, and all the personal property and one-half the real property in fee 
simple when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters. 
99. CAL. PROB. CODE • ˜ $  221, 223 (West 1956); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. •˜ 392.020 (Bald- 
win 1978); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. •˜ 700.105 (West 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. $3 134.040, 
.050 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, 8 213 (West 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. • ˜ • ˜  19-303, -304 
(1981). Kentucky gives the spouse a fixed dower/curtesy share. California, Michigan, Ne- 
vada, and Oklahoma each give the spouse one-third or an issue's share, whichever is 
greater, when sharing with issue, and one-half the estate when sharing with parents or 
brothers and sisters. (Michigan gives the first $3,000 of the personal estate to the spouse 
if there are no issue. For real property, the Michigan statute gives only a one-third inter- 
est when sharing with one surviving issue.) The District of Columbia gives the spouse 
one-third of the estate when sharing with issue and one-half when sharing with parents 
or brothers and sisters. 
100. In South Carolina, the spouse shares the estate either with issue (one-third or 
an issue's share, whichever is greater), with parents or brothers and sisters (one-half the 
estate), or with lineal ancestors (one-half the estate). S.C. CODE ANN. $ 21-3-20 (Law. Co- 
op. 1976). Massachusetts gives the spouse one-half the estate when sharing with issue, 
and the first $50,000 plus one-half the remainder of the estate when sharing with surviv- 
ing kindred. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, $ 1 (West Supp. 1983). Rhode Island gives 
the surviving spouse a dower/curtesy share of personal property and a life estate in real 
property. The remainder interest in the real property, and a portion of any remaining 
personal property, then go to the first surviving class of heirs from the following list: 
issue, parents, brothers and sisters, grandparents, uncles and aunts, great-grandparents, 
great-uncles and great-aunts, and nearest lineal ancestors. R.I. GEN. LAWS •˜•˜  33-1-1 to -2- 
10 (1969). Iowa gives the spouse $50,000 or one-third of the estate, whichever is greater, 
if there are issue and $50,000 plus one-half if there are no issue. IOWA CODE ANN. $ 8  
633.211-.212 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983). 
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 894 (West Supp. 1984). 
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B. Sharing Among Classes of Heirs Other than Surviving 
Spouse 
Only nine states-Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mis- 
sissippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyo- 
ming-require sharing among classes of heirs when no spouse 
survives the decedent.lo2 The remaining forty-one states and the 
District of Columbia do not require sharing among classes in the 
absence of a surviving spouse. Rather, the estate is distributed 
to the class of heirs with the greatest statutory priority, begin- 
ning with issue of the decedent, to the exclusion of all other clas- 
ses of heirs. Even in the nine states that provide for sharing 
among classes in the absence of a surviving spouse, the surviving 
issue of the decedent take the entire estate. Sharing among clas- 
ses occurs only among the parents and siblings of the decedent 
when neither issue nor spouse survive. The respective shares of 
the siblings and parents vary according to individual state 
1aw.lo3 
The preceding discussion indicates the very limited use 
American states make of fixed share distributions and sharing 
among different classes of heirs. The following section of this ar- 
ticle discusses the problems that arise when joint sharing is in- 
corporated into a scheme of intestate succession and delineates 
some of the techniques suggested by the Islamic system for deal- 
ing with these problems. However, because of differences be- 
tween American and Islamic history and social circumstances, 
many of the substantive aspects of the Islamic system are inap- 
propriate for transfer to the American system. Nevertheless, the 
experience of the Islamic system in dealing with the problems of 
102. GA. CODE ANN. 5 53-4-2 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. llO1/z 3 2-1 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1983) (Probate Act of 1975, 5 2-1); IND. CODE ANN. 5 29-1-2-1 (Burns 1972); LA. 
Crv. CODE ANN. art. 891 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. 5 91-1-3 (1972); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. 5 474.010 (Vernon Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 21-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TEX. 
PROB. CODE ANN. 5 38 (Vernon 1980); WYO. STAT. 5 2-4-101 (1980). 
103. In Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and Wyoming, the father 
and mother share equally with brothers and sisters in the estate. In Mississippi, Mis- 
souri, and Wyoming, if the parents and siblings do not survive, the grandparents and 
uncles and aunts share equally. In Indiana, the father and mother share equally with 
brothers and sisters, except that a parent takes no less than one-fourth of the estate. In 
Louisiana, brothers and sisters take subject to a usufruct in favor of the parents. In 
Texas, the father and mother receive equal portions in the whole estate, but a sole sur- 
viving parent takes one-half and the other half goes to the brothers and sisters. In Illi- 
nois, the father and mother share equally with brothers and sisters, but a sole surviving 
parent takes a double portion. 
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fixed shares may provide some insight into how we can incorpo- 
rate such a scheme into our own system. 
IV. TECHNIQUES 
In American law there is generally an order of exclusive pri- 
ority by which heirs take the estate of the decedent: (1) the 
spouse, (2) the decedent's issue, (3) the decedent's parents, (4) 
the decedent's brothers and sisters, and (5) others.lo4 At present 
the American scheme incorporates a system of fixed shares al- 
most exclusively between the spouse and children. The ABA 
study suggests that the distributive preferences of the testator 
would best be served by also permitting the following heirs to 
inherit with each other: the spouse with the mother, the spouse 
with the issue, the parent(s) with the siblings, and the son with 
the issue of other, deceased sons.105 However, much work re- 
mains to be done in this area. The ABA study does not present 
results concerning the sharing of the inheritance between the 
following heirs who do inherit together in the Islamic scheme: 
parents with children, siblings with children, grandparents with 
children, the spouse with grandchildren, the spouse with grand- 
parents, the spouse with siblings, grandchildren with parents, 
grandchildren with grandparents, grandchildren with siblings, 
parents with grandparents, and grandparents with siblings.10e 
Furthermore, this list mentions only combinations of two differ- 
ent heirs and does not refer to combinations of three or more 
heirs who might inherit together. 
Jurisdictions seeking to reform their intestate succession 
laws to provide a larger group of heirs who share concurrently in 
an inheritance will face two major problems: (I) the fear of dis- 
turbing a time proven system that has provided a simple and 
satisfactory method of distributing an intestate decedent's es- 
tate; and (2) the difficulties of apportioning the estate among 
members of various classes of heirs. The techniques used in the 
Islamic law of inheritance may be helpful in dealing with both of 
these problems. 
A. Reform of a Time Proven Scheme Through Amendment 
One problem that hinders reform of intestate succession 
104. See supra note 85. 
105. See generally Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2. 
106. See generally supra Table 1,  pp. 274-78. 
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laws is the uncertainty concerning the changes to be made and 
the fear of disturbing a system having the advantages of a sim- 
ple scheme and a long history. This fear might be mitigated by 
dismissing the idea of reform in favor of the idea of amendment. 
The scheme of intestate succession among the pre-Islamic tribes 
favored the Agnates' inheritance in a simple order of exclusive 
priority. Later, Islamic law amended this scheme to include 
fixed shares for certain designated individuals. The system of 
fixed shares, promulgated initially through three verses in the 
Qur'an, was simply grafted into the Agnatic succession scheme. 
As a result, it was possible to make certain changes in Islamic 
inheritance law without reconsidering the whole scheme of intes- 
tate succession. 
If the goal were to further the usual intent of the testator 
and allow certain heirs to inherit with others under American 
intestate laws, a scheme of fixed shares that more closely re- 
flected the testator's intent could be adopted by way of amend- 
ment to existing statutes without destroying the existing scheme 
of intestate succession. 
The uncertainty concerning the changes that should be 
made will remain until further surveys such as those contained 
in the ABA study have been conducted. The ABA study was not 
meant to be complete. However, as the need for certain changes 
becomes apparent, i t  should be possible to implement them 
through successive amendments to the intestate succession laws 
without waiting for a total picture of sweeping reform. Gradual 
change in this matter will allow greater flexibility for experimen- 
tation and should diminish the problem of uncertainty. 
B. Apportionment Through Designated Fixed Shares 
Some of the problems in apportioning an estate among vari- 
ous classes of heirs include: (1) how a fixed share will be desig- 
nated for a specific heir; (2) how the proportionate share of each 
class of inheriting heirs will be determined; (3) what adjust- 
ments will be made when the total of the fixed shares is either 
greater or less than unity; and (4) how an inheritance will be 
apportioned when only remote heirs survive the decedent. 
Islamic law has developed a systematic method of answering 
or dealing with each of these problems. This method provides 
tested solutions that draftsmen of intestate laws may wish to 
consider in adopting inheritance reforms. 
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1.  Designation of fixed shares 
Once the combination of heirs who will inherit together has 
been determined, Islamic law provides several different ways in 
which a fixed share may be designated for a specific heir: 
(I) A fixed share may be designated only if certain persons 
survive the decedent with the fixed sharer. For example, the 
husband and wife in the Islamic system receive a designated 
share of one-fourth and one-eighth respectively if they survive 
with an agnatic descendant.lo7 Likewise, the mother receives a 
fixed share of one-sixth if she survives with an agnatic descen- 
dant,lo8 and the father receives a fixed share of one-sixth if he 
survives with a male agnatic descendant.lo9 
(2) A fixed share may be designated only if certain persons 
survive the decedent and other persons do not. For example, in 
the Islamic system, the mother surviving with two or more 
brothers or sisters but without an agnatic descendant receives a 
fixed share of one-sixth.l1•‹ The consanguine sister who survives 
with one germane sister but without an agnatic descendant or a 
male agnatic ascendant or a germane brother or a consanguine 
brother receives a fixed share of one-sixth.'" An agnatic grand- 
father who survives with a male agnatic descendant but without 
a father or a nearer agnatic grandfather receives a fixed share of 
one-sixth.l12 An agnatic granddaughter who survives with a 
higher female agnatic descendant but without a higher or an 
equal male agnatic descendant receives a fixed share of one- 
sixth.l13 
(3) I t  is also possible for a fixed share to be designated only 
if certain persons do not survive the decedent with the fixed 
sharer. For example, in the Islamic system, the husband and 
wife are entitled to receive respective shares of one-half and one- 
fourth only if they survive the decedent without an agnatic de- 
scendant.l14 A uterine brother or sister is entitled to a fixed 
share of one-sixth if he or she survives the decedent without an 
107. See supra Table 1, lines 1 & 3, p. 274. 
108. See supra Table 1, line 7, p. 275. 
109. See supra Table 1, line 11, p. 275. 
110. See supra Table 1, line 8, p. 275. 
111. See supra Table 1, line 22, p. 276. 
112. See supra Table 1, line 25, p. 277. 
113. See supra Table 1, line 32, p. 278. 
114. See supra Table 1, lines 2 & 4, p. 274. 
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agnatic descendant or a male agnatic ascendant."' A mother 
who survives without an agnatic descendant or two or more 
brothers or sisters or a father is entitled to a fixed share of one- 
third."' A daughter who survives without a son is entitled to a 
fixed share of one-half."' Likewise, a germane sister who sur- 
vives without an agnatic descendant or a germane brother or a 
male agnatic ascendant is entitled to a fixed share of one-half.'18 
A consanguine sister is entitled to the same share in similar, al- 
though not identical, circumstan~es."~ Other heirs who fall 
within this category are the grandmotherlZ0 and the agnatic 
granddaughter.lZ1 
These three methods of determining the designated share 
for a specified heir under Islamic law should be of particular 
concern to those seeking intestate law reform. These methods 
require critical focus on whether an heir should always inherit 
the same fixed share or whether the presence or absence of other 
objects of the intestate's bounty should affect the fixed share of 
any or all other heirs. Although the fixed shares under the Is- 
lamic system may not prove workable in modern American soci- 
ety, they nevertheless may serve as a model upon which the 
framework of American reform may be based. 
2. Allocating shares among classes 
The fixed share described in Islamic law applies to a class of 
heirs and requires that the proportion of the estate which that 
class receives be fixed regardless of whether another class of 
heirs is added to or dropped from the list of sharers. 
The ABA study indicates that following the Islamic concept 
of allocating a fixed portion to each class would produce desira- 
ble results for American jurisdictions. If the decedent leaves a 
father, mother, and brother and sister, the ABA study concluded 
that preferences for distribution among the surviving father, 
mother, and brother and sister of the decedent was 2.5-2-2.122 
Does this mean that the father should always inherit 514 of the 
115. See supra Table 1, line 6, p. 274. 
116. See supra Table 1, line 10, p. 275. 
117. See supra Table 1, line 15, p. 275. 
118. See supra Table 1, line 18, p. 276. 
119. See supra Table 1, line 23, p. 277. 
120. See supra Table 1, line 29, p. 278. 
121. See supra Table 1, line 35, p. 278. 
122. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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siblings' share in order to reflect distributive preferences? Sup- 
pose the decedent is survived only by the father and the brother 
and sister. This hypothesized set of survivors was presented to 
the respondents in the telephone survey of the ABA study. A 
weighted average of the patterns for these three relatives inher- 
iting without the mother indicates that the distributive prefer- 
ences would still be 2.5-2.123 
However, what would happen if there were only one brother 
surviving with the father, or five brothers, or even fifteen broth- 
ers? The fixed proportion allocated to the class of siblings ulti- 
mately would require that the absolute share of each sibling de- 
crease as the number of siblings increase. The problem is not 
solved by allocating a fixed proportion to each heir, rather than 
to each class, because ultimately the father's absolute share 
would become an insignificant amount in combination with an 
increasing number of shares to brothers and sisters. One solution 
to this problem would be to vary the fixed share given to a class 
depending on the number of persons in the class. Islamic law 
uses this approach in the case of sisters, daughters, and grand- 
daughters inheriting in conjunction with other heirs. A sister, 
daughter, or granddaughter will ordinarily be entitled to inherit 
one-half, but two or more sisters, daughters, or granddaughters 
would collectively inherit two-thirds of the estate.12' 
123. The distribution patterns found in the study were as follows: 
The Four Dominant Distribution Patterns for the 
Father-Brother-Sister Relation Set (Percent)* 
Distribution Pattern by Percent of 
Percentage of Estate to: Respondents No. of 
Father Brother Sister in Pattern Respondents 
100 0 0 29.2 219 
50 25 25 15.4 115 
33 33 33 36.4 273 
0 50 50 7.6 57 
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 
-
85 
- 
Total. . . . . 99.9 749 
*1 missing case. 
Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, at 346. Weighing each pattern by the percentage of 
respondents in the pattern produces a weighted average distribution pattern as follows: 
Father Brother Sister 
49.033 19.783 19.783 
124. See supra Table 1, lines 15, 18, 23, 35, pp. 275-78. 
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Distributive preferences in the United States might be ana- 
lyzed to determine not only if siblings should inherit with par- 
ents, but also how much the proportionate share of siblings 
should be increased when there is an increase in surviving mem- 
bership of that class. I t  may be determined that two siblings 
should take a larger share than one and ten siblings should take 
a larger share than two. A maximum fixed share should also be 
contemplated in order to avoid minimizing the shares of he'irs in 
other classes. 
3. Adjustment to fixed shares to provide for total distribution 
An additional problem that has not confronted American 
intestate succession systems is designating certain fixed shares 
to individuals and finding that the total of these shares in a par- 
ticular case adds to greater than or less than unity. At present, a 
spouse is entitled to inherit a designated share with surviving 
issue or, in some states, with surviving parents or surviving sib- 
lings. The spouse is given a fixed share and the remainder is di- 
vided among the class that inherits with the spouse. There are 
some states that alter the proportion of the estate going to the 
spouse depending upon the number of issue surviving. However, 
there is never a problem of the shares totalling to other than 
unity because the shares are specified for each combination. 
In an intestate scheme which incIudes several combinations 
of heirs inheriting in conjunction with one another, the specifica- 
tion of shares for each combination might well become unwieldy. 
The Islamic solution to this problem has been to designate fixed 
shares for joint sharers with and without certain other persons 
surviving the decedent but not for every combination of heirs. 
When these fixed shares do not add to unity, the shares are pro- 
portionately increased or decreased until unity results. In Is- 
lamic law this process is called 'awl (decrease) and radd 
(increase). 
Care should be taken in constructing a scheme of fixed 
shares to minimize the possibility of a situation in which the 
proportionate decrease of fixed shares may be necessary to bring 
the total to unity. When fixed shares are grafted upon an al- 
ready existing system in which heirs inherit in an order of exclu- 
sive priority, the class that would otherwise inherit the whole 
estate will usually take as residuaries. A system of fixed shares 
that is too generous in shares allocated to the sharing class may 
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totally exclude or drastically reduce the share of a residuary who 
once had an exclusive right to the inheritance. 
One way in which the Islamic scheme protects the interest 
of the residuary is to include him in the class that receives a 
fixed share. In the case of the father who inherits with a female 
agnatic descendant but without a male.agnatic descendant, the 
father is entitled to a fixed share of one-sixth plus any remain- 
ing residue. If the father survives the decedent with two daugh- 
ters and the husband of the decedent, the two daughters would 
be entitled to a two-thirds share (8/12), the husband would be 
entitled to a one-fourth share (3/12), and the father would be 
left with the remaining residue of one-twelfth. However, because 
the father is entitled to a one-sixth fixed share plus any remain- 
ing residue, he is entitled to a minimum share of one-sixth 
(2112). Through the process of radd, the two daughters are then 
entitled to split an 8/13 share, the husband is entitled to a 3/13 
share, and the father is entitled to a 2/13 share.'26 A similar 
combination of fixed share with residue is given to the agnatic 
grandfather when he inherits with a female agnatic descendant 
but without a father or a nearer agnatic grandfather or a male 
agnatic de s~endan t . ' ~~  
Islamic law further protects members of the residuary class 
by varying the fixed share of one class of heirs as the class of 
residuary heirs increases in number. In the Islamic system the 
mother who survives the decedent without an agnatic descen- 
dant or a father is entitled to a fixed share of one-third if she 
survives with one brother of the decedent, but she is entitled to 
a fixed share of only one-sixth if she survives with two or more 
brothers of the decedent.''? This variation in the fixed share of 
the mother permits the brothers to have greater shares as their 
number increases from one to two. 
4. Apportionment of the estate among remote heirs 
As the heirs designated to take from the decedent become 
further removed and less important as objects of the decedent's 
bounty, distributive preferences may indicate that they be to- 
tally excluded from the inheritance by the survival of any heir 
existing in a closer degree to the decedent. There is no reason to 
125. See supra Table 1, line 12, p. 275. 
126. See supra Table 1, line 26, p. 277. 
127. See supra Table 1, lines 8 & 10, p. 275. 
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distinguish this set of heirs from those who inherit presently in 
classes according to an order of exclusive priority, except insofar 
as the fixed shares of certain heirs are grafted upon the closer 
set of heirs and not those further removed. If there are no heirs 
who inherit as residuaries in the first set, it may be determined 
that the testator's distributive preferences are to give the entire 
estate to the fixed sharers and to increase their shares propor- 
tionately if they do not total to unity when first determined. For 
simplicity of presentation in an intestate succession law, a divi- 
sion could be made between the primary heirs who inherit with 
fixed sharers and the secondary heirs who inherit only if there 
are no primary heirs or fixed sharers. This distinction has been 
made in the Islamic system between the Agnates and the Blood 
Relatives. 
Most American states do not provide for the inheritance by 
heirs beyond a certain degree removed from the decedent. There 
is an interest in limiting the number of potential takers in order 
to avoid the "laughing heir" (one who is so loosely linked to his 
benefactor as to suffer no sense of bereavement at  his loss).128 
On the other hand, a laughing heir may be preferred to the state 
taking by escheat. 
If a preference is found to give to the secondary heirs, it 
may be difficult to determine the distributive preferences of the 
testator concerning the inheritance of each of those relatives. 
With the assumption that the testator would prefer a distribu- 
tion pattern analogous to that of the distribution to the first two 
classes of heirs, Islamic law provides two different methods for 
implementing such a preference: tanzil and qaraba. Either of 
these methods could be adapted to meet the needs of American 
intestate reform. 
According to the doctrine of tanzil, each secondary heir is 
put in the position of one of the primary heirs with whom he is 
connected. The connection with the primary heir is determined 
in a particular way, and the right of each heir to inherit is deter- 
mined initially by the proximity of his relationship to the pri- 
mary heir he represents. If he is entitled to inherit, he will take 
the share which would have devolved on the primary heir in con- 
junction with the other primary heirs represented. Tanzil recog- 
nizes that the testator may want to benefit the nearest relative 
128. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20 IOWA L. 
REV. 202, 208 (1935). 
304 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
to a deceased relative of the first two classes in the same way 
that he would have benefitted the latter. Therefore, each Blood 
Relative stands in the shoes of the ordinary heir with whom he 
is connected. 
According to the doctrine of qaraba, each secondary heir is 
considered in his direct relationship to the decedent. Mutually 
exclusive classes of heirs are determined, and within the class 
that is to inherit, relatives who are nearer in degree to the dece- 
dent exclude the more remote. When the relatives are all in 
equal degree to the decedent, the relatives who are closest in 
degree to primary heirs may exclude others. This latter doctrine 
provides for classes of heirs that resemble the mutually exclusive 
categories of the American system, but within the class that in- 
herits, the heirs are determined by degree of relationship. 
The problems accompanying the incorporation of 'fixed 
shares in an intestate succession law are manifold. The remarks 
made here only begin to touch on them. I hope, however, that 
this presentation of the manner in which the Islamic system has 
already dealt with problem areas will help to illuminate solu- 
tions to some of the obstacles that accompany intestate law re- 
form. I also hope that the detailed discussion of the American 
system will indicate the severe lack of experimentation in the 
several states for intestate succession reform. The ABA study 
indicates possible areas in which substantive reform is needed. 
This article's comparative analysis suggests techniques for im- 
plementing potential reforms. Further study in both areas is 
needed, but it rests with the states to provide a forum for the 
testing of such reforms. 
An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of 
the German Criminal Theory's General System 
for Analyzing Criminal Acts 
Professor Dr. Wolfgang Naucke* 
Over the past several years, increasing attention has been 
paid in the United States to German criminal law and criminal 
theory. This is a reflection not only of the preeminent position 
of German criminal law in countries outside the common law or- 
bit,' but also of the burgeoning literature on the German crimi- 
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many; Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Criminology, and Legal Philoso- 
phy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University. An earlier version o f  this paper was presented 
to  the law faculty at U.C.L.A. during 1979. The author wishes to thank Mr. David Morri- 
son, J.D., who was a Fulbright Scholar at the faculty of  law, University o f  Frankfurt a.M. 
in 1979, for assistance in translating this paper. He also wishes to  thank Professor W .  
Cole Durham, Jr. o f  the J .  Reuben Clark Law School for assistance in preparation of  the 
introduction to  this article and in making a number o f  refinements in the text. 
1. See Hall & Wagner, Foreword to  Symposium: The New German Penal Code, 24 
AM. J. COMP. L. 589, 589 (1976); Durham, Book Review, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 629, 634. 
2. See, eg.,  G. FLETCHER, ETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); J .  LANGBEIN, COMPARA- 
TIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977); Arzt, Responses to the Growth of Crime in  
the United States and West Germany: A Comparison of Changes in  Criminal Law and 
Societal Attitudes, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43 (1979); Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in  
Germany, 96 HARV. L REV 1032 (1983); Clausnitzer, The Statute of Limitations for 
Murder in  the Federal Republic of Germany, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473 (1980); Daly, 
Intoxication and Crime: A Comparative Approach, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 378 (1978); 
Damaska, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German Monograph, 
29 AM. J .  COMP. L. 119 (1981); Eser, The Politics of Criminal Law Reform: Germany, 21 
AM. J. COMP. L 245 (1973); Felstiner, Plea Contracts in  West Germany, 13 LAW & SOC'Y 
REV. 309 (1979); Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robin- 
son, 23 UCLA L. REV 293 (1975); Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: 
A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REV. 367 (1973); Fletcher, The 
Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1971); 
Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570 
(1978); Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in  Three "Inquisitorial" 
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); Herrmann, The Rule of 
Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in  Germany, 41 U. 
CHI.  L. REV. 468 (1974); Horton, Life Imprisonment and Pardons in the German Federal 
Republic, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 530 (1980); Horton, Abortion Law Reform in the Ger- 
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central structural features of German criminal law, which can be 
described as the German theory's "general system for analyzing 
criminal acts." (The underlying German term, Straftatsystem, 
has no precise English equivalent and can also be translated as 
the "general system for structuring criminal analysis," or more 
briefly, as the "general analytical system" or as the "criminal 
analysis struct~re."~- These phrases will be used interchangeably 
man Federal Republic, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 288 (1979); Hoskins, A Comparative Anal- 
ysis of the Crime of Conspiracy in  Germany, France and the United States, 6 N.Y.U. J.  
INT'L L. & POL. 245 (1973); Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 753 
(1981); Johnson & Drew, This Nation Has Money for Everything-Except Its Courts, 17 
JUDGES' J ,  Summer 1978, a t  8; Kappel & Leuteritz, Wife Battering i n  the Federal Re- 
public o f  Germany, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 225 (1980); Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly: 
Nose Counting Isn't Enough, 18 JUDGES' J. 4 (1979); Langbein, Land Without Plea Bar- 
gaining: How the Germans Do I t ,  78 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979); Langbein & Weinreb, 
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978); Mc- 
Gehee, Child Abuse i n  the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 VICTIMOLOGY 215 (1981); 
O'Keefe & Czeniek, A S tudy  of the Drug Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, 32 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 488 (1977); Peltzer, The  Criminal Responsibility and Personal 
Liability of  the Director in  the Bankruptcy of His Company: Germany, 9 INT'L BUS. 
LAW. 33 (1981); Scheerer, The  New Dutch and German Drug Laws: Social and Political 
Conditions for Criminalization and Decriminalization, 12 L. & SOC'Y REV. 585 (1978); 
Silving, Comments on  Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws-A Comparative Analysis, 
34 REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE P.R. 107 (1973); Symposium: The New German 
Penal Code, 24 AM. J.  COMP. L. 589 (1976) (articles by Arzt, Binavince, Darby, Eser, 
Fletcher, Hall, Herrmann, Luderssen, Oehler, Ryu, Silving, and Wagner); Teske & Ar- 
nold, Comparison of  the Criminal Statistics o f  the United States and the Federal Re- 
public o f  Germany, 10 J.  CRIM JUST. 359 (1982); Volkmann-Schluck, Continental Euro- 
pean Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive Model?, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1981); Weigend, 
Sentencing i n  West Germany, 42 MD L. REV. 37 (1983); Note, Anti-Terrorism: The  
West German Approach, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 167 (1980); Note, Positivist Roots of 
Criminal Law and the  West German Criminal Law Reform, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 613 
(1979); Comment, The  West German Day-Fine System: A Possibility for the United 
States?, 50 U .  CHI. L. REV. 281 (1983). 
3. Literally translated, "Straftatsystem" means simply "criminal act system," but 
this translation fails to convey the structural and methodological significance of the 
Straftatsystem as a basic organizing principle of German criminal law. No translation of 
the term can be fully adequate, since there is no precise equivalent to the Straftatsystem 
within the American legal system and American legal practice. Thus, any set of English 
words will fail to adequately convey what is involved because of the lack of a correspond- 
ing institutional referent within American legal culture. In an effort to  bridge this lan- 
guage gap, i t  has proven useful to employ a number of English terms that would not be 
obvious choices a t  the level of literal translation. The word "general" is added to indicate 
the expectation that the Straftatsystem is the method of analysis to be applied in all 
cases. Moreover, the Straftatsystem is general in the same sense that the "general part" 
(allgemeiner Teil)  of criminal law is general: it relates to features of criminal conduct 
that go beyond the specific crimes of the "special part" (besonderer Teil). Not surpris- 
ingly, German texts on the general part are typically organized around the basic features 
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis. See, e.g., J .  BAUMANN. 
STRAFRECHT: ALLCEMEINER TEIL (8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL (3d ed. 1978); R. MAURACH, DEUTSCHES TRAFRECHT: ALLCEMEINER 
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in this article to refer to the German Straftatsystem.) This sys- 
tem is an intellectual framework that defines and delimits the 
approach that a German jurist adopts in determining whether 
particular conduct violates the norms of the substantive criminal 
law. I t  is parallel in systemic significance to the Model Penal 
Code's innovative "element analysis" method~logy,~ but has 
much deeper philosophical and cultural roots. This article will 
TEIL (4th ed. 1971); E. SCHMIDH~USER, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL (2d ed. 1975); G. 
STRATENWERTH, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL (3d ed. 1981). 
The terms "analyzing" and "analytical" are used because the Straftatsystem is fun- 
damentally concerned with what American lawyers would describe as legal analysis. 
More particularly, the Straftatsystem provides a structure for analyzing the basic con- 
stituents of criminal liability: whether the relevant prohibitory norm has been violated, 
whether justificatory circumstances are present, and whether culpability or accountabil- 
ity is negated by pertinent excusing conditions. Technically, i t  might be more accurate to 
think of the Straftatsystem as an effort a t  "synthesis" rather than "analysis," since its 
key function is to bring together the various constituents of liability and the wider values 
that shape our thought about criminal norms, justifications, and excuses in a structured 
methodology for resolving particular cases. But Americans tend to use the term "anely- 
sis" indiscriminately to  cover both the "breaking down" (analytic) and the "gathering 
together" (synthetic) aspects of the process of reasoning used in deciding cases. "Ansly- 
sis" is thus the better term to use in conveying the meaning of Straftatsystem to Ameri- 
can lawyers. 
The terms "structure" and "structuring" used in two of the suggested translations 
reflect the fact that the Straftatsystem constitutes not only a method of analysis, but a 
structure or structuring of thought. Perhaps these come to the same thing, but there are 
contexts in which the structural dimension of the Straftatsystem is not adequately 
evoked by the English word "system." The term System in German has stronger struc- 
tural overtones than the cognate English term. 
One further point about the term System must be made. The Straftatsystem is not 
to be thought of as a system of criminal law in the sense that one might speak of a 
"philosophical systemw-i.e., as a theoretical or metaphysical construct accounting for a 
particular sector of thought or reality. This is not to say that German criminal theorists 
have not utilized the Straftatsystem as a central feature of comprehensive accounts of 
German criminal law. They have. Indeed, as noted above, most texts on the "general 
part" of German criminal law are organized around the basic features of the Straftatsys- 
tem. Moreover, as this article contends, the general system for analyzing criminal acts 
does reflect a constellation of values connected with the ideal of rule of law (Rechtsstaat- 
lichkeit). Conceivably, in an  age more conducive to philosophical system building, a 
criminal theorist might attempt to construct a system embodying these values. The point 
for present purposes, however, is that Straftatsystem is to be thought of as a practical, 
systematic method for structuring analysis of liability for criminal actions, rather than as 
some particular thinker's philosophical systematization of criminal law. 
German criminal law scholars often refer not only to the Straftatsystem, but also to 
the Straftatlehre (literally, "criminal act doctrine"). The latter is merely the body of 
doctrine or theory about the former. No effort has been made to distinguish between 
translations of these two terms in this article, since from the perspective of American 
readers, the two blend together as a linked theoretical approach to analyzing criminal 
liability. 
4. See generally Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liabil- 
ity: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983). 
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describe how the general analytical system operates in practice 
and will then explore the deeper values it reflects and protects. 
My aim is to provide an overview of a central feature of German 
criminal methodology, and then to reflect a t  a more general level 
on the relationship between legal methodology and legal values. 
A. "Wild Postering": A Representative Problem 
For those familiar with the significance of the "general the- 
ory for analyzing criminal actsw5 in German criminal thought, 
the topic addressed by this article may sound extremely broad. I 
think, however, that the subject is central to a number of signifi- 
cant theoretical and practical issues. The nature of the subject 
may become more clear if I begin with a legal issue that is cur- 
rently the subject of frequent debate in Germany. 
German courts are time and again confronted by the follow- 
ing set of facts: A group of young people has difficulty gaining 
public attention for their political views, and to remedy this 
problem they decide to "advertise." They have some posters 
printed and paste them up as firmly as possible in as many loca- 
tions as they see fit.6 The modern glues are quite permanent, 
and the material is often bonded to the surface to which it is 
attached. I t  is usually a tremendous inconvenience to remove 
the posters or fliers, and is sometimes impossible. 
Under German criminal law, the question is whether the 
foregoing conduct is sufficient to constitute the crime of damag- 
ing property under section 303 of the German Criminal Code.? 
There are conflicting opinions, and the courtse and scholarse de- 
5. See supra note 3. 
6. In Germany this is called wildes Plakatieren, which may be translated as "wild 
postering," or more tamely, as "unauthorized advertising." 
7. Section 303 provides, "Wer rechtswidrig eine fremde Sache beschadigt oder zer- 
stort, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft." 
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 9 303 (W. Ger.). This may be translated as follows: "Whoever 
wrongfully damages or destroys an object not belonging to him shall be punished by 
imprisonment for a term not to exceed two years or by a fine." 
8. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 JURI~TEN ZEITUNG [JZ] 
70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 72; OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 NEUE JURIS- 
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1656; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 NJW 1636; see also 
1978 NJW 1637-42; Judgment of Nov. 13, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen 
[BGHST], W. Ger., 29 BGHST 129. 
9. See, e.g., 1 R. MAURACH & F. SCHR~DER. STRAFRECHT: BESONDERER TEIL 267 (6th 
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fend their views with numerous arguments. I t  is unsettled 
whether firmly pasting a flier or poster on an object damages 
that object. Those who believe that it does must turn to further 
questions. Conceivably, such property damage is justified by the 
right to freedom of speech. Even someone who does not accept 
the argument that free speech rights legitimize property damage 
might still argue that the young people should not be punished 
because they (mistakenly) thought that their right to freedom of 
speech justified their actions. These are difficult legal issues in 
Germany and they place great demands on the breadth and pre- 
cision of analysis. 
B. Fundamental Tools of Legal Analysis in the German 
System 
The German lawyer must have total command of two fun- 
damental and distinct tools of legal analysis to discuss properly 
the question of the punishability of unauthorized advertising: 
knowledge of the pertinent code sections and mastery of the 
general system for analyzing criminal acts. 
1.  Knowledge of code provisions 
Knowledge of the the pertinent code sections entails knowl- 
edge not only of the wording of the applicable statutory texts 
but also a sound understanding of how they are to be inter- 
preted. In the "wild postering" situation, one must know the 
text of section 303 of the German Criminal Code. According to 
the text of section 303, the damage or destruction of an object is 
a prerequisite for liability. The German lawyer must be aware 
that, according to the accepted interpretation of section 303, 
cases of unauthorized advertising fall within the statute's prohi- 
bition of "damaging" as opposed to "destroying" property.l0 He 
or she must also be conscious of the various legal interpretations 
of the word "damage." Interpretations of this term are associ- 
ed. 1977); STREE, STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR, •˜ 303, Marginal No. 8 (A. Schonke & H. 
SchrSder, 21st ed. 1982). For a summary of the various positions, see Dolling, 
Sachbeschadigung durch Plakatieren uom Gebrauchsgegenstiinden, 1981 NJW 207; 
Gossel, Wildes Plakatieren und Sachbeschadigung im Sinne des $ 303 STGB, 1980 
JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU [JR] 184; Maiwald, Unbefugtes Plakatieren ohne Sub- 
stanzuerletzung keine Sachbeschadigung?, 1980 J Z  256; Thoss, Sachbeschadigung 
durch unbefugtes Plakatieren?, 1978 NJW 1612; Katzer, Das unbefugte Plakatieren als 
Auslegungsproblem der Sachbeschadigung (8 303 STGB) (Diss. Frankfurt a.M. 1982). 
10. See supra note 7 .  
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ated with three different views of the interests protected by sec- 
tion 303. The interests protected by this statute might reflect 
concerns with (1) the physical integrity of the object; (2) the ob- 
ject's functional capacities; or (3) the authority of the owner to 
determine what can and cannot be done with the object." If the 
protected interest is seen as the physical integrity or the func- 
tional capacity of the property, unauthorized advertising does 
not constitute damaging property. Pasting up a placard usually 
destroys neither the physical integrity nor the functional capac- 
ity of an object. If, on the other hand, the interest protected by 
making it a crime to damage property is the owner's authority 
over the object, then unauthorized advertising does constitute 
damaging property. Indeed, unauthorized advertising unavoid- 
ably invades the authority of the owner over his property. 
Familiarity with, and the ability to discuss, these issues are 
part of the knowledge of the code that is required for a German 
jurist to work effectively with section 303. 
2. The general system for analyzing criminal acts 
Familiarity with the code, however, does not provide the 
German lawyer with enough knowledge to make a thorough legal 
analysis of unauthorized advertising. He must also be master of 
the second tool of legal analysis, the general system for analyz- 
ing criminal acts. In this general analytical system are collected 
those features of crime that are common to all crimes, whether it 
be damaging property, theft, murder, or anything else.12 If, 
therefore, unauthorized advertising is to be punishable under 
German law, it must be found to exhibit the general paradig- 
matic features of crime as determined by German criminal the- 
ory, as well as the particular elements of section 303 established 
by statute. 
By pouring the question of liability for specific conduct 
through the filter of the general system for analyzing criminal 
acts, we are adding something-and not just a little some- 
11. See, e.g., G.  ARZT, STRAFRECHT. BESONDERER TEIL, VERM~GENSDELIKTE 9 ff. 1978; 
1 R. MAURACH & F SCHR~DER. ST AFRECHT. BESONDERER TEIL 265 ff. (6th ed. 1977)'('Das 
Wesen der Sachbeschiidigung"). 
12. For an overview of the West German literature, see BAUMANN, STRAFRECHT: ALL- 
CEMEINER TEIL 171 ff. (8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLCE- 
MEINER TEIL 155 ff. (3d ed. 1978); 1 R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, STRAFRECHT: ALLCEMEINER 
TEIL 157 ff. (6th ed. 1983); E. SCHMIDHAUSER, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER T IL 22 ff., 139 
ff. (2d ed. 1975); G.  STRATENWERTH. S RAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER T IL I 57 ff. (3d ed. 1981). 
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thing-to the law as written by the legislature. My central con- 
cern in this article is this "filling out" of the code's text by the 
general analytical system. In order to appreciate how this "filling 
out" process operates, we turn first to a brief description of the 
main elements of the system. 
The general analytical system describes the main features of 
criminal action with the German terms Tatbestandsmassigkeit 
(definition of the offense), Rechtswidrigkeit (wrongfulness), and 
Schuld (culpability).13 Whatever the governing code provision 
may be, every criminal act must be wrongful and culpable con- 
duct that conforms to (i.e., is violative of) the definition of the 
offense. Unauthorized advertising can only be punished if it vio- 
lates the definition, is wrongful, and is culpable. These central 
elements are discussed with much effort and pomp in Germany. 
13. These translations of the German terminology are necessarily rough and imper- 
fect. The basic structural features of criminal action they identify and the contrasts be- 
tween them have been explored a t  length by Professor George P. Fletcher. See G. 
FLETCHER, ETHINKING CRIMINAL AW 454-504, 552-69, 575-79 (1978); see also Durham, 
Book Review, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 629, 634-40. In the main, the translations I am using 
follow those used by Professor Fletcher, but a few comments are in order. 
First, Tatbestandsmassigkeit connotes more than what American lawyers normally 
mean by the definition of an offense. The first part of the word, Tatbestand, means 
"that of which the [criminal] act consists." The suffix -massigkeit means "the state or 
condition of being subject to." In actuality, then, the German term refers not to the 
definition of an offense itself, but to the state of being subject to or in conformity with 
(i.e., in violation of) the definition or prohibitory norm (which specifies what the criminal 
act consists of). In many ways, the phrase "elements of an offense" constitutes a better 
translation of the core term Tatbestand, since it preserves the German term's ambiguous 
reference to both the norm and the prohibited conduct. One could thus translate 
Tatbestandsmassigkeit as "the state or condition of fulfilling the defined elements of a 
criminal offense." I t  is simpler, however, to refer to this feature of criminal acts as the 
definition of the offense, or as the state of fulfilling or violating the definition. 
Turning to Rechtswidrigkeit, I prefer the translation "wrongfulness" to Fletcher's 
rendition of the term as "wrongdoing." A literal translation would be "the state or condi- 
tion of being against the law" or more simply "unlawfulness." I share Fletcher's view 
that this is inadequate because, to an American reader, this might suggest that Recht- 
swidrigkeit has to  do  only with the state or condition of being inconsistent with positive 
law. The German term Recht, which means both "law" and "right" has moral overtones 
that are independent of positive law. While I thus agree with Fletcher on the major 
translation issue here-namely, that an unduly positivistic rendition should be 
avoided-I prefer "wrongfulness" to "wrongdoing" because the former preserves the 
sense that Rechtswidrigkeit is a characteristic of actions, rather than the "doing" itself. 
Schuld could be literally translated as "guilt," but the question of guilt tends to be 
thought of in English as the final determination that a defendant is criminally liable, not 
as a more limited issue about whether the defendant may fairly be held accountable for 
his conduct. "Culpability," with its overtones of accountability and moral responsibility, 
is a closer translation. 
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The discussion, however, has not achieved a conclusive result.14 
A few main points, however, are undisputed. 
a .  T h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of a n  o f f e n s e .  T h e  word 
Tatbestandsmassigkeit embraces all of the elements of a partic- 
ular crime that are found in the applicable code section. A rough 
American equivalent would be the phrase "elements of the of- 
fense."16 There is a Tatbestand or definition of theft, homicide, 
fraud, and so on. The problems of interpretation mentioned ear- 
lier16 that arise in connection with applying section 303 to "wild 
postering" are questions about whether such conduct fits within 
the scope of the definition of damaging property. A German law 
student writing an exam on this issue, or for that matter, a Ger- 
man judge deciding a "wild postering" case, would be regarded 
as engaging in improper analysis if he or she tried to treat these 
questions at  a different stage of the analysis-i.e., as an issue of 
wrongfulness or culpability. 
Demanding that the problem of determining which legal in- 
terest is protected by section 303 be treated as a problem of the 
definition of damaging property affects more than the mere for- 
mal ordering of legal analysis. This demand also aids the deci- 
sion of substantive issues. The content of the definition of a 
crime cannot be extended beyond that formulated by the legisla- 
ture. In the context of section 303, for example, the authority of 
the property owner to determine what may happen to his prop- 
erty is protected only to the extent this authority is asserted to 
prevent damage to, or destruction of, the property. From this 
perspective it would take a strained interpretation to hold unau- 
thorized advertising to be a violation of section 303, since such 
conduct leaves the property intact and intrudes solely upon the 
owner's authority. Further, the notion of Tatbestandsmassigkeit 
itself, in its German usage, necessarily implies that the perpetra- 
tor's deed ( T a t )  be unambiguously and conspicuously antisocial. 
If, however, the definition of the crime of damaging property 
were tied to the authority of the owner to control his property, 
the determination of whether a particular act satisfied the ele- 
ments of the definition would be dependent upon whether the 
property owner viewed the act as an incursion upon his author- 
14. See H .  JESCHECK. LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS. ALLGEMEINER TEIL 159-72 (3d ed. 
1978); E. SCHMIDHAUSER, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 159 ff. (2d ed. 1975). 
15. See supra note 13. 
16. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
3051 ANALYZING CRIMINAL ACTS 313 
ity. But this latter definition does not comport with accepted 
theory concerning the nature of the definition of criminal acts. 
Thus, this theory makes it more difficult to punish "wild poster- 
ing" as a violation of section 303.17 
b. Wrongfulness. Rechtswidrigkeit, or wrongfulness, 
embraces all the statutory and extrastatutory general grounds 
for holding that conduct which is violative of the definition may 
still be found to be justified, thereby escaping punishment. Self- 
defense is a classic justification that negates the wrongfulness of 
an act. The right to free speech, which some "wild posterers" 
cite as the source of the legitimacy of their activity, is a doubtful 
justification in their case;lB but it is in any event an argument 
that must be legally analyzed under the heading of wrongful- 
ness. The category of wrongfulness in the general analytical sys- 
tem not only provides the proper place for the discussion of such 
justifications but also provokes the discussion of doubtful 
justification. 
c. Culpability. The first task of the element of Schuld 
or culpability in the general analytical system is to secure the 
status of culpability as an indispensible prerequisite to punish- 
ment. A result of the culpability requirement is that the lawyer 
must carefully consider possible grounds for excusing the actor, 
even though his conduct is violative of the definition of the 
crime and is wrongful. Insanity and duress are illuminating ex- 
amples of the doctrines that serve to negate culpability in this 
manner. A party availing himself of either of these defenses typ- 
ically claims that while he has engaged in conduct specified in 
the definition of some crime, and though he has done so without 
justification, he cannot fairly be held responsible for what he 
did. 
Legal discussions of unauthorized advertising commonly en- 
counter the view that this conduct conforms to the definition of 
damaging property and is wrongful. Those who defend this posi- 
tion are not, however, finished with their analysis. They must 
take up the further problem presented by the possibility that 
the actor thought he had a right to paste up posters. In the 
terms of the theory of the general analytical system, this is a 
17. See OLG. Karlsruhe, W.Ger., 1978 JZ 72; Thoss, supra note 9, at 1613. 
18. Just as in the United States, free speech rights in West Germany constitute con- 
straints on state action, and do not confer unfettered license to encroach on the rights of 
others. 
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problem of culpability. A perhaps overly simplistic formulation 
is that the category of culpability marshals all of the arguments 
favoring a finding of not guilty that are based on the subjective 
state of the accused and insures that they are considered in 
every case. 
C. Application of the General Analytical System 
Knowledge of the statute and the general system for analyz- 
ing criminal acts are the two tools of analysis that the German 
criminal lawyer must employ in order to decide every case. The 
law student must, from the very beginning of his studies, be- 
come sure of his ability to handle both. The practicing criminal 
lawyer is, for the most part, uninterested in the subtleties of the 
academic discussion of refinements in the theory of the general 
analytical system, but he recognizes that the basic elements of 
the structure guide his work. This can be seen in the German 
courts' decisions on unauthorized advertising. Judges apply the 
general analytical system as a matter of course as the framework 
for analyzing and deciding cases.'@ 
The use of these two tools of analysis is made more interest- 
ing by a further feature of the legal landscape. The power to 
decide cases is not evenly distributed between the statute and 
the general analytical system. Rather, the latter is given priority. 
Law students learn, for example, that a statute can only be ap- 
plied in a manner permitted by the system. Every statute must 
submit to being reordered and reinterpreted by way of the gen- 
eral analytical system before it can be applied. The statute as 
formulated by the legislature is not applied directly; prior to ap- 
plication the statute is passed through the sieve of this system 
and undergoes a structural metamorphosis in that process. 
Thus, the provision of the German Criminal Code covering 
damage to property is not applied directly and verbatim to the 
case of unauthorized advertising. I t  must first be subjected to 
the strict regimen of the general analytical system. Its provisions 
must first be dissected into the categories of the definition, 
wrongfulness, and culpability, and only then applied. 
19. See, e.g., OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 
NJW 1636; 29 BGHST 129. 
3051 ANALYZING CRIMINAL ACTS 315 
I t  can be concluded from the discussion to this point that 
the general system for analyzing criminal acts is successfully 
able to force conformity with its dictates upon criminal statutes. 
Its structuring of legal materials and legal analysis transcends 
the dictates of the positive law. This is a rather remarkable state 
of affairs. In accord with the tradition in Europe since the Ren- 
aissance, German criminal law is inseparably bound to legisla- 
tion. The maxim nulla poena sine lege, with its requirements of 
prospectivity and fair warning by statute, is a zealously guarded 
constitutional principle in West Germany;20 and yet, the same 
criminal law that is supposedly bound to and by legislation 
yields to the nonlegislated general system for analyzing criminal 
acts. 
I want to discuss some troubling aspects of this relationship 
between legislation and the general analytical system. The goal 
is to justify, if possible, the preeminent position of this system 
vis-a-vis legislation. 
A. Transpositive Features of the General Analytical System 
The German Criminal Code itself does not require that at- 
tention be paid to the general system for analyzing criminal acts. 
The Code does presuppose application of the system a t  many 
points. The words for definition, wrongfulness, and culpability 
are repeatedly usede21 But this is not a consistent legislative 
practice. No provision exists from which one could derive the 
legislative intent that the structure be used in applying the 
Code's sections. 
German scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies thought that they could derive the main features of the 
general structure by studying the text of the Code.22 They 
thought of the Code as a kind of physical object, and hoped that 
by constantly observing it they could discover its inner order. 
20. GRUNDCESETZ [GG] art. 103 abs. 2 ( W .  Ger.); STGB 8 1 ( W .  Ger.); see P. BOCK- 
ELMANN, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 10 ff. (3d ed. 1979); J. WESSELS, STRAFRECHT: 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 8 ff. (12th ed. 1982). 
21. See, e.g., STGB •˜ 11 abs. 1 nr. 5 (W. Ger.); see also id. $8 13, 17, 20, 32, 34, 35. 
22. See, e.g., E. BELING. DIE LEHRE VOM VERBRECHEN (1906); K. BINDING. DIE 
NORMEN UND IHRE UBERTRETUNC (1872); F. VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN 
STRAFRECHTS 116 ff. (14th ed. 1905). 
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The structure of offenses seemed to be a kind of scientific dis- 
covery. The requirement of respect for the structure was 
founded on its status as a law of nature. 
This justification of the preeminence of the general analyti- 
cal system underestimates, however, the nature of the claim that 
this system makes. This justification rests on the notion that the 
main features of the general system are an intrinsic part of the 
Code;23 but the argument has a scarcely acceptable consequence. 
Another set of statutes-for example, a code that did not recog- 
nize wrongfulness or culpability as prerequisites of punish- 
ment-would of necessity lead quickly and unswervingly to an- 
other theory of the structure of offenses. This is precisely what 
the general analytical system will not allow. I t  is not tied to a 
given body of positive law. Rather, the theory of the general an- 
alytical system requires that all positive legislation conform to 
it. 
The fact that the positive criminal law of a particular coun- 
try a t  a particular time happens to give credence to the catego- 
ries of definition, wrongfulness, and culpability is a political ac- 
cident. A theory of the general structure of crimes cannot be 
founded on such an accident. Put  another way, the general sys- 
tem for analyzing crimes demands to be recognized even when 
the positive criminal law does not conform to it. Legal theory 
then becomes criticism of nonconforming positive law. At any 
rate, it is clear that the general analytical system is not derived 
from the positive law; on the contrary, it comes before and sets 
itself above positive law. 
B. The Propriety of Placing the General Analytical System 
Above the Positive Law 
We are left with the question of whether such patronizing 
treatment of legislation is acceptable in a legal system in which 
statute is supreme. With respect to this question, the credentials 
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis are im- 
pressive. The system is often praised in German literature as the 
guarantor of order, certainty, and impartiality in the application 
of individual statutes.24 These credentials provide some insight 
23. See, e.g., H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLCEMEINER TEIL 157 (3d 
ed. 1978); H. WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT 37-38 (11th ed. 1969); H. MAYER, 
STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 41-42 (1953). 
24. See H. JESCHECK. LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLCEMEINER TEIL 155-57 (3d ed. 
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into the vastness of the claim staked out by the general analyti- 
cal structure on the landscape of the criminal law. In Germany, 
this general analytical system is the hallmark of sophisticated 
lawyerly professionalism. Let legislators write the statutes as 
they please-our structure insures at  least order, certainty, and 
impartiality in the statutes' application. This is the first clear 
signal that the general analytical system entails more than a for- 
mal model that helps one better organize and explicate statutory 
language. Embodied within the general system for structuring 
criminal analysis are certain basic elements that are essential to 
any process that calls itself just. 
Admittedly, an explanation of why the general analytical 
system developed its particular structural features (i.e., violation 
of the definition, wrongfulness, and culpability) is still required. 
A continuing respect for these elements promotes order, cer- 
tainty, and impartiality in the administration of justice. But 
these goals are attainable in other ways. One could, for example, 
number the characteristics of a particular crime arbitrarily, be- 
ginning with number one and ending when each characteristic 
had been assigned a number. Order, certainty, and impartiality 
could be insured by requiring courts to work down this checklist 
in every case.26 
However, much more than the simple, formal ordering of 
the process of deciding an individual criminal case is sought in 
German criminal law by invoking the general system for analyz- 
ing criminal acts and, in particular, by structuring analysis in 
terms of the categories of violation of the definition, wrongful- 
ness, and culpability. These categories seek rather to impose cer- 
tain substantive values in connection with the making of partic- 
ular decisions-values that are not necessarily contained in the 
individual criminal statutes being applied. 
The substance imparted by the three main categories of the 
general analytical structure is different for each category. The 
category of violation of the definition seeks to insure that the 
criminal justice system does not impose criminal liability with- 
out first establishing that a precise statutory rule has been bro- 
ken by the perpetrator. The category of wrongfulness seeks to 
1978); Welzel, Zur Dogmatik im Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT UR MAURACH 3 (1972). 
25. Element analysis under the American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE pro- 
ceeds in essentially this fashion. It assumes that the process of carving up the character- 
istics of a crime is essentially arbitrary, and that the only genuine issue to be faced in 
making a determination of liability is whether all the elements have been satisfied. 
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insure that general justificatory exceptions militating against lia- 
bility are sought, clarified, and considered in every case. The 
category of culpability seeks to insure that punishment does not 
follow on the mere showing that, objectively viewed, a rule has 
been violated without justification. I t  forces attention to the per- 
son of the perpetrator and requires special attention to the ex- 
cuses he offers for his 
Clearly, then, the substantive values of the general analyti- 
cal structure entail a precise legal program. In order to shore up 
this program against the ever present risk of legislation that 
runs afoul of its dictates, and especially to safeguard its author- 
ity in times when the positive legislation of a country tends to- 
ward disregarding it, secure foundations must be found to justify 
and protect the program. 
In Germany, as in the United States, constitutional princi- 
ples are cited for this purpose. The category of violation of'the 
definition as a general characteristic of crime is commonly 
thought to be founded on the provision in the West German Ba- 
sic Law (Grundgesetz, the West German constitutional docu- 
ment) that punishment can only be legislatively ~rescribed.~' 
Another commonly defended position attempts to ground the 
status of culpability as a general prerequisite of punishment on 
the article of the Basic Law that declares the dignity of the per- 
son to be i nv i~ l ab l e .~~  
But these efforts to derive some of the features of the gen- 
eral analytical system from constitutional provisions are not so 
much genuine justifications as displays of the European ten- 
dency to argue for every legal conception as if it had legislative 
origins. In fact, West Germany has no constitutional provision 
requiring that, for conduct to be punishable, it must, in addition 
to being violative of a statute, satisfy the various categories of 
the general system for analyzing criminal acts. That is, the insis- 
tence that criminal liability attaches only where conduct violates 
a definition and is wrongful and culpable is not rooted exclu- 
sively in constitutional provisions. The most that one can say is 
26. See supra note 12. 
27. GG art. 103, abs. 2. 
28. GG art. 1, abs. 1. Compare H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLGE- 
MEINER TEIL 99 ff. (3d ed. 1978); W. NAUCKE. STRAFRECHT. EINE EINFBHRUNG 102 ff. (4th 
ed. 1982). 
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that the cited West German constitutional provisions and the 
general structure of offenses can be traced back to a common 
legal tradition. 
C. The General Analytical System and Just Punishment 
This tradition is the real foundation for the demand that 
the positive law only be applied as the general analytical struc- 
ture allows. The structure represents the results of lengthy de- 
liberations in the realms of political and moral philosophy, as 
well as the result of numerous experiments in real world politics. 
This is, to be sure, a rather sweeping statement. We would 
do well to try to flesh out more precisely the meaning of the 
contention that the general system for analyzing criminal acts 
imparts the most durable results of prolonged endeavors in po- 
litical and moral theory and practice. 
What is meant is primarily that this general analytical 
structure is not merely a scholarly or legislative construction. I t  
is instead a reservoir of political experience gained during 
lengthy periods of legal history. One could probably show that 
the basic features of the theory were already known and valued 
long before the beginning of the modern history of criminal law. 
The political experience that the general analytical struc- 
ture of offenses seeks to secure for the decision of every case can, 
in my opinion, be described more or less as follows: Deviation 
from the accepted norms of society should not be responded to 
with uncontrolled violence. The first reaction, rather, should be 
to try to gain distance from the deviant event. This distance is 
attained by binding oneself to a definite and formal pattern of 
analysis. 
To phrase the idea pointedly, applying the statute according 
to the program of the general analytical structure is a contrast- 
ing image to a violent act as well as to any summary execution of 
punishment. The general system for analyzing criminal acts re- 
flects the discursive, objective way in which Western philosophi- 
cal tradition thinks about a subject-crime and punish- 
ment-that offers resistance to the tendency to react to breaches 
of established norms with unfettered and arbitrary power. The 
degree to which a theory of the general structure of offenses like 
the German theory is followed is an indication, I believe, of the 
distance that a system of criminal law has put between itself and 
the direct, forceful, and manipulative imposition of the will of 
the majority on deviant individuals in society. The general ana- 
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lytical structure, or its functional equivalent, is thus not only a 
practical criterion to be applied in deciding particular cases, but 
also an indicator of the level of criminal law culture a particular 
society has attained. 
From the vantage point of the general analytical structure 
and its use, one is able to specify the position of the criminal in 
the criminal process. The structure, whose main features I have 
described, guarantees that the criminal is in a precisely definable 
legal position regardless of the exact construction of a particular 
statute. The general structure guarantees (I) that the particular 
statutory violation must be established (fulfillment of the re- 
quirements of the definition); (2) that the criminal can defend 
himself with general justifications of his conduct (wrongfulness); 
and (3) that attention is devoted to the accused as a person by 
allowing him to raise any relevant excusing conditions 
(culpability). 
The theory of the general system for analyzing criminal acts 
thus contains the minimum conditions that must be maintained 
if punishment is to be just. The demand that the positive law 
only be enforced within the framework described by the struc- 
ture is nothing more than the demand that the minimum condi- 
tions for just punishment be p r e s e r ~ e d . ~ ~  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has established that the relation- 
ship between the German criminal theory's general analytical 
structure and the positive law has a number of important 
features. 
First, whatever the content of everchanging criminal laws 
may be, the structure of offenses imbues the decision of every 
case with the results of long-term, extrastatutory considerations 
of justice that constitute some of our deepest traditions in crimi- 
nal law. The general structure represents politically, philosoph- 
ically, and morally proven traditions in a quickly evolving world 
of expedient legislation. There is much in the considerations 
that have shaped the theory of the general analytical structure 
that is traceable to particular European or German develop- 
ments. I believe some of these developments to be responses to 
29. See W. NAUCKE, STRAFRECHT: EINE EINFUHRUNG 240 ff. (4th ed. 1982); W. 
NAUCKE. GRUNDLINIEN EINER RECHTSSTAATLICHPRAKTISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN STRAFTATLEHRE 
(1979). 
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issues that are distinctively German and that do not have 
broader ramifications for other legal cultures. But it would be 
premature to treat problems concerning the general analytical 
structure as problems of a single country's law.30 Discussions 
with American colleagues have convinced me that the basic fea- 
tures of the structure are clearly perceptible in American law. 
This lends credence to the view that the values implicit in the 
general system for analyzing criminal acts have a natural lawlike 
character that transcends national boundaries. 
Second, it appears that, at  least to some extent, the emer- 
gence of a general system for analyzing criminal acts depends on 
accidents of national, political, legal, and, in particular, proce- 
dural developments. But if, as I have argued, the recognition 
and application of the general analytical system is an indicator 
of the level of criminal law culture a particular society has at- 
tained, then work on refining and developing the theory of such 
systems of analysis cannot be limited by national boundaries. 
Finally, while linguistic usage and legal conceptualization in 
the theory of general systems for structuring legal analysis may 
differ from country to country, it should not be difficult to ex- 
amine the results of national discussions of such issues in fruit- 
ful ways. By focusing on the contribution these discussions make 
to clarifying and refining the place of the criminal law in a de- 
mocracy, we can make joint strides toward a larger objective: the 
furtherance of justice in punishment. 
30. For an extended analysis of the features of the general analytical structure dis- 
cernible in common law approaches to criminal law, see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMI- 
NAL LAW 391-875 (1978). 
COMMENTS 
Philosophical Hermeneutics: Toward an 
Alternative View of Adjudication 
Adjudication is interpretation: i t  is the process by which a 
judge comes to understand a legal text and express its meaning.' 
Two opposing views of adjudication prevail in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. The first sees judicial interpretation as being ob- 
jectively constrained by legal rules and institutional principles 
that compel a correct determination of textual meaning.2 The 
second sees judicial interpretation as being subjectively deter- 
mined by personal value preferences that render textual mean- 
ing contingent and rn~ l t ip le .~  
In a crucial way, these two opposing views of adjudication 
are mirror images. Both views assume that interpretation is an 
essentially free and discretionary activity; their disagreement 
turns on whether freedom and discretion can be effectively con- 
strained. While the first view insists that effective constraints 
are available, the second view maintains that they are not. As a 
result, both views focus their discussions largely on the availabil- 
ity of interpretive constraints. In the process, however, their dis- 
1. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.REv. 739 (1982). See generally 
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 T E X .  L. REV. 527 (1982). In this comment, "text" 
connotes any written document, including reported judicial decisions, statutory and con- 
stitutional law, administrative regulations, and such writings as wills and contracts. In 
each instance, the writing is an object o f  interpretation. However, "text" does not con- 
note only written documents. For example, Paul Ricoeur has argued that meaningful 
social action shares the constitutive features o f  a written text, and that the methodology 
o f  the social sciences is similar t o  the procedures for the interpretation o f  written texts. 
P. RICOEUR, The Model o f  the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,  in HER- 
M E N E U T I C S  A N D  T H E  HUMAN SCIENCES 197-221 (1982). In other words, the interpretation 
o f  "text" includes the interpretation o f  social actions and relationships. See C. GEERTZ, 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-30, 452 (1973) (culture is an "acted document," an 
"ensemble o f  texts," whose analysis is similar t o  reading a manuscript); see also Taylor, 
Understanding i n  Human Science, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS 25 (1980); Taylor, Interpreta- 
tion and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS 3 (1971). 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 6-46. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 47-98. 
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cussions fail to examine the validity of the assumption that in- 
terpretation is free and discretionary. For this reason, Anglo- 
American jurisprudence remains irresolvably divided in its views 
of adjudication. 
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the view of interpreta- 
tion that is assumed, but never directly examined, in Anglo- 
American juri~prudence.~ Philosophical hermeneutics contends 
that interpretation is not a free and discretionary activity but 
rather a dialogical interaction between interpreter and text that 
is made possible through their mutual participation in a com- 
mon medium of history and language. In other words, neither 
interpreter nor text independently determines textual meaning; 
both interpreter and text interdependently contribute to the de- 
termination of textual meaning. Thus, contrary to the Anglo- 
4. Philosophical hermeneutics was first elaborated by Hans-Georg Gadamer. See H. 
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975). It  is a general theory of interpretation that was 
developed as a challenge to interpretive assumptions in social science and literary theory, 
which are similar to the assumption underlying the opposing views of adjudication in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Philosophical hermeneutics is commanding increased at- 
tention as a powerful critique of traditional interpretive theories in these disciplines. 
See, e.g., Z. BAUMAN, HERMENEUTICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (1978); J. BLEICHER, THE HER- 
MENEUTIC   MAC IN AT ION: OUTLINE OF A POSITIVE CRITIQUE OF ~CIENTISM AND SOCIOLOGY 
(1982); J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSO- 
PHY AND CRITIQUE (1980); H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (1976); R. HOWARD, 
THREE FACES OF HERMENEUTICS (1982); D. HOY, THE CRITICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HIS- 
TORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (1978); R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS: INTERPRETA- 
TION THEORY IN SCHLEIERMACHER. DILTHEY, HEIDEGGER, AND GADAMER (1969); P. RICOUER, 
HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1981). 
Recently, philosophical hermeneutics has gained some attention in Anglo-American 
jurisprudential literature. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Un- 
derstanding, 60 BU.L. REV. 204, 221-22 (1980); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 
Term-Forward: Names and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1 , 6  n.11 (1983); Fiss, Objectiu- 
ity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739,745 n.12 (1982); Hermann, Phenomenology, 
Structuralism, Hermeneutics and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Conti- 
nental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 398-409 (1982); Leedes, 
An Acceptable Meaning of the Constitution, 61 WASH. U.L. Q. 1003 (1984); McIntosh, 
Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L REV. 1 (1982). By contrast, 
philosophical hermeneutics is the focus of tremendous jurisprudential discussion in Eu- 
rope, particularly in West Germany. See, e.g., J. ESSER, VORVERSTXNDNIS UND 
METHODENWAHL IN DER RECHTSFINDUNG (1972); W. HASSEMER, EINF~HRUNG I  DIE GRUN- 
DLAGEN DES STRAFRECHTS 77-80, 113-159 (1981); W. HASSEMER, TATBESTAND UND TYPUS: 
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR STRAFRECHTLICHEN HERMENEUTIK (1968); J. HRUSCHKA, DIE KON- 
STITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES (1965); A. KAUFMANN, ANALOGIE UND "NATUR DER SACHE" 
(1965); A. KAUFMANN & W. HASSEMER, EINFUHRUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND RECHT- 
STHEORIE DER GEGENWART (1981); M. KRIELE, THEORIE DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG (1976); F. 
MULLER, JURISTISCHE METHODIK (1976); H. SCH~NEMANN, SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN UND 
JURISPRUDENZ: EINE EINF~HRUNG FUR PRAKTIKER 47-53 (1976). 
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American jurisprudential view, interpretation is a structured 
process of existential constraints. 
Philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct theoretical 
challenge to Anglo-American jurisprudence because the herme- 
neutic view of interpretation renders the Anglo-American debate 
on the availability of constraints for judicial interpretation 
groundless. For this reason, philosophical hermeneutics deserves 
attention from the Anglo-American jurisprudential community. 
At least, attention to philosophical hermeneutics may initiate 
the critical examination of the nature of interpretation that has 
heretofore been ignored. At most, attention to philosophical her- 
meneutics may lead to a transcendence of the opposing views of 
adjudication that prevail in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Part I of this comment contends that Anglo-American juris- 
prudence is riven by opposing views of adjudication and that 
this opposition is based on a common assumption about the na- 
ture of interpretation. Part I1 maintains that this opposi- 
tion-the difference of views concerning the availability of inter- 
pretive constraints-has captured the attention of Anglo- 
American jurisprudence and diverted its focus from examining 
the validity of the assumption about interpretation upon which 
the opposition rests. Next, it examines the nature of interpreta- 
tion from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. Part I11 
concludes that the theory of interpretation provided by philo- 
sophical hermeneutics represents a direct challenge to the An- 
glo-American assumption about interpretation and that this 
challenge demands an Anglo-American jurisprudential response. 
The two opposing views of adjudication found in Anglo- 
American jurisprudence may be characterized as objective and 
subjective interpretivism. Objective interpretivism represents an 
effort to interpret a legal text without the influence of the judi- 
cial interpreter's value-orientation, through the construction of 
interpretive constraints. Subjective interpretivism represents a 
countereffort to deconstruct interpretive constraints in the belief 
that interpretation is unavoidably controlled by personal value 
 preference^.^ Both views presume that interpretation is a free 
5. The existence of an objective-subjective opposition has been recognized in legal 
scholarship, Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981), 
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and discretionary activity-free in the sense that the evaluation 
of the text is normatively standardless, and discretionary in the 
sense that judgment of the text entails a personal choice based 
on privately held values. The difference between objective and 
subjective interpretivism lies in their disagreement about the ef- 
ficacy of constraints for interpretive activity. 
A. Objective Interpretivisrn: T h e  Construction of 
Constraints 
The basic justification for the effort of objective interpretiv- 
ism to secure value-free interpretation of a legal text is founded 
on a fundamental tenet of the Anglo-American administration of 
justice: rule of law demands that judicial interpretation occur on 
in theories of literary and legal interpretation, Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Inter- 
pretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Fiss, supra note 1, a t  739, 
in theories of judicial reasoning, Gross, The Theory of Judicial Reasoning-Toward a 
Reconstruction, 66 KY. L.J. 801 (1978); Reynolds, The Concept of Ob~ectiuity in Judicial 
Reasoning, 14 W. ONT. L. REV. 1 (1975), and in legal history, F. SHUMANN, LEGAL POSITIV- 
ISM 95-119 (1963); Kaufman & Hassemer, Enacted Law and Judicial Decision in Ger- 
man Jurisprudential Thought, 19 TORONTO L.J. 461 (1969). 
Professor Roberto Unger has argued that all Western thought is riven by an antin- 
omy between "universals" (objectivism) and "particulars" (subjectivism) that is manifest 
in the persistently irresolvable antinomies of "theory and fact" in the sciences, "reason 
and desire" in human studies, and "rules and values" in jurisprudence. R. UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 133-38 (1975). In Professor Unger's view, the universals have 
lost touch with the particulars, creating an unbridgeable gulf between them. This gulf 
results because of the perception that universals are the only acceptable objects 
thought: 
The evisceration of particulars consists in treating particulars as fungible ex- 
amples of some abstract quality. To be sure, the particulars as parts are recog- 
nized as more real than the universals as wholes. . . . Nevertheless, as the con- 
creteness of the particulars increases, so does their individuality. Therefore, it 
becomes impossible to  think or to speak about them in general categories; 
hence, given the nature of thought and language, impossible to think or speak 
of them a t  all. That much is implied by the antinomy of theory and fact. 
Id. a t  136. 
Ultimately, the objective-subjective opposition in Western thought may be traceable 
to Cartesian metaphysics. See generally 4 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: 
DESCARTES TO LEIBNIZ 74-146 (1963). Descartes's ontological dichotomization of the 
world into subject (inquirer) and object (subject matter) yielded only two alternative and 
mutually exclusive possibilities for providing an account of the world: subjective valua- 
tion or objective description. In other words, explanation is possible only in terms of the 
subject or the object; their essential separation precludes explanation relying on both 
subject and object. See M. HEIDEGGER. The Question Concerning Technology, in THE 
QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. 
HEIDEGGER. Question]; M. HEIDEGGER, The Age of the World Picture, in THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. HEIDEG- 
GER, Age]; M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 122-34 (1927). 
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a basis other than in accordance with the will of a judge.e In 
pursuit of this ideal, objective interpretivists seek to ensure 
value-free interpretation in two principal ways. First, they seek 
to minimize the normative gaps of the legal system to preclude 
the invitation to rely on subjective values. Second, they seek to 
maximize the institutional demands on judges to adjudicate in 
accordance with the general constitutional character of the legal 
system. In other words, the strategy is to contruct constraints on 
the judicial interpreter in order to ensure his personal detach- 
ment from the legal text. 
The hope of achieving personal detachment from the object 
of interpretation is the reason for characterizing this view of ad- 
judication as objective. Essentially, objectivity is a demand that 
the object of interpretation be allowed to reveal its own meaning 
independent of the value-laden interests of the interpreter.' For 
instance, in the social and literary sciences objectivity is sought 
by way of methodologies that proscribe the personal participa- 
tion of the interpreter in his work. These methodologies preest- 
ablish impersonal criteria of evaluation that are characteristic of 
the object of interpretation itself so that the object may reveal 
its intrinsic meaning.8 The assumption is that the interpreter's 
6. See generally F. HAYEK, THE RULE OF LAW (1975); F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF LIBERTY (1960); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 76-103 (1975). Professor Mark 
Tushnet has argued that legal objectivity cannot be questioned without undermining the 
rule of law and thus the unique function of the judiciary in the American political order. 
See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1206-07; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Intepretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) [hereinaf- 
ter cited as Tushnet, Following the Rules]. 
7. A representative definition of objectivity is found in F. CUNNINGHAM. OBJECTIVITY 
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1973). An inquiry is objective if and only if: 
[a] it is possible for its descriptions and explanations of a subject-matter to 
reveal the actual nature of that subject-matter, where "actual nature" means 
"the qualities and relations of a subject-matter as they exist independently of 
an inquirer's thoughts and desires regarding them," and [b] it is not possible 
for two inquirers holding rival theories about some subject-matter and having 
complete knowledge of each other's theories. . . both to be justified in adhering 
to their theories. 
Id. a t  4 (footnote omitted). For other discussions of objectivity, see generally W. 
NEWTON-SMITH, HE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE (1981); K. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
(rev. ed. 1981). 
8. One example of such a methodology is found in R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF 
HISTORY (1946). Collingwood argued that, in order to interpret the action of historical 
agents, one must take into account the "inside" or "thought-side" of their actions. His 
assumption was that historical events express the thought of their agents. Thus, under- 
standing historical events required ascertainment of the thoughts of their agents, which 
could be accomplished through "reenactment." By reconstructing the circumstances of 
the historical event, the interpreter could project himself back into the position of the 
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value-laden interests in the text, if allowed to factor into his in- 
terpretation of it, obscures the text's meaning. In jurisprudence, 
objectivity is sought in the same way for the same reason. The 
methodology is the deductive application of preexisting legal 
rules and institutional principles through which the legal text 
may be understood in impersonal legal terms, not in terms of 
personal nonlegal values. 
Objective interpretivism found its first modern expression 
in John Austin's construction of a "science of law."9 A basic 
agent, "reenactn or "rethink" the reasons for the agent's actions, understand the thought 
behind the deeds, and discern the meaning of the event. The methodology of reenact- 
ment is objective in the sense that i t  presupposes the historical interpreter's capacity to 
acquaint himself directly with his subject matter (the historical agent) and to derive the 
subject matter's own special meaning (the thought behind the acts). Reenactment is also 
objective in the sense that it requires the negation of the personal and historical perspec- 
tive of the interpreter and demands evaluation of the historical event as the agent him- 
self evaluated it. Because the agent and the interpreter share a common rational human- 
ity, the interpreter is presumably qualified to evaluate the agent he., the "text") on its 
own terms. For a recent exposition and expansion of Collingwood, see R. MARTIN, HIS- 
TORICAL EXPLANATION: RE-ENACTMENT AND PRACTICAL INFERENCE (1977). 
E. D. Hirsch's search for criteria to validate literary interpretations led him to a goal 
of interpretation similar to Collingwood's: ascertainment of authorial intention. E. 
HIRSCH, VALID~TY I N  INTERPRETATION (1967). "The interpreter's primary task is to 
reproduce in himself the author's 'logic,' his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short, his 
world. Even though the process of verification is highly complex and difficult, the ulti- 
mate verificative principle is very simple-the imaginative reconstruction of the speaking 
subject." Id. a t  242. Professor Hirsch's position has been accepted in other discussions of 
the applicability of literary interpretation to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., McIntosh, 
supra note 4. 
Some judicial interpreters have thought that authorial intention is determinative of 
textual meaning. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290'U.S. 398, 453 
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("The whole aim of construction, as applied to a pro- 
vision of the Constitution, is . . . to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers 
and the people who adopted it."). For an analysis and criticism of this theory of adjudi- 
cation, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. 
REV. 204 (1980). 
This comment relies upon Hirsch's rival in hermeneutic philosophy, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, to critique the prevailing views of interpretation in legal thought. The reason 
for this reliance is Hirsch's commitment to objectivity and his resultant inability to con- 
tribute to the transcendence of the objective-subjective opposition. For a good introduc- 
tion to the issues of the Hirsch-Gadamer debate, see D. HOY, supra note 4, a t  11-72. 
9. See generally J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 62-136 (1964). 
Admittedly, Austin is not the first in the Anglo-American tradition to advocate objective 
adjudication. Blackstone wrote "what that law is, every subject knows, or may know, if 
he pleases; for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge, but is permanent, 
fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN- 
TARIES 151. Elsewhere, he wrote: 
The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their de- 
termination or sentence, but the determination and the sentence of the law. I t  
is the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law 
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theme of his legal science was the separation of positive law 
from transpositive  consideration^.'^ The purpose of this separa- 
tion was to allow logical analysis of the positive law in order to 
ascertain the essential concepts and structures of the legal order 
reflected in it." Using this legal scheme required one to 
fix in the mind a map of the law, so that all its acquisitions 
made empirically in the course of practice, take their appropri- 
ate places in a well-conceived system; instead of forming a cha- 
otic aggregate of several unconnected and merely arbitrary 
rules. It tends to produce the faculty of perceiving at a glance 
the dependencies of the parts of his system . . . .I2 
With this legal map, Austin believed that, consistent with his 
rational description of law, the dominant method of judicial in- 
and fact . . . which judgment or conclusion depends not therefore on the arbi- 
trary caprice of the judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of 
justice. 
3 id. a t  434. Indeed, the notion of legal objectivity is ultimately attributable to the 
Greeks. Greek mythology portrays the goddess Themis with the sword of justice in her 
right hand and the scales of justice in her left. She is blindfolded, symbolizing impartial- 
ity. The assumption is that justice originates in judgments that are free from the per- 
sonal prejudices of the legal administrator. Judgment is reached only through the 
mechanical balancing of evidence that is sorted onto the dishes of the scale by other 
similarly impartial persons. Reynolds, supra note 5, a t  2. Interestingly, legal objectivity 
is not endemic only to Anglo-American jurisprudence; it is the primary paradigm of ju- 
risprudential and judicial analysis in legal systems following the civil law tradition. See 
generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969). 
10. Throughout his work, Austin pleaded for a strict separation of law as it is and 
law as it ought to be: 
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be 
or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed 
standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though 
we happen to dislike it . . . . 
J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 184 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954). Austin did not dismiss the influence 
moral opinion had on the development of law, or conversely, the influence the law had on 
moral standards. He believed, however, that the determination of moral norms upon 
which law ought to rest was not within the province of jurisprudence but was a subject of 
the "science of legislation." Id. at  127, 372. The science of jurisprudence concerned itself 
only with the study of laws once they were posited. See generally Hart, Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Rumble, The Legal 
Positivism of John Austin and The Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 
CORNELL . REV. 986 (1981). 
11. According to Austin, every legal order has the same basic constituent parts. Con- 
cepts like duty, right, liberty, injury, punishment, redress, law, sovereignty, and indepen- 
dent political society belong to every legal order because "we cannot imagine coherently 
a system of law (or a system of law as evolved in a refined community), without conceiv- 
ing them as constituent parts of it." J. AUSTIN. supra note 10, a t  367. 
12. 2 J. AUSTIN. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 
1095 (5th ed. R. Campbell 1885). 
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terpretation was syllogistic: legal classification of the facts and 
their subsumption under general rules.13 
Nevertheless, Austin acknowledged the existence of "judici- 
ary law."14 In instances of linguistic ambiguity in legal terms, 
interstices in the body of positive law, and social change render- 
ing law archaic, judges are invited to legislate rules on the basis 
of their own value-orientations.15 This reality introduced consid- 
erable dissymmetry into Austin's rational system of law.16 His 
response was to conceive of an institutional mechanism that har- 
monized particular judge-made rules with the general legal or- 
der. Reasoning that judicial activity is an extension of the sover- 
eign's power, Austin concluded that the sovereign could 
legitimate judge-made rules either by express acceptance or by 
acquiescence to their existence." In other words, judges could be 
institutionally constrained from arbitrarily legislating rules to 
the extent that they "legislat[e] in subordination to the 
s~vereign."'~ 
Austin's construction of a normatively complete system of 
law and an institutional constraint on judicial interpretation was 
prototypical for subsequent jurisprudential efforts to achieve le- 
13. See Rumble, supra note 10, a t  1017-18. 
14. 2 J. AUSTIN. supra note 12, a t  620. See generally Hart, supra note 10, a t  608-10 
& nn.33-35; Rumble, supra note 10, at 1017-21. 
15. Austin saw ambiguous legal terms as "hotbeds of competing analogies. The in- 
definiteness is incorrigible. A discretion is left to the judge. Questions arising on them. . . 
are hardly questions of interpretation or induction, for though the rule were explored 
and known as far as possible, doubt would remain." 2 J. AUSTIN, supra note 12, a t  1001 
n.20. Austin also contended that judicial legislation was necessary "to make up for the 
negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator." J. AUSTIN, supra note 10, at 191. 
In this regard, judicial legislation was of "obvious utility" to adapt law to social change. 2 
J. AUSTIN. supra note 12, a t  612. Austin noted that equity courts were created because of 
the unwillingness of common law courts to "do what they ought to have done, namely to 
model their rules of law and of procedure to the growing exigencies of society, instead of 
stupidly and sulkily adhering to the old and barbarous usages." Id. a t  647. 
16. Austin wrote: 
Wherever, therefore, much of the law consists of judiciary law, the entire 
legal system, or the entire corpus juris, is necessarily a monstrous chaos: partly 
consisting of judiciary law, introduced bit by bit, and imbedded in a measure- 
less heap of particular judicial decisions, and partly of legislative law stuck by 
patches on the judiciary law, and imbedded in a measureless heap of occasional 
and supplemental statutes. 
2 J. AUSTIN, supra note 12, a t  660. 
17. "For, since the state may reverse the rules which [the judge] makes, and yet 
permits him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign will 
'that his rules shall obtain as law' is clearly evinced by its conduct, though not by its 
express declaration." J. AUSTIN, supra note 10, a t  31-32. 
18. 2 J. AUSTIN, supra note 12, a t  510. 
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gal objectivity. Thus, nineteenth century legal formalism pro- 
pounded the view that a legal system is a closed logical system 
in which correct decisions are deducible from predetermined le- 
gal rules by pure logical operation.'' This formalist view of law 
gained widespread acceptance in legal scholarship and judicial 
opinions.'O Although strict legal formalism has been largely 
abandoned, its substance persists in many contemporary theo- 
ries of judicial decision.'l This is especially apparent among the 
"new analytical j~rists," '~ who seek to document the theoretic 
 fetter^,"'^ or the preexisting principles of rational decision, that 
constrain judicial interpretation. 
One of the leading figures in the new analytical movement 
has been H. L. A. Hart. His strategy was to minimize the fre- 
quency of the linguistic indeterminacy of rules that invites reli- 
ance on subjective values. In his estimation, a legal rule has a 
"core of certainty" and a "penumbra of In the core of 
19. See generally Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251 
(1975). Typically, the following five postulates accompany the legal formalist's position: 
[Flirst, that every concrete legal decision [is] the "application" of an abstract 
legal proposition to  a "fact situation"; second, that i t  must be possible in every 
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal prepositions by means 
of legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a 
"gapless" system of legal propositions, or must, a t  least, be treated as if it were 
such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be "construed" legally in 
rational terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of 
human beings must always be visualized as either an "application" or "execu- 
tion" of legal propositions, or as an "infringement" thereof. 
M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY A~~ SOCIETY 64 (1954) (footnote omitted). 
20. See infra notes 47-49. 
21. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973). Strict legal formal- 
ism is the deductive application of preexisting rules. Substituting "rational" and "princi- 
ples" for "deductive" and "rules" produces a broader definition of formalism: the ra- 
tional application of preexisting principles. In this definition, "principles" may mean 
rules as well as propositions of purpose or value. Professor Kennedy argues that purpose- 
based reasoning is "no less dependent on rules" and "no less vulnerable to the dilemma 
of formality" than is traditional rule formalism. Id. a t  396-98; see also Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Kennedy, Form and Substance]. For example, under Kennedy's analysis, Hart 
and Sack's portrayal of judicial decision as "rational implications of the 'shared pur- 
poses'" implicit in the "social order" ultimately possesses the same structure as rule 
formalism. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 668-69 (Cambridge tent. ed. 1958). 
22. See generally Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861 
(1966). 
23. See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the 
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975). 
24. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119 (1961); see also Hart, supra note 10, a t  607. 
The problem of penumbral vagueness is inevitable: "the price to be paid for the use of 
general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact." H. 
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certainty, the applicability of the rule to a factual circumstance 
is clear. However, in the "fringe of vagueness," the normative 
guidance of the rule dissipates, thus imposing a "creative func- 
tion" upon the judge to resolve the While syllogistic 
reasoning may be appropriate in the core of certainty, it cannot 
be employed in the fringe of vagueness, and resort to subjective 
values is i n e ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~  
HART, supra. at  125. Because of the finitude of language, language cannot be successfully 
employed for the subsumption of the infinity of unique constellations of facts available 
in the world. Id. Basically, Hart agrees with the Austrian legal sociologist Karl Wurzel, 
who compared concepts in legal rules to photographs with vague and gradually vanishing 
outlines. "Every concept in the empirical sciences has its central image and beside it a 
zone of transition gradually vanishing into nothingness." K.'WURZEL. METHODS OF JURID- 
ICAL THINKING IN SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 372 (1917). But Hart's more direct philo- 
sophical indebtedness for the penumbral vagueness, or "open texture of law," idea is to 
Waissman's address on verifiability in Supp. vol. 19 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 119 
(1945). See generally N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 12-19 (1981). 
25. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120, 144 (1961). 
26. Id. at 122-25. The problem is that linguistic indeterminacy allows multiple 
meanings, presenting a judge with "a fresh choice between open alternatives" that can- 
not be decided with formal logic but only with his "discretion." Id. Elsewhere Hart 
wrote: 
If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their applica- 
tion to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical de- 
duction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been cherished 
as the very perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what 
judges, or indeed anyone, should do in bringing particular cases under general 
rules. In this area men cannot live by deduction alone. And it follows that if 
legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational, 
their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to premises. 
. . . [I]t seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision sound in 
such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be . . . . 
Hart, supra note 10, at  606-08. Importantly, Hart contended that normative guidance 
was not wholly lacking in penumbral areas. Overarching social policies from which legal 
rules are derived may cover the "penumbra of doubt." 
The point must be not merely that a judicial decision to be rational must be 
made in the light of some conception of what ought to be, but that the aims, 
the social policies and purposes to which judges should appeal if their decisions 
are to be rational, are themselves to be considered as part of the law in some 
suitably wide sense of "law". . . . [Ilnstead of saying that the recurrence of 
penumbral questions shows us that legal rules are essentially incomplete, and 
that, when they fail to determine decisions, judges must legislate and so exer- 
cise a creative choice between alternatives, we shall say that the social policies 
which guide the judges' choice are in a sense there for them to discover; the 
judges are only "drawing out" of the rule what, if it is properly understood, is 
"latent" within it. To call this judicial legislation is to obscure some essential 
continuity between the clear cases of the rule's application and the penumbral 
decisions. 
Id. at  612. To the extent that Hart relies on purpose or value propositions to reach deci- 
sions in the penumbra of doubt, his concept of law remains formalistic. See supra note 
21. 
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However, Hart  argued that "preoccupation with the penum- 
bra" is a mistake-one that  confuses and obstructs the advance 
of juri~prudence.~' 
[T]o soften the distinction [between clear and penumbral 
cases] is to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally 
like those of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no cen- 
tral element of actual law to be seen in the core of central 
meaning which rules have, that there is nothing in the nature 
of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to re- 
consideration in the light of social poli~y.~" 
On the contrary, the meaning of rules is normally not in doubt; 
rules have a core of "settled" meaning.29 Proper attention to  this 
fact might reveal an  "essential continuity" in clear and unclear 
case a d j u d i ~ a t i o n . ~ ~  For this reason, Hart's concept of law is 
heavily rule-oriented, focusing on the normative constraints im- 
posed on a d j ~ d i c a t i o n . ~ ~  
Another of the leading analysts is Ronald Dworkin. Like 
Hart, Dworkin acknowledges the existence of "hard cases" in 
which "no settled rule dictates a decision."32 However, unlike 
Hart, Dworkin contends that  a judge is not free to interpret 
from nonlegal values,33 but  is constrained to  interpret in light of 
the political structure of his community. Hard-case adjudication 
27. Hart, supra note 10, at 614-15. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. a t  614. 
30. Id. a t  612. 
31. "[Tlhe life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of 
officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of 
variable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case." H. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961). 
32. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Dworkin, Hard Cases]. Presumably, "easy" cases would be cases in which rules with 
settled meaning do dictate a decision. Dworkin has argued that rules are applicable in an 
"all-or-nothing fashion," meaning that "[ilf the facts a rule stipulates are given, then 
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, 
in which case it contributes nothing to the decision." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 
U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967). In short, "rules dictate results, come what may." Id. a t  36. 
33. Dworkin interpreted Hart as contending that a judge, who possesses no rules to 
guide his adjudication, exercises "strong discretion," meaning that "he is not bound by 
any standards from the authority of law. . . ." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 14, 35 (1967). However, i t  is questionable whether Hart can be so interpreted. 
See supra note 26; see also Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 
823, 845 (1972) (Hart uses "rule" in a broad sense that includes principles and stan- 
dards); Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574, 596-99 (1975) (by "discre- 
tion" Hart simply means that a judge must use his best judgment in appealing to public 
standards in resolving borderline cases). 
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requires reference to the set of principles that, comprising a 
community's "constitutional morality," are "presupposed by the 
laws and institutions of the community" and are therefore infer- 
able from those laws and  institution^.^^ By referring to these 
principles, a judge is capable of adjudicating a hard case in a 
fashion that preserves the institutional integrity of the political 
community and achieves the result to which a party is entitled.36 
In short, the legal system is "a seamless web" that provides suf- 
ficient normative guidance for the correct judicial resolution of 
every legal dispute.36 
34. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t  1105-07. 
35. Dworkin's argument, which he entitles "the rights thesis," is that judicial deci- 
sions in hard cases are characteristically generated by principle not policy. Id. at  1060. 
Arguments of principle justify a decision by showing that it respects or secures some 
individual or group right; they are distinguishable from arguments of policy that justify a 
decision by showing that i t  advances br  protects some collective goal of the community 
as a whole. Id. a t  1059. Dworkin believes that principles are discoverable from the insti- 
tutional structures that are constitutive and regulative of the context in which the judi- 
cial decision must be made. In the case of a game, for example, the adjudication of a 
hard case by a referee is institutionally constrained to that particular decision which 
preserves the integrity of the game. Id. a t  1078-82. "We do not think that he is free to 
legislate interstitially within the 'open texture' of imprecise rules. If one interpretation of 
[a] rule will protect the character of the game, and another will not, then the partici- 
pants have a right to the first interpretation." Id. a t  1080 (footnote omitted). The 
uniquely correct interpretation of the rule is found when the referee reconstructs the 
game's character by posing to himself different theories about the nature of the game. 
(In this respect, Dworkin's interpretation theory is notably similar to  Collingwood's "re- 
enactment" theory. See supra note 8.) When the referee determines which of the theo- 
ries most appropriately fits the institutional features of the game, then that theory of the 
game's character guides his resolution of the dispute. Consequently, only one party has 
the right to win the dispute, which right is the referee's obligation to determine in light 
of the genuine institutional character of the game. The same applies to a judge who must 
enforce "existing political rights" latent in the combination of the constitutional values 
and substantive rules of his political community. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t  
1063. For a good discussion and critique of this argument, see Note, Dworkin's "Right 
Thesis," 74 MICH. L. REV. 1167 (1976); see also Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation 
of a Judge: The HartlDworkin Dispute, 75 MICH L. REV. 473 (1977); Greenawalt, Policy, 
Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991 (1977). 
Rolf Sartorius has expressed views that are consistent with Dworkin's. Sartorius ar- 
gues that while on occasion "extra-legal" considerations such as policy or value enter 
judicial reasoning, "legal principles" are always available to govern their use and, accord- 
ingly, "the judge is in all cases ultimately guided by legal principles which severely limit, 
if they do not totally eliminate, his discretion." Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial 
Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151 (1971). Moreover, he maintains that "a litigant before a 
court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but 
rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something 
to which the law entitles him." Id. a t  153; see also Sartorius, The Justification of the 
Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS 171 (1968). 
36. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t  1093-96; see also Dworkin, Judicial Dis- 
cretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624, 634 n.7 (1963) ("an arrangement of entitlements"); Note, supra 
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In a recent clarification of his position, Dworkin analogizes 
hard-case adjudication to a "chain novel" enterpri~e.~' The task 
of a writer to contribute one chapter to a novel-in-progress re- 
quires him to determine the direction of developments in prior 
chapters. Then, consistent with the demands of coherency for 
the entire work, the writer must advance these developments in 
the same direction through his chapter.38 Similarly, the task of a 
judge to adjudicate a hard case in the common law enterprise 
requires him to determine the structure of his legal commu- 
nity-from its profound constitutional arrangement to the de- 
tails of its statutory schemes and judicial opinions. Then, consis- 
tent with the demands of coherency for his work, the judge must 
write his decision " 'going on as before' rather than by starting 
in a new direction as if writing on a clean slate."3s Indeed, the 
note 35, a t  1169-70 (concluding that Dworkin's concept of law is "gapless"). T o  the ex- 
tent that Dworkin asserts overarching legal principles from which legal conclusions can 
be deduced, his jurisprudence may be considered formalist in substance. See supra notes 
19, 21.  
37. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U .  FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). The "chain 
novel" enterprise is described as follows: 
Imagine, then, that  a group of novelists is engaged for a particular project. 
They draw lots to determine the order of play. The lowest number writes the 
opening chapter of a novel, which he then sends to  the next number who is 
given the following assignment. He must add a chapter to that novel, which he 
must write so as to make the novel being constructed the best novel i t  can be. 
When he completes his chapter, he then sends the two chapters to the next 
novelist, who has the same assignment, and so forth. 
Id. a t  166-67. 
38. Dworkin wrote: 
Now every novelist but the first has the responsibility of interpreting what has 
gone before . . . . Each novelist must decide what the characters are "really" 
like; what motives in fact guide them; what the point or theme of the develop- 
ing novel is; how far some literary device or figure consciously or unconsciously 
used can be said to contribute to these, and therefore should be extended, re- 
fined, trimmed or dropped. He must decide all this in order to send the novel 
further in one direction rather than another. But all these decisions must be 
made, in accordance with the directions given, by asking which decisions make 
the continuing novel better as a novel. 
Id. a t  167. For a more thorough examination of the chain-novel enterprise and its conse- 
quences for aesthetic and legal interpretation, see Dworkin, supra note 1. 
39. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t  168. 
Deciding hard cases a t  law is rather like this strange literary exercise. The sim- 
ilarity is most evident when judges consider and decide "common-law" cases; 
that is, when no statute figures centrally in the legal issue, and the argument 
turns on which rules or principles of law "underlie" the related decisions of 
other judges in the past. Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or 
she must read through what other judges in the past have written not simply 
to  discover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they said 
it, but to reach an opinion about what these judges have collectively done, in 
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judge is duty-bound by his participation in the common law en- 
terprise to follow the legal history he findq40 thus, "the con- 
straint, that [he] must continue the past and not invent a better 
past, will often have the consequence that [he] cannot reach de- 
cisions that he would otherwise, given his own political theory, 
want to reach."4' 
The construction of constraints on judicial interpretation 
has also proceeded outside the analytic movement. This is exem- 
plified in Herbert Wechsler's "neutral principles" and John Hart 
Ely's "textual determinism" approaches. Herbert Wechsler's 
neutral principles approach requires judges to decide cases on 
the basis of general principles that the judges are committed to 
apply consistently in all similar cases.42 John Hart Ely's textual 
the wav that each of our novelists formed an ooinion about the collective novel 
so far written. . . . Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case 
before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of which these innumer- 
able decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his 
job to continue that history into the future through what he does on the day. 
He must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to ad- 
vance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of 
his own. So he must determine, according to his own judgment, what the ear- 
lier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken as 
a whole, really is. 
Dworkin, supra note 1, a t  542-43. 
40. "A judge's duty is t o  interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a better 
history." Dworkin, supra note 1, a t  544. 
41. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t  169. Dworkin's chain-novel analogy is a valiant at- 
tempt to outflank both objective and subjective interpretivism. Chain novel interpreta- 
tion is neither purely objective, since i t  allows room for reinterpretation of the prior 
writings in a way that both unifies and provides new meaning, nor purely subjective, 
since i t  prevents the interpreter from proceeding independently of prior institutional 
writers. In this regard, the chain-novel analogy has much to commend it. Nevertheless, 
as Professor Stanley Fish has perceptively and correctly argued, "Dworkin repeatedly 
falls away from his own best insights into a version of the fallacies (of pure objectivity 
and pure subjectivity) he so forcefully challenges." Fish, supra note 5, a t  552. Dworkin 
"posits for the first novelist a freedom that is equivalent t o  the freedom assumed by 
those who believe that  judges (and other interpreters) are bound only by their personal 
preferences and desires . . . ." Id. a t  555. Moreover, he views later novelists as "bound by 
a previous history in a way that would be possible only if the shape and significance of 
that history were self-evident." Id. 
42. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
11-12, 15 (1959). 
[Tlhe main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genu- 
inely principled, resting with respect t o  every step that is involved in reaching 
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that 
is achieved[,] . . . [resting] on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, 
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles 
imply[.] 
H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 21 (1961); see also Bork, 
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determinism requires judges to look only to the words of the 
document and, when faced with opaque terms, to the intent of 
those who wrote it. In Ely's view, judges "should confine them- 
selves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in 
the written Constitution . . . ."43 In essence, both of these theo- 
ries assert that the proper institutional role of judicial interpret- 
ers is to follow the available norms in good faith and to commit 
to the logical implications of their appli~ation.~' 
The common element in each of the legal theories 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,6-7 (1971) (ad- 
vocating a requirement that decisions rest on principles that are neutral in content and 
application); Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amend- 
ment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1113-14 (1980) 
(arguing that the ruling in Harris v. McRae was inconsistent with the operative principle 
of Roe v. Wade and criticizing the Court for not being principled). 
In his criticism of Wechsler, Professor Martin Shapiro observed an essential objec- 
tivism in the "neutral principles" approach: 
[Nleutral principles or standards are really the objective and eternal rules em- 
bedded in a "Blackstonian" body of law and the Constitution, which the judge 
discovers and applies to the case before him. When the defenders of neutral 
principles speak of the judge as motivated by reason, not will, they visualize 
the common law judge who did not command (make law) but simply discov- 
ered by deductive and analogical reasoning which of the great verities of the 
common law controlled the particular set of facts before him. Since the com- 
mon law itself was the embodiment of reason and was applied by a purely 
reasonable process, there was no need of, nor could there be any room for, 
judicial prejudice, fiat, or preference. 
Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral 
Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 593 (1963) (footnote omitted). 
43. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1, 3, 13-17 (1980). Professor Ely felt secure in 
asserting that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided because he found it obvious that the 
purported right there vindicated was based on no "value inferable from the Constitu- 
tion" and "lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special." Ely, The 
Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933, 949 (1973). 
Professor Ely's understanding of interpretation resembles Professor Thomas Grey's. See 
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolu- 
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Grey, Do We Have a n  Unwritten Consti- 
tution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). 
The term "textual determinism" is adopted from Professor Owen Fiss who appropri- 
ately found the term that  usually attaches to  Ely's work, "interpretivism," to be misde- 
scriptive. Fiss, supra note 1, a t  743. As will be shown in part I1 of this comment, inter- 
pretation is in fact much more than that contemplated in Professor Ely's approach. 
Professor Ely's "textual determinism" facially resembles Professor George Christie's 
objectivism. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311 (1969). Concluding that 
contemporary legal theorists had failed to "confirm our intuition that judicial decision- 
making is objective," Professor Christie argued that only "those marks on paper called 
statutes and cases" could be accepted as the fixed reference points for judicial interpre- 
tation. Id. a t  1326. 
44. See Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 6 (arguing that Ely's and Wechs- 
ler's theories are inconsistent with liberalism). 
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presented-Austin's legal science, Hart's minimization of pen- 
umbral doubt, Dworkin's hard case argument, Wechsler's neu- 
tral principles, and Ely's textual determinism-is the effort to 
ensure that the legal text is interpreted without the influence of 
the judicial interpreter's value-orientation. In each case, norma- 
tive gaps in the body of law are minimized, and institutional de- 
mands on the judicial interpreter are maximized, with the design 
of ensuring that the legal text is interpreted in harmony with 
the external legal order. However, this common effort makes 
sense only if the judicial interpreter is viewed as being free to 
determine the outcome of his interpretation in accordance with 
personal value preferences. In other words, by constructing in- 
terpretive constraints, each theory presumes that interpretation 
is an activity in need of constraint because i t  is fundamentally 
free and discretionary. 
This presumption is evidenced in Dworkin's chain novel 
analogy. Dworkin maintains that the contributor of a chapter to 
the novel-in-progress must be seriously committed to continue 
the work of his  predecessor^;^^ indeed, he must be duty-bound to 
"advance the enterprise in hand."46 In other words, an aware- 
ness on the part of the novelist and the judge of their responsi- 
bility to the corporate enterprise will supposedly check a temp- 
tation to strike out in some direction of their own. Only with a 
sense of duty to the enterprise will the novelist and the judge 
comport themselves as partners in the chain rather than as free 
and independent agents. In short, the entire account depends on 
the possibility of novelists and judges (both interpreters) com- 
porting themselves in some fashion that is inconsistent with the 
chain enterprise; i.e., in a free and discretionary fashion. The 
question then becomes whether novelists and judges can com- 
port themselves in a fashion inconsistent with the chain enter- 
prise. If one assumes that the answer is yes, then one must see 
that interpretation as free. If one assumes that the answer is no, 
then one must see interpretation as something entirely different. 
As will be argued in parts 11 and I11 of this comment, interpreta- 
tion is something different from that presumed by objective 
interpretivists. 
45. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 167 ("[IJn this case the novelists are expected to take 
their responsibilities seriously, and to recognize the duty to create, so far as they can, a 
single unified novel rather than, for example, a series of independent short stories with 
characters bearing the same names."). 
46. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 543. 
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B. Subjective Interpretiuism: The Uncontrollable Assertion 
of Values 
Objective interpretivism has not gone without critical re- 
sponse. In the early part of the twentieth century, a growing ten- 
dency towards objective formalism in legal ed~cat ion ,~ '  legal 
s c h o l a r ~ h i p , ~ ~  and judicial opinions49 sparked the vigorous 
countermovement of legal realism.60 Legal realism had many dis- 
47. In legal education, Christopher C. Langdell's case-method approach to the study 
of law was gaining widespread acceptance in the law schools. Professor Rumble has sug- 
gested that this was the "signal event" in the emergence of legal realism. Rumble, supra 
note 10, a t  996. 
Langdell's case method presumed that the law consisted of certain principles and 
rules that could be distilled out of selected cases because legal doctrines evolved slowly 
and traceably in relatively few key cases. He argued that the number of legal principles 
and rules is "much less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in'which 
the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to which 
legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension." 
C. LANGDELL. A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii-ix (2d ed. 1879). 
Consequently, "[tlhe vast majority [of cases] are useless, and worse than useless, for any 
purpose of systematic study." Id. a t  viii. In order to find the rules of law, a jurist need 
only analyze the key cases in the evolution of a legal doctrine. Once in possession of 
these rules, the "true lawyer" would apply them "with constant facility and certainty to 
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs." Id. 
48. In legal scholarship, the American Law Institute undertook its first attempt to 
restate the law in order to clarify the fundamental principles behind the "swamp of deci- 
sions." Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the Committee, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 
pt. 2, 48, 52 (1923). The ALI was established because of the growing recognition that the 
law is uncertain. "[TJhe confusion, the uncertainty, [is] growing worse from year to 
year. . . . [Wlhatever authority might be found for one view of the law upon any topic, 
other authorities could be found for a different view . . . . [Tlhe law [is] becoming 
guesswork." Id. a t  48-49. 
Similarly, legal scholars such as Joseph Beale and Samuel Williston asserted that 
the varied issues in their fields, conflicts of law and contracts respectively, were governed 
by unified bodies of legal doctrine. See 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
92-94 (1935) (determination of domicile has certain automatic legal consequences that 
apply regardless of circumstance). See generally S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(1920) (deriving the law of contracts from few general principles of universal appli- 
cability). 
49. In federal and state judicial opinions, social legislation was invalidated partly on 
the "logic" of general constitutional concepts such as liberty of contract and substantive 
due process. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 US.  45 (1905); see also Allaire v. St. 
Luke's Hosp., 184 111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). 
50. See generally T. BENDITT. LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE (1978); G. GILMORE, THE 
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-98 (1977); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 1-135 
(1968); R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). 
Langdell's case method approach was criticized for its exclusive focus on the opera- 
tion of rules in judicial decisions. According to William 0. Douglas, such a focus 
grossly oversimplifies and distorts the nature of law. After all, law is neither 
more nor less than a prediction of what a governmental agency or other agency 
of control will do under a given situation. A study of the legal literature exem- 
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sonant voices; however, these voices achieved harmony in the be- 
lief that a legal text has any number of possible meanings, that 
interpretation consists of choosing one of those meanings, and 
that selecting a particular meaning forces the judge to express 
his own values. In short, legal realism contended that interpreta- 
tion is an uncontrollably subjective value-based activity. Legal 
realism is thus the basic expression of subjective interpretivism 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Legal realism originates with distrust of "the theory that 
traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily opera- 
tive factor in producing court  decision^."^' This "rule-skepti- 
plified by judicial opinions supplies part, but only part, of the material neces- 
sary to make such a prediction. The other psychological, political, economic, 
business, social factors necessary to complete that prediction are innumerable. 
The weakness of the old system was that all of these more general and impon- 
derable factors were eliminated from consideration. I t  was for that reason that 
the nonconformists in legal education began to raise disconcerting notes. 
W. DOUGLAS, Education for the Law, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND 
PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURI- 
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 278, 280 (1969). 
Williston's scholarship in contracts was criticized, for example, for presupposing the 
unity of the legal universe, a notion impossible to reconcile with the totality of judicial 
decisions. The "legal universe," wrote Walter Wheeler Cook, "is far more complex than 
that visualized by the more orthodox writers of whom Professor Williston is an exam- 
ple." Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 497, 514 (1939). Cook argued that a 
unified body of legal doctrines could be maintained only if one completely ignored some 
judicial decisions or failed to distinguish consistently between actual holdings and dicta. 
According to Cook, Williston's treatise on contracts illustrated both these vices. Id. a t  
499, 514. For a contemporary critique of recently perceived formalizations of law, see 
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
387 (1981). 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound were vigorous in their condemnation of 
judges who decided cases solely in a formally deductive manner from legal generaliza- 
tions. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 16 (1910); Pound, 
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454,457, 478-80 (1909). Holmes, for instance, criticized 
analysis that relied on the logical compulsion of legal generalizations to  reach particular 
conclusions. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York, 
198 US.  45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes insisted upon the role of uncon- 
scious factors in reaching decisions. "The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition 
more subtle than any articulate major premise." Id. This skepticism towards general 
rules as a means of compelling particular decisions and this insistence on the role of 
unconscious factors in the adjudicatory process found resonance in the realist movement 
as two of its central themes. See W. RUMBLE, supra, a t  39-40. 
51. K. LLEWELLYN. JURISPRUDENCE: R ALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 56 (1962). 
"[Tlhe theory that rules decide cases seems for a century to have fooled not only library- 
ridden recluses, but judges. More, to have fooled even those skillful and hard-bitten first- 
hand observers of judicial work: the practitioners." Llewellyn, The Constitution as  a n  
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1934). 
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c i ~ m " ~ ~  was motivated by the interpretive malleability and nor- 
mative ambiguity of legal materials. For example, Karl 
Llewellyn observed two judicial techniques of case construction 
that permit either an extremely narrow or an extremely wide ap- 
plication of p r e ~ e d e n t . ~ ~  With the "strict" or "orthodox" tech- 
nique, a judge can, "through examination of the facts or of the 
procedural issue, narrow the picture of what was actually before 
the court and can hold that the ruling made requires it to be 
understood as thus restricted."" In other words, a judge can, if 
he desires, limit the authoritative value of an "unwelcome prece- 
dent" by so narrowly confining it to its particular facts that its 
ruling could be made to apply only to "red-headed Walpoles in 
pale magenta Buick cars."bb By contrast, the "loose view of pre- 
cedent" holds that once "a court has decided . . . any point or all 
points on which it chose to rest a case," then "[nlo matter how 
broad the statement, no matter how unnecessary on the facts or 
the procedural issues, if that was the rule the court laid down, 
then that the court has held."" The judge can, if he chooses, 
capitalize on "welcome precedents" for the purpose of authorita- 
tively supporting any proposition he  desire^.^' Essentially, the 
same judicial techniques were thought to be available for statu- 
tory cons t ru~ t ion .~~  
This range of interpretive possibilities for case and statu- 
tory materials decreased their normative value for the realists. 
52. This term appears to have been coined by Jerome Frank. See J .  FRANK. LAW AND 
THE MODERN MIND (1949). Professor Rumble treats this term as being descriptive of the 
main currents of the realist movement. See W. RUMBLE, supra note 50, a t  48-106. But for 
an  argument distinguishing influential realist Karl Llewellyn's work from "rule-skepti- 
cism," see W. TWINING. KARL LLEWELLYN A D THE REALIST MOVEMENT 408 n.22 (1973). In 
any event, rule-skepticism for the realists did not mean that judges completely disre- 
garded rules in adjudication but only that rules were one factor among many, including 
social, moral and psychological factors, which influenced judicial decisions. W. RUMBLE, 
supra note 50, a t  189-90. 
53. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66-68 (1960). In an earlier book, Llewellyn 
explicated 64 techniques of precedential construction. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 77-91 (1960) [hereinafter cited as K. LLEWELLYN, TRADITION]. 
54. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66 (1960). 
55. Id. a t  67. 
56. Id. a t  67-68. 
57. Id. a t  68. 
58. "[Algain and again . . . I have had to insist that the range of techniques correctly 
available in dealing with statutes is roughly equivalent to the range correctly available in 
dealing with case law materials." K. LLEWELLYN, TRADITION, supra note 53, a t  371. Llew- 
ellyn listed 47 examples of contradictory, yet legally acceptable, canons of statutory con- 
struction, id. a t  522-35, to illustrate that "there are two opposing canons on almost every 
point." Id. a t  521. 
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But the realists maintained that such normative ambiguity was 
inconsequential in comparison to the equivocity resulting from 
the plethora of squarely conflicting judicial decisions. For exam- 
ple, Benjamin Cardozo believed that every legal precedent could 
be matched by another reaching an opposite conclusion.5s Con- 
sequently, a judge could find precedential authority for any pro- 
position on nearly any issue.'O 
The absence of consistent normative guidance from legal 
materials had two important consequences for the realists' pic- 
ture of judicial interpretation. First, the normative void necessi- 
tated judicial choice; it "disposes of all questions of 'control' or 
dictation by pre~edent."~' With conflict among precedential au- 
thorities, a judge was compelled to choose from among them the 
authority that best assisted him in resolving his case. The au- 
thority he chose to rely upon was solely within his control; he 
possessed "sovereign prerogative of ~hoice."'~ As Herman Oli- 
phant pictured the necessity of judicial choice, every case con- 
sidered by judge or student "rests at  the center of a vast and 
empty stadium. The angle and distance from which that case is 
viewed involves the choice of a seat. Which shall be chosen? 
Neither judge nor student can escape the fact that he can and 
60. Belief in the plurality of judicial authority on any issue was virtually universal 
among the realists. See, e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 
(1908) (Justice Holmes portrayed judicial decision as a balancing of opposed principles); 
B. CARDOZO, supra note 59, a t  40 (one principle or precedent often is matched by another 
pointing to an opposite conclusion); J. FRANK, supra note 52, a t  111 n.2 ("You will al- 
most always find plenty of cases to cite in your favor."); K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  
339 ("Our whole body of authoritatively accepted ways of dealing with authorities . . . is 
a body which allows the court to select among anywhere from two to ten 'correct' alter- 
natives in something like eight or nine appealed cases out of ten."); Cohen, The 
Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5, 11 (1937) (cases often pre- 
sent "a plaintiff principle and a defendant principle," each opposing the other); Corbin, 
The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234, 246 (1914) (prior judicial decisions "are not 
harmonious; in them can be found authority for both sides of almost any question"); 
Dickinson, The Law Behind Law: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 285, 298 (1929) (broad general 
principles of the law have a significant habit of traveling in pairs of opposites); Douglas, 
Stare Decisis, in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 18, 19 
(1963) ("[Tlhere are usually plenty of precedents to go around; and with the accumula- 
tion of decisions, it is no great problem for the lawyer to find legal authority for most 
propositions."). 
61. K. LLEWELLYN, TRADITION, supra note 53, a t  76. 
62. O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
210, 239 (1920), quoted in E. Ros~ow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE xiii (1962). 
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must choose."s3 In sum, judges, not rules, possessed the critical 
function in case adjudication. 
The second consequence of the normative void for the real- 
ists' picture of adjudication was that judicial choice could be 
made and justified only on extralegal grounds. Llewellyn rea- 
soned that if conflicting legal premises are available, then "there 
is a choice in the case; a choice to be justified; a choice which 
can be justified only as a question of policy-for the authorita- 
tive tradition speaks with a forked t~ngue."'~ In other words, 
without the authority of dispositive rules, judges could only re- 
sort to nonlegal values to resolve disputes. Some realists hoped 
that the extralegal grounds the judge used to justify his decision 
would be considerations of the social consequences of his in- 
tended decision as weighed against possible alternative deci- 
sions. In the balancing of possible social consequences resulting 
from his decision, the judge became, for the realists, a kind of 
social engineer, and the law became his instrument to facilitate 
social progress and j~st ice. '~ 
63. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J .  71, 73 (1928). 
64. K.'LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  70. Felix Cohen made a similar statement: 
"[Nlo one of these rules [of prior cases] has any logical priority; courts and lawyers 
choose among competing propositions on extra-logical grounds." F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYS- 
TEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS. AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM 35 n.47 
(1959). 
65. This instrumental aspect of legal realism was the result of the influence of Wil- 
liam James's and John Dewey's philosophical pragmatism. See generally W. RUMBLE, 
supra note 50, a t  4-20, 72-78; R. SUMMERS, supra note 50, a t  22-35. The pragmatists were 
antiformalist thinkers. William James stressed that theorists should turn "away from 
abstraction . . . , from verbal solutions, from had a priori reasons, from fixed principles, 
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins." W. JAMES, What Pragmatism 
Means, in THE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM JAMES 376, 379 (J. McDermott ed. 1968). Instead, 
theorists should adopt a "pragmatic" orientation, by "looking away from first things, 
principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and . . . looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts." Id. a t  380 (emphasis omitted). This "pragmatic method," or result- 
orientation, was concerned with the "ways in which existing realities may be changed." 
Id. Similarly, John Dewey argued that theoretical decision-making should be result-ori- 
ented. "The problem is not to draw a conclusion from given premises; that can best be 
done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering a keyboard. The problem is t o  find 
statements of general principle and of particular fact which are worthy to serve as prem- 
ises." J. DEWEY, PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION 134 (1931). Thus, the "logic of rigid dem- 
onstration" must be replaced by a "logic of search and discovery," a "logic relative to 
consequences rather than to antecedents," a "logic of inquiry into probable conse- 
quences." Id. a t  138-39; see also J .  DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938); J. 
DEWEY, ESSAYS I N  EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC (1916). 
This result-orientation was picked up by the realists. Llewellyn wrote that realistic 
jurisprudence "fits into the pragmatic and instrumental developments in logic." K. 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  28. With society in a constant state of flux, "and in flux 
typically faster than the law, . . . the probability is always given that any portion of law 
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But other realists believed that the justification of the judi- 
cial decision would not be socially instrumental, but subjectively 
intuitive. Psychology teaches, wrote Jerome Frank, that "the 
process of judging" does not begin at  a premise and proceed to a 
conc lu~ion .~~  "Judging begins rather t.he other way around-with 
a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily 
starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find prem- 
ises which will substantiate it."67 Frank argued that the same 
must apply to judges. 
Now, since the judge is a human being and since no 
human being in his normal thinking processes arrives a t  deci- 
sions (except in dealing with a limited number of simple situa- 
tions) by the route of . . . syllogistic reasoning, it  is fair to as- 
sume that the judge, merely by putting on the judicial ermine, 
will not acquire so artificial a method of reasoning. Judicial 
judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are 
worked out backward from conclusions tentatively formu- 
lated.68 
Frank believed the formulation of the conclusion, whether done 
vaguely, tentatively, or expressly was an expression of the "sub- 
jective sense of justice inherent in the 
Other realists also believed that judicial intuitions about the 
particular justice of a case motivated judges to resolve that case 
in a particular way. Llewellyn wrote that the judicial mind is 
driven by a sense of "Justice-for-All-of-Us."70 Benjamin Cardozo 
argued that a judge's decision in choosing between alternative 
standards is based on the "conviction in the judicial mind7' that 
the standard selected leads to " j~ s t i c e . "~~  Finally, according to 
Judge Frank Hutcheson, judicial decisions are reached by an in- 
needs reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it  purports to serve." Id. a t  
55. Thus, the realists advocated an examination of law to the end that it might be made 
adaptable to man's own ends. "A good deal of fruitless controversy has arisen out of 
attempts to show that [a] definition of law. . . is either true or false," wrote Felix Cohen. 
"A definition of law is useful or useless. I t  is not true or false, any more than a New 
Year's resolution or an insurance policy." F. COHEN. Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 
33, 62 (L. Cohen ed. 1970). 
66. J. FRANK. supra note 52, a t  100. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. a t  101 (citation omitted). 
69. Id. a t  281 (citation and emphasis omitted). 
70. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, a t  339. 
71. B. CARDOZO, supra note 59, a t  41. 
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tuitive "hunch."72 "[Tlhe judge really decides by feeling, and not 
by judgment; by 'hunching' and not by ratiocination . . . ."73 For 
Judge Hutcheson, "the vital, motivating impulse for the Ijudi- 
cial] decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for 
that cause."74 
For some legal realists, judicial intuitionism was simply in- 
adequate for a theory of adjudi~ation.'~ Having raised profound 
skepticism in the objective formalist model of adjudication, 
some realists felt compelled to provide some hope for legal con- 
sistency and certainty. Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the 
principle of hope: predictionism. 
People want to know under what circumstances and how far 
they will run the risk of coming up against what is so much 
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to 
find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our 
study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the 
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.76 
72. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial 
Decision, 14 CORNELL .Q. 274 (1929); cf. Prott, Updating the Judicial "Hunch": 
Esserk Concept of Judicial Predisposition, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 461 (1978) (inaccurately 
comparing a German theorist's legal hermeneutic theory with Hutcheson's "hunch" 
notion). 
73. Hutcheson, supra note 72, a t  285. 
74. Id. John Rawls has written the following in contrasting systematic theories of 
justice with the intuitionist-pluralist perspective: 
Intuitionist theories, then, have two features: first, they consist of a plurality of 
first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular 
types of cases: and second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules, 
for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a 
balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right. 
J .  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34 (1971). This is an apt description of the ground of 
legal realism's judicial intuitionism. 
75. This inadequacy was observed from without the ranks of legal realism: 
They have assured us of the immense range of irrational considerations enter- 
ing into the judicial process, the subjectivity necessarily inherent in judicial 
determinations, the dominating influence of prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and 
preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits . . . without present- 
ing us with an embracive theory of the constructive elements necessary for the 
building of a serviceable science of legal methodology. 
Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal Method, 
44 VA. L. REV. 365,376 (1958). One reason for this inadequacy may be that realists were 
intent on destroying, rather than constructing, theory. See Rumble, The Paradox of 
American Legal Realism, 75 ETHICS 166, 173-76 (1965). 
76. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); see also K. LLEWEL- 
LYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 13 (1960) ("[Tjhe main thing is seeing what officials do . . . and 
seeing that there is a certain regularity in their doing-a regularity which makes possible 
prediction of what they and other officials are about to do tomorrow."). 
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However, realists who were committed to predictionism could 
not agree on those factors from which accurate predictions could 
be made.77 The only agreement was that one had to look beyond 
the "paper" rules, or the formal legal rules enunciated in judicial 
decisions, and discover the "real" rules, or the psychological, po- 
litical, economic, business, and social factors that accounted for 
judicial behavior in a particular case.7s 
77. Fred Rodell argued that one could look a t  the "vast complex of personal fac- 
tors-temperament, background, education, economic status, pre-Court career" and 
make predictions based on these factors "with a surprising degree of accuracy." Rodell, 
For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing, 50 GEO. L J  700, 700-01 
(1962). Llewellyn cited 14 "steadying factors" upon which predictions could be based. K. 
LLEWELLYN. TRADITION, supra note 53, a t  19-51. Herman Oliphant argued that the pre- 
dictable element in judicial decisions is the judges' "response to the stimuli of the facts 
of the concrete cases before them . . . . The response of their intuition of experience to 
the stimulus of human situations is the subject-matter having the constancy and objec- 
tivity necessary for truly scientific study." Oliphant, supra note 63, a t  159. 
78. In other words the "real" rules of the judicial process are the regularities of 
judicial behavior. The paper-real rule distinction is found in both J. FRANK, COURTS ON 
TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 336-37 (1949), and K. LLEWELLYN, supra 
note 51, a t  21-27. 
This emphasis on studying and describing actual judicial behavior led some realists 
to attempt to create a precise science of judicial behavior through empirical research. 
This largely inspired the foundation of the Institute of Law a t  the John Hopkins Univer- 
sity in 1928. The aim of the school was "the development of the scientific study of law. 
All else [was] incidental." Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 309 
(1927). Achievement of this objective required research of an empirical nature. Walter 
Wheeler Cook emphasized that 
the only way to find out what anything does is to observe it in action and not 
to read supposedly authoritative books about it, or to attempt by reasoning to 
deduce it from fundamental principles assumed to be fixed and given. The con- 
sequence of this assumption is that only a small part of the work of the staff of 
the Institute will be with books in libraries; by far the larger part will be con- 
cerned with the difficult, time-consuming, and expensive task of gathering and 
interpreting the facts concerning the operation of our legal system. 
Cook, Scientific Study and the Administration of Justice, 34 MD. ST. B.A. REP. 148 
(1929). 
One interpretation of the realist movement is that i t  was not a critical reaction to 
Langdellian and formalist model of law. See G. GILMORE, supra note 50. Gilmore believes 
that 
the adepts of the new jurisprudence-Legal Realists or whatever they should 
be called-no more proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Langdellian juris- 
prudence than the Protestant reformers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centu- 
ries proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Christian theology. These were 
the ideas that "law is a science" and that there is such a thing as "the one 
True rule of law." 
Id. a t  87. Gilmore therefore maintains that "[r]ealist jurisprudence proposed a change of 
course, not a change of goal." Id. a t  100. Although this interpretation is defensible, i t  
does not represent the whole movement. Some realists doubted that a science of law was 
possible a t  all. See, e.g., Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 761, 773 (1932); 
Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal "Science," 20 N.C.L. REV. 1, 10-22 (1941). For a good 
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Jerome Frank rejected the search for "real" rules. In 
Frank's estimation, "the major cause of legal uncertainty is fact- 
uncertainty-the unknowability, before the decision, of what the 
trial court will 'find' as the facts, and the unknowability after 
the decision of the way in which it 'found' those facts."79 Thus, 
Frank concluded that "it is impossible, and will always be im- 
possible, because of the elusiveness of the facts on which deci- 
sions turn, to predict future decisions in most (not all) law- 
suits."80 Fact-uncertainty arises for two reasons. First, in 
addition to possessing discretion in rule-applying, a judge pos- 
sesses discretion in fact-finding. "When the oral testimony is in 
conflict as to a pivotal fact-issue, the trial judge is a t  liberty to 
choose to believe one witness rather than an~ther."~'  This dis- 
cretionary fact-finding is "almost boundless" since appellate 
courts rarely interfere with such  determination^.^^ Second, 
judges react to facts very subjectively. These judicial subjectivi- 
ties include "unique, idiosyncratic, sub-threshold biases and 
predilections" which are impossible to precisely define.83 Simi- 
larly, jurors reach their fact-determinations on "emotional re- 
sponses to the lawyers and wi tnes~es ."~~ Because of these una- 
discussion o f  the  branch o f  legal realism concerned with creating a "science o f  law," see 
Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant & Yntema: T h e  Scientific Wing of American Legal Real- 
ism (pts. 1-2), 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 249 (1979); see also Schlegel, American Legal Realism 
and Empirical Social Science: The  Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L.
REV. 195 (1980); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From 
the  Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979). 
79. J. FRANK, supra note 52, at xiv. Frank characterized his argument as "fact-skep- 
ticism." It marks one o f  the  major divisions in t he  realist movement. See generally W.  
RUMBLE, supra note 50, at 107-36. Frank classified the  realists into two groups: rule- 
skeptics and fact-skeptics. Rule-skeptics, o f  whom Llewellyn was "the outstanding repre- 
sentative," focus on appellate courts and strive for greater legal certainty. Fact-skeptics 
focus on trial courts and deny the  possibility o f  accurate formulations o f  real rules. J. 
FRANK, supra note 78, at 73-75. 
80. J. FRANK, supra note 78, at 74 ("the pursuit o f  greatly increased legal certainty 
is, for the  most part, futile-and . . . its pursuit, indeed may well work injustice"). 
81. Id. at 57. 
82. Id. 
83. J. FRANK, supra note 52, at xxvi. "The  reactions o f  trial judges or juries t o  the  
testimony are shot through with subjectivity." J. FRANK, supra note 78, at 22. Elsewhere, 
Frank called these subjectivities "prejudices o f  judges . . . [that] have no 'large scale 
social' character, and lack uniformity. T h e y  are distinctly individual, unconscious, un- 
get-at-able." T h e y  are "concealed, publicly unscrutinized, uncommunicated . . . secret, 
unconscious, private, idiosyncratic." Frank, "Short of  Sickness and Death": A S tudy  of  
Moral Responsibility i n  Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 573, 582 (1951). 
84. J. FRANK. supra note 78, at 130. Frank continues, "they like or dislike, not any 
legal rule, but  they do  like an artful lawyer for the  plaintiff, t he  poor widow, the  brunette 
with the soulful eyes, and they do  dislike the big corporation, the  Italian with a thick, 
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voidable subjectivities in the judicial process and the 
impossibility of rationalizing them, Frank concluded that "real" 
rules could never be formulated concerning the probable out- 
come of cases.86 
Although the energy of legal realism was largely spent by 
m i d c e n t ~ r y , ~ ~  its legacy remains. The critical legal studies move- 
ment is one example of the contemporary continuation of the 
legal realist attack on objective legal analysis.s7 Critical legal 
scholars agree with the realists' contention that legal analysis is 
nothing more than a veneer covering deeper motives for judicial 
decisions. But critical legal scholars depart from the realists by 
providing a neo-Marxist, materialist explanation, rather than a 
psychoanalytic account of judicial  decision^.^^ They undertake 
this explanation in two principal ways. First, they show legal 
foreign accent." Id. Elsewhere, Frank contended that "adequate fact-finding . . . requires 
devoted attention, skill in analysis, and, above all, high powers of resistance to a multi- 
tude of personal biases. But these qualities are obviously not possessed by juries. They 
are notoriously gullible and impressionable." J. FRANK, supra note 52, a t  192. 
85. Any attempt to increase the capacity of "real" rules to scientifically accurate 
predictions about judicial behavior, Frank believed, was impossible: 
[Slince most persons consider that a true science makes predictions possible, 
we ought to put an end to notions of a "legal science" or a "science of law," 
unless we so define "legal" or "law" as to exclude much of what must be in- 
cluded in the judicial administration of justice, because no formula for predict- 
ing most trial-court decisions can be devised which does not contain hopelessly 
numerous variables that cannot be pinned down or correlated. 
J. FRANK. supra note 78, a t  190 (footnote omitted). 
86. See generally W. RUMBLE. supra note 50, a t  238-39. 
87. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Decon- 
struction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 623-30 (1984) (critical legal studies is a "direct descen- 
dent" of legal realism); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
563, 564-73 (1983) (criticism of the formalist and objectivist traditions underlying mod- 
ern legal thought as a characteristic theme of the movement); White, The Inevitability 
of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649, 649-57 (1984) (critical legal studies' self- 
identification with legal realism is an attempt to achieve legitimacy); Note, 'Round and 
'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1669, 1677 (1982) (critical legal scholars have a "particularly close kinship" to 
legal realist forebears, and the work of the former can be understood as a "maturation" 
of the work of the latter). 
For a critical assessment of the critical legal studies movement, see Hutchinson & 
Monahan, Law, Politics, and The Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drnma of 
American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984); Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want 
to be Radical?, 36 STAN L. REV. 247 (1984); Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through 
Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984); Sunstein, Politics and Adjudication, 94 
ETHICS 126 (1983); Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Re- 
view), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466 (1983). 
88. See Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 6 
n.* (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (critical legal scholars borrow heavily from the "Marxist tradi- 
tion and current trends in Marxist thought"). 
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doctrines to be historically contingent by demonstrating their 
change over time in response to judicial class biases and judicial 
perceptions of the material needs of capitalist society.8e Second, 
they show legal reasoning to be fundamentally incoherent by 
elaborating the logical contradictions or "opposing principles" 
underlying private law, particularly the law of the marketplace, 
contract law.80 Thus, they view legal analysis as ideological, non- 
rational argumentatione1 that is used to legitimate existing social 
 practice^.^^ 
89. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Professor Hor- 
witz argues that precapitalist, communitarian doctrines of private law made way for 
nineteenth century capitalist-oriented doctrines because of the class sympathies of 
judges and their historically limited perceptions of social needs. However, this account of 
legal development is disputed. See, e.g., Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History 
of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979) (demonstrating that no such shift occurred in 
contract law during the period Horwitz describes); White, The Intellectual Origins of 
Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671 (1977) (providing a fundamentally different account 
of the development of tort theory). 
For other examples of the critical legal studies argument for the development of 
American law, see Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline 
of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601, 601, 604 (1977) (arguing 
that law is composed of "interpretive activity, arising in concrete social situations" and 
that legal structure encompasses a mode of interpretation "at the level of the implicit 
legal consciousness moving within the whole of social discourse"); Tushnet, Perspectives 
on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A History of 
American Law," 1977 WIS. L. REV. 81 (tracing the development of American law and 
noting the impact on legal structure and social order from societal norms and "autono- 
mous internal dynamics"); see also Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 
(1984). 
90. See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 21. Professor Kennedy argues 
that "there are two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with substantive issues [found 
in American private law opinions, articles, and treatises] which I call individualism and 
altruism." Id. a t  1685; see also Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Unger, supra note 87. 
91. See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981). Professor Kelman depicts legal argument as involving "inter- 
pretive construction," or the conscious and unconscious reduction of factual situations to 
substantive legal controversies, and "rational rhetoricism," or "the process of presenting 
the legal conclusions that result when interpretive constructs are applied to the 'facts.' " 
Id. a t  592. In Kelman's view, the necessary imposition of interpretive constructs prior to 
the employment of rational rhetoricism radically undercuts the rationality of legal 
argument: 
[Ilnterpretive constructs. . . are . . . simply inexplicably unpatterned mediators 
of experience, the inevitably nonrational filters we need to be able to perceive 
or talk,at all. . . . When the unwarranted conceptualist garbage is cleared away, 
dominant legal thought is nothing but some more or less plausible common- 
wisdom banalities, superficialities, and generalities, little more on close analysis 
than a tiresome, repetitive assertion of complacency that "we do pretty well, 
all considered, when you think of all the tough concerns we've got to balance." 
Legal thought does have its rigorous moments, but these are largely grounded 
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Other less organized remnants of legal realism can be found 
in other contemporary writings. In his leading law school primer 
on judicial reasoning,03 E. H. Levi portrays adjudication in terms 
of organic growth in the law whereby the "concepts" that ex- 
press the law change in response to changed conditions in soci- 
ety.04 His model implies that judicial "intuition" is the vehicle 
by which a judge registers and implements into law the changed 
"concepts" of s o ~ i e t y . ~ ~  In contrast, Sanford Levinson, maintain- 
ing that the unavailability of determinate meaning in literary in- 
terpretation applies equally to judicial interpretation, argues 
that every judicial interpreter is radically impaired in his ability 
to confidently express the meaning of the text or to reject the 
meaning proposed by another.96 The "contingency of percep- 
in weak and shifting sands. There is some substance, but we tend to run for 
cover when it appears. 
Id. a t  671-72; see also Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Kairys, supra note 
88, a t  3 ("There is no legal reasoning in the sense of legal methodology or process for 
reaching particular, correct results." Law is "only a wide and conflicting variety of styl- 
ized rationalizations from which courts pick and choose."); Trubek, Complexity and 
Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought 
About Law, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 529, 561 (1977) ("I see the [legal] system as partially 
open and flexible, and therefore as offering support for moral and political 'entrepre- 
neurs' who can take advantage of the pressures of ideals and the legitimation needs of 
the system to effect changes that can further genuine equality, individuality, and 
community."). 
92. See Gabel, supra note 89, a t  602 (traditional legal theory produces fictions by 
hypostatizing phenomena into facts); Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 
90 YALE L.J. 1275, 1276 (1981) (traditional legal scholarship contributes to legitimation 
of oppressive social order); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 
BUFFALO L. REV. 209 (1979) (the Commentaries legitimated existing social practices in 
Blackstone's England through the creation of artificial legal categories that gradually 
assumed an appearance of necessity). 
93. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948). 
94. Id. a t  6-9. 
95. In Levi's model of reasoning, "concepts" (such as consideration and trespass), 
not legal rules, are the main vehicles of the law. See Levi, The Natural Law, Precedent 
and Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L. REV. 587, 604 (1938). His model follows Max Radin's 
portrayal of judicial reasoning as a selection between "several categories [that] struggle 
. . . for the privilege of framing the situation before [the judges]." Radin, The Theory of 
Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357,359 (1925). Radin argues that 
" 'principles' are not princip!es at  all but aggregations of type transactions, schematized 
to make them easier to carry in one's memory." Id. a t  360; see also K. LLEWELLYN, TRA- 
DITION, supra note 53 (conceptions such as "type situation" and "situation-sense" are 
basic to judicial reasoning). However, these pictures of judicial reasoning provide no nor- 
mative guidance for weighing the "concepts" or "categories." See J. RAWLS, supra note 
74, a t  34. 
96. Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982). For a criticism of this 
position, see Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 495 (1982). 
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tion" results in "fractured and fragmented d i scour~e , "~~  leaving 
the interpreter with only a mere "hope that some future con- 
junction of author and reader will provide a common language of 
Ijudicial] d iscour~e."~~ 
In sum, legal realism and its heirs basically argue that judi- 
cial interpretation is an unavoidable expression of privately held 
values because of the unavailability of effective interpretive con- 
straints. They see normative guidance as being unavailable be- 
cause it is not self-evident: a variety of meanings is attributable 
to the same precedent or statute and contradictory meanings ex- 
ist among different precedents and statutes. Therefore, judicial 
interpreters are compelled to choose from among the available 
meanings-a choice that can be made only on extralegal bases 
that include the privately held values of the judicial interpreter. 
Similarly, institutional demands that a judicial interpreter per- 
form in a certain fashion are ineffective. The irrepressible sub- 
jective motivations of the judicial interpreter make it impossible 
to ensure the judicial interpretation of a text within any objec- 
tive constraint. 
The Anglo-American jurisprudential traditions of objective 
and subjective interpretivism both presume that judicial inter- 
pretation is a free and discretionary activity. The principal dif- 
ference between these two traditions lies in the extent to which 
they believe that the judicial interpreter can be controlled in ex- 
ercising his freedom and discretion. On one hand, the objective 
interpretivist tradition constructs normative and institutional 
constraints that supposedly prevent the responsible judicial in- 
terpreter from freely resorting to personal, value-laden consider- 
ations. On the other hand, the subjective interpretivist tradition 
denies the authority and efficacy of such constraints, concluding 
that judicial interpretation is an activity motivated by nonratio- 
nal subjective interests. 
Unfortunately, both traditions have failed to examine criti- 
cally their common presumption that interpretation is by nature 
free and discretionary. Rather, each tradition has directed its ef- 
forts a t  contesting the availability of interpretive constraints. 
97. Levinson, supra note 96, at 402-03. 
98. Id. 
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The result has been the incapacity of both jurisprudential tradi- 
tions to transcend their opposition. Thus, while objective inter- 
pretivism's preoccupation with constructing normative and insti- 
tutional constraints has prevented it from investigating the 
possible structure of interpretation, subjective interpretivism's 
primary interest in deconstructing these constraints has diverted 
its attention away from the need to explain the otherwise "mys- 
terious" act of in te rp re ta t i~n .~~  
The objective-subjective opposition can be transcended by 
denying the common presumption about the nature of interpre- 
tation. In other words, if interpretation is shown not to be free 
99. Professor Edgar Bodenheimer once argued that the divergent ideological com- 
mitments of analytical positivism and legal realism prevented them from providing "a 
well-considered theory of the non-formal (i.e., non-positive) sources of the law." 
Bodenheimer, supra note 75, at  375. Responding to H.L.A. Hart's "open texture" charac- 
terization of legal rules, Bodenheimer maintained that Hart's continuing commitment to 
the analytical positivist ideal of judicial objectivity inhibited him (and would inhibit all 
other analytical positivists) from investigating the possible structure of judicial discre- 
tion. On the other hand, the legal realists' continued assurance to jurists "of the im- 
mense range of irrational considerations entering into the judicial process, the subjectiv- 
ity necessarily inherent in judicial determinations, [and] the dominating influence of 
prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits" 
diverted his focus from "presenting us with an embracive theory of the constructive ele- 
ments necessary for the building of a serviceable science of legal methodology." Id. a t  
376. In short, the ideological commitments of analytical positivism and legal realism were 
"leading the science of law into a blind alley from which it can extricate itself only by an 
extensive and serious re-investigation of the entire realm of legal methodology." Id. a t  
375; see also R. UNGER. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 3, 104-42 (1975) (characterizing con- 
ceptions of reason intrinsic to Western thought in the sciences, humanities, and jurispru- 
dence as dichotomous, which results in a "prison house" for thought from which escape 
is possible only with a "total criticism" of the "deep structures" of our thought and a 
transcendence of the dichotomies with a "holistic consciousness"); Gross, supra note 5 
(outlining jurisprudential "patterns of evasion" of the rule-value dichotomy); Reynolds, 
supra note 5 (following Bodenheimer's analysis). 
Charles A. Miller's description of judicial interpretation is one example of the "blind 
alley" or "prison house" effect flowing from objective-subjective dichotomous views of 
adjudication:. 
The three sources of decision-values, rules, and facts-combine to focus on 
the mysterious "act of deciding." While the sources of decision are rationally 
comprehensible, the act of deciding is not. But after that act, adjudication be- 
comes understandable once more when the opinion of the court, the explana- 
tion of decision, is handed down. 
C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 11 (1969) (footnote omitted). 
This description vacillates helplessly between objective and subjectiJe accounts without 
hope of any synthesis. For this reason, the act of judicial interpretation remains mysteri- 
ous. A similar vacillation is evident within legal realism between its scientific and intui- 
tionist wings. See supra text accompanying notes 61-78. More recently, Professor Dwor- 
kin's position has been characterized as a vacillation between objectivity and 
subjectivity. See Fish, supra note 5. 
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and discretionary, then the disagreement between objective and 
subjective interpretivism over the availability of effective con- 
traints for interpretation disappears. No ground exists to sup- 
port the disagreement. Jurisprudential discussion of adjudica- 
tion is then necessarily transformed to reflect the new view of 
interpretation.'OO 
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the notion that interpre- 
tation is free and discretionary.lO' Interpretation is a dialogical 
100. Generally, advocates of the resolution of the objective-subjective opposition in 
jurisprudence have sought to construct a method of reasoning that integrates the objec- 
tive and subjective dimensions of human experience. For instance, see Roberto Unger's 
argument, supra note 99. In Unger's estimation, an "order of mind" must be constructed 
that exists "between" the particularity of events in human experience and the generality 
of concepts and symbols constituting the content of human thought. Id. at  107-11. Fur- 
ther, this "order of mind" must employ neither the subjective valuations associated with 
the particularity of events nor the logic and causality associated with the generality of 
thought, but rather a "symbolic interpretation" that merges these two. Id. Examples of 
this interpretation are found in the aesthetic experience of finding universal meaning 
and concrete particularity in a great work of art or the religious experience of finding 
Christ as an embodiment of both the universal, infinite God and the particular, finite 
man. Id. at  144; see also Gross, supra note 5. 
In contrast, Professor Noel Reynolds contended that the escape from Bodenheimer's 
"blind alley" should begin with a complete reformulation of the classical ideal of legal 
objectivity into a notion of objectivity that more fully "squares . . . with actual human 
experience." Reynolds, supra note 5, at  27. In his estimation, this could be achieved by 
seeing legal generalizations as publicly corrigible; see also Fiss, supra note 1. 
101. The term "hermeneutics" can be traced to the Greek noun, hermeneia, mean- 
ing interpretation. See R. PALMER. supra note 4, a t  12-32. The term hermeneia appears 
to be derived from the name of the Greek god Hermes. Essentially, Hermes' task was to 
translate, or bring into a form intellectually accessible to human understanding, the 
transcendent knowledge of the gods. Analysis of Hermes' divine function of mediation 
between the world of gods and the world of men reveals a three-fold dimensionality that 
hermeneia, or interpretation, had for the early Greeks. First, Hermes was to reveal and 
proclaim the will of the gods to men. Thus, interpretation connoted an announcing of 
what was previously unrevealed. Id. at  15-20. Second, Hermes was to elucidate what was 
revealed by relating it to the listeners' own projects and intentions. Thus, interpretation 
to the Greeks carried with it the implication of a context in which the receivers of the 
message found themselves. The problem of interpretation was making clear the message 
in terms of the receivers' anticipations of meaning. Id. at  20-26. Third, Hermes was to 
bring the unintelligible into intelligibility through the medium of the people's own lan- 
guage. He was a translator who sought to mediate man's own understanding with the 
gods' understanding. For the Greeks, interpretation meant a mediation of world views, a 
fusion of different understandings in which interpreter and object both operated. Id. at  
26-32. 
Hermeneutics did not begin to assume the form of a theory of interpretation until 
the Reformation. Arguing that the Bible could be understood independently and validly 
without the dogmatic interpretation of the Catholic Church, the Reformers sought a the- 
ory of biblical exegesis that would allow their interpretation to stand on its own. See J. 
BLEICHER, supra note 4, a t  12-13; see also H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 153-55 
(1975). The Reformers argued that any textual passage, the sense of which is not clear, 
could be understood through the reciprocal relationship between the whole text and its 
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interaction between interpreter and text that occurs within an a 
priori relationship that is mediated by their common history 
and language. In this interaction, neither interpreter nor text de- 
termines textual meaning independently of the other; both in- 
terpreter and text contribute interdependently to the determi- 
nation of textual meaning. In essence, philosophical 
particular passages. While the whole scriptural text guided the interpretation of the par- 
ticular passages, the meaning of the whole could be reached only through the cumulative 
understanding of individual passages. From sacred texts, it was only a small step to ap- 
ply the same insight to profane texts. 
Until Friedrich Schleiermacher, "special" hermeneutics existed in the various disci- 
plines, depending upon the kind of text involved and the theoretical problems peculiar 
to the discipline. Schleiermacher sought to establish a "general" hermeneutic underlying 
all specialized hermeneutics by trying to elucidate the foundational act of all hermeneu- 
tics-the act of understanding itself. Arguing that understanding occurs primarily 
through a comparing of the unintelligible to the already intelligible, he schematized the 
act of understanding as a circle. Just as the unclear meaning of a particular textual pas- 
sage is made clear by reference to the general meaning of the whole text, so is any partic- 
ular experience made intelligible by reference to what has already been understood. But 
what has already been understood is only the accumulation of the meaning of particular 
experiences. This schema of understanding-the general informing the particular and 
the particular informing the general-became known as the "hermeneutical circle." See 
J .  BLEICHER, supra note 4, a t  13-16; H. GADAMER, supra, a t  162-74; R. PALMER, supra note 
4, a t  75-97. 
Following Schleiermacher's attempt to generalize hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey 
sought to make hermeneutics the foundation for all the human sciences by providing a 
universally valid methodological basis for the interpretation of all human expressions. 
Dilthey believed that employment of the hermeneutical circle could lead to a knowledge 
of the human world resembling the natural sciences' knowledge of nature. Asserting that 
the meaning of all human action lay in the subjective intention of the actor, Dilthey 
reasoned that the task of understanding was to reconstruct the actor's original "life- 
experience" by way of the hermeneutical circle in order to understand the actor as he 
understood himself. See J .  BLEICHER, supra note 4, a t  19-26; H. GADAMER, supra, a t  192- 
234; R PALMER. supra note 4, a t  98-123. In this respect, Dilthey presages Collingwood's 
objective reenactment theory of interpretation. See supra note 8. 
Dilthey's notion of understanding marked a decisive turn in hermeneutic theory-a 
turn that Hans-Georg Gadamer viewed as wrong. In Gadamer's view, Dilthey's herme- 
neutics impiied that the inquirer's present situation had a negative value. Understanding 
the actor as he understood himself required "essentially a self-transposition or imagina- 
tive projection whereby the [inquirer] negates the temporal distance that separates him 
from the object and becomes contemporaneous with it." Linge, Introduction to H. 
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, a t  xiv (1976). In other words, temporal distance 
between the inquirer and the object of his inquiry is a source of prejudice that hinders 
valid understanding and that must be transcended. To the extent that Dilthey's notion 
of understanding demands negation of the inquirer's present and extrication from his 
immediate historical situation, Gadamer believed Dilthey's hermeneutic theory must be 
rehabilitated. Gadamer argued that the interpreter can never extricate himself from the 
entanglements of his history and the prejudices that come with those entanglements. 
The interpreter's history is always constitutively involved in his process of understand- 
ing. Id. 
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hermeneutics sees interpretation as an activity of mutual con- 
straint between the interpreter and the text. 
A. The Historicality of Interpretation 
Philosophical hermeneutics' rejection of the free and discre- 
tionary view of interpretation begins with an argument for the 
fundamental historicality of interpretation. Philosophical her- 
meneutics contends that every interpreter is historically situ- 
ated. To be historically situated means to be inextricably located 
within a relational context that bears the stamp of the past.lo2 
An interpreter's historical situatedness implies both that the in- 
terpreter cannot encounter the present without a direction to his 
project and a perspective of his text that are dictated to him 
from his past and, equally important, that there are parameters 
to his project and boundaries to his perspective. In other words, 
the interpreter's past not only provides certain possibilities for 
seeing the present, it also limits what can possibly be seen. 
Both the possibilities and the limitations of the interpreter's 
present are a manifestation of the interpreter's "effective-his- 
tory."lo3 The effective-history of an interpreter "determines in 
advance both what seems to [him] worth enquiring about and 
what will appear [to him] as an object of inve~tigation."'~~ Put 
another way, it is the interpreter's "horizon," or "range of vi- 
sion[,] that includes everything that can be seen from a particu- 
102. See H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  225-74. Gadamer is deeply indebted to 
Martin Heidegger for this view of the interpreter. In his phenomenology of man, Heideg- 
ger contended that man's being is "Dasein" (There-Being). M. HEIDEGGER. BEING AND 
TIME (1962). In other words, man is always located temporally and spatially. However, 
man does not exist solipsistically; his being is "Being-in-the-world." Id. at  78-90. By 
"world," Heidegger means not just the natural environment of entities, but the relational 
context in which man always finds himself immersed and in terms of which each entity is 
pregrasped and preunderstood. Id. at  91-145. The existential structures of "Being-in-the- 
world" are man's primordial "being-with" objects of experience, his "being-in" situa- 
tions, and his "being-towards" (caring for) objects of experience. Id. at  149-273. Each of 
these structures presumes that man "grasps in advance" the objects of his experience 
because of his primordial relation to them. Id. at  188-95. Consequently, human under- 
standing has a prestructure which comes into play in all interpretation. For this reason, 
"[ilnterpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to 
us" in advance. Id. at  191-92. Gadamer seized upon these basic insights about man and 
interpretation. "Heidegger's temporal analytics of human existence (Dasein) has, I think, 
shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviours 
of the subject, but the mode of being of [man] itself." H. GADAMER. supra note 101, at  
xviii; see also J. BLEICHER, supra note 4, at  98-103; R. PALMER, supra note 4, at  124-61. 
103. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, at  267-74. 
104. Id. at  267-68. 
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lar vantage point."lo5 Moreover, the effective-history of an inter- 
preter infuses him with pre-judgments that he cannot possibly 
dispossess himself. Because he sees the present only in terms of 
judgments that he has drawn in the past, the interpreter's past 
judgments predispose him to judge the present in the same way. 
The interpreter always approaches the text with certain expecta- 
tions that reflect his past experience.lo6 
Not only is the interpreter historically situated, but so is his 
text. The effective-history of the text is manifest in the manner 
in which it has been previously understood. Its "horizon" is the 
range of its prior interpretations; its pre-judgment is how it has 
come to be judged by others.lo7 Importantly, it is the text's 
grounding in history that makes its present interpretation possi- 
ble. The interpreter's and the text's sharing of history allows the 
interpreter to have access to the text, to find relation with it, or 
to have a basis for understanding it at  all. In other words, a 
common history provides the medium for interpreting the text 
and determining its meaning. 
Given the historicality of both interpreter and text, philo- 
sophical hermeneutics maintains that interpretation and mean- 
ing are possible only because of the interpreter's historically 
based pre-judgments of the text. This claim is illustrated by re- 
105. Id. at 269. 
106. H. GADAMER. The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHILO- 
SOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976). 
[Tlhe historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of 
the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. 
Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions 
whereby we experience something-whereby what we encounter says some- 
thing to us. 
Id.  Certainly, one of the most controversial aspects of philosophical hermeneutics is the 
notion that pre-judgment has positive, rather than negative value for interpretation. 
Gadamer attributes the negative connotation of pre-judgment to the Enlightenment. H. 
GADAMER, supra note 101, at  239-45. The Enlightenment idealized reason as the autono- 
mous determiner of judgments. Pre-judgments were seen as being remnants of an unen- 
lightened mentality that impedes rational self-determination. Truth was obtained by re- 
jecting pre-judgments and establishing an impartial system of rules and methodological 
principles. Gadamer seeks to rehabilitate the concept of pre-judgment. Given man's his- 
toricality, pre-judgments are an ontological fact. 
107. In the case of an interpreter's original reading of a text, the horizon of the text 
is not so much evident in its historicality as it is in its linguisticality. In this case, the 
text is intellectually accessible to the interpreter primarily because of their sharing of a 
common language. As will be shown in section C, language has an horizon too; it is the 
peculiar world view of the community that possesses the language. See infra text accom- 
panying notes 134-41. For this reason, the interpreter will always have certain expecta- 
tions of meaning from the language in which he is immersed. 
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flecting on the common interpretation of any written text. When 
an interpreter encounters a written text, he performs an act of 
projection. He projects onto the text the meaning that he antici- 
pates the text as a whole may have for him; his "effective-his- 
tory" disposes him to pre-judge the possible meaning of the text. 
However, in projecting the "fore-meaning"lo8 of the text, the in- 
terpreter may encounter passages that call into question its suit- 
ability and adequacy as an account. Most likely, the interpreter 
will be "pulled up short by the text," signifying that the pro- 
jected meaning of the text "does not yield any meaning or [the 
text's] meaning is not compatible with what [the interpreter] 
had expected."109 Consequently, the interpreter is compelled to 
account for the unsettling passage in his understanding of the 
text and to revise his fore-meaning accordingly. The revised 
fore-meaning then becomes the newly projected meaning, and 
the process of projection from fore-meaning to particular textual 
passages and back to fore-meaning continues as before. "The 
working out of this fore-project, which is constantly revised in 
terms of what emerges as [the interpreter] penetrates into the 
meaning, is understanding what is there.""O 
In this illustration, the interpreter's pre-judgments "consti- 
tute the initial directedness of [his] whole ability to experience 
[the text] at  all."ll1 His pre-judgments direct him to the text as 
an object worthy of inquiry; they are the ground for his initial 
interest in reading the text. Moreover, his pre-judgments direct 
him along a particular course of inquiry; they are the fore-mean- 
ings that he projects for the text as a whole and that are revised 
as they become challenged by the text itself. Although the inter- 
preter's pre-judgments constitute his initial direction, they do 
not necessarily constitute solely his understanding of the text. 
His pre-judgments may turn out to be legitimate, and thus pro- 
108. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  237. 
109. Id. For a brief discussion of what philosophical hermeneutics intends in the 
word "meaning," see supra note 122 and authorities cited therein. 
110. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  236. The constant movement from the inter- 
preter's pre-judgment of the text to a particular passage of the text and back to pre- 
judgment, with both informing each other, illustrates the basic epistemological model of 
philosophical hermeneutics known as the "hermeneutical circle." See supra note 101. 
The "hermeneutical circle" should not be understood to be viciously inescapable. For a 
cogent clarification of this commonly misunderstood aspect of philosophical hermeneutic 
theory, see D. HOY, supra note 4, at  2-6. 
111. H. GADAMER, The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHIL- 
OSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976). 
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ductive for understanding, if they are confirmed in being 
"worked out" with the passages of the text. But his pre-judg- 
ments may also turn out to be illegitimate, and thus unproduc- 
tive for understanding, if they "come to nothing in the working 
out."l12 In either case, however, it is only in terms of the inter- 
preter's pre-judgments that judgments of the text can be 
reached. The crucial point is that pre-judgments become legiti- 
mate or illegitimate only if the interpreter allows them to be 
challenged and questioned by the object of his inquiry. Other- 
wise, the interpreter's pre-judgments become definitive and pre- 
scribe how he will understand the text. 
An interpreter prevents his pre-judgments from prescribing 
his understanding of the text by being "effective-history con- 
s c i o u ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Such c ~ n ~ c i o u ~ n e ~ ~  entails awareness of his pre-judg- 
ments and suspension of the effects of his effective-history. Ad- 
mittedly, suspension of effective-history is impossible in any 
absolute sense. "The prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind 
of the interpreter are not at  his free disposal. He is not able to 
separate in advance the productive prejudices that make under- 
standing possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding 
and lead to  misunderstanding^.""^ But latent pre-judgments 
can be teased into the foreground of awareness through an open 
and direct confrontation with the text. In confronting the text, 
the interpreter encounters its "otherness" which throws his pre- 
judgments into contrasting relief and thereby casts them into 
the foreground of awareness for his critical scr~t iny."~ 
Although the text is historically related to the interpreter, it 
is nonetheless "an historically intended separate ~bject .""~ In 
other words, it is not only physically separate but also tempo- 
rally distant in its creation from the interpreter's present. Im- 
112. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, a t  237. 
113. Id.  a t  268-71. 
114. Id .  a t  263. 
115. Linge, supra note 101, a t  xx-xxi. Linge illustrates this phenomenon in the his- 
tory of cultures: 
[I]t is in times of intense contact with other cultures (Greece with Persia or 
Latin Europe with Islam) that a people becomes most acutely aware of the 
limits and questionableness of its deepest assumptions. Collision with the 
other's horizons makes us aware of assumptions so deep-seated that they 
would otherwise remain unnoticed. This awareness of our own historicity and 
finitude-our consciousness of effective history-brings with it an openness to 
new possibilities that is the precondition of genliine understanding. 
Id .  a t  xxi. 
116. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  263. 
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portantly, every interpreter, even the creator of the text, must 
accomplish his interpretation across some temporal distance 
that is never "a closed dimension, but is itself undergoing con- 
stant movement and extension."l17 This means that the inter- 
preter always occupies a new present in relation to the text, giv- 
ing him a new perspective (or pre-judgment) of the text that is 
shaped by concerns and expectations inherited from his con- 
stantly extending past. For this reason, a text is always endowed 
with a sense of "otherness," or   st ran genes^."^^^ To be sure, the 
text retains its sense of "familiarity"110 as well, because of its 
presence in the interpreter's history (and, as will be shown later, 
language); this familiarity is manifest in the interpreter's capac- 
ity to pre-judge the text. 
Thus, the interpreter's open and direct confrontation with 
the text reveals a "polarity of familiarity and st ran genes^."'^^ 
This polarity creates a contrast between what the interpreter 
presently expects to understand from the text and what the text 
historically has to say. 
If a person is trying to understand something, he will not be 
able to rely from the start on his own chance previous ideas, 
missing as logically and stubbornly as possible the actual 
meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently au- 
dible that it breaks through the imagined understanding of it. 
Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it 
to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained 
mind must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's quality of 
newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither 'neutral- 
ity' in the matter of the object not the extinction of one's self, 
but the conscious assimilation of one's own foremeanings and 
prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's own 
bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and 
thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own fore- 
meanings.lZ1 
In other words, if the interpreter is open to the text, meaning 
that he is genuinely prepared to receive its message, then the 
text may expose his pre-judgments by way of establishing a con- 
trast between itself and those pre-judgments. In this way, the 
117. Id. at 266. 
118. Id. at 262. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 262-63. 
121. Id. at 238. 
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interpreter becomes aware of his pre-judgments and avoids the 
prescriptive effect they would have on his understanding of the 
text were they to remain latent in his consciousness. 
This open confrontation between the interpreter's pre-judg- 
ments and the text is the process by which the true meaning of 
the text emerges.122 In allowing constantly emerging pre-judg- 
ments to be contrasted and tested against the text, the inter- 
preter is in the position to discard pre-judgments that obscure 
textual understanding and to retain pre-judgments that are con- 
firmed by the text. In short, temporal distance between inter- 
preter and text does not obstruct understanding, but actually 
produces it. Temporal distance acts as a "filtering process;" it 
"not only lets those prejudices that are of a particular and lim- 
ited nature die away, but causes those that bring about genuine 
understanding to emerge clearly as For this reason, in- 
terpretation and the determination of meaning are never a com- 
pleted task, but are "an infinite process."124 
In sum, the view of interpretation that emerges from a dis- 
122. In the parlance of philosophical hermeneutics, meaning is something that 
neither inheres in an object nor attaches to it as an arbitrary projection of thought. 
Meaning is contextual, occurring only in relationships with the interpreter. Meaning is 
seen as always being "for us;" it is found in making the unintelligible intelligible in terms 
of our present concerns and expectations, just as Hermes made the unintelligible world 
of the gods intelligible to man through the medium of man's own language. See R. 
PALMER, supra note 4, at  118-21, 184. 
This determination of meaning is thus dependent on the interpreter making the text 
"applicable" to him. Application is a crucial dimension of interpretation. See D. HOY, 
supra note 4, at  51-61. Gadamer believed that interpretation in theological and judicial 
contexts is particularly exemplary of this dimension: 
In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is the essential tension be- 
tween the text set down-of the Law or of the proclamation-on the one hand 
and, on the other, the sense arrived at  by its application in the particular mo- 
ment of interpretation, either in judgment or in preaching. A law is not there 
to be understood historically, but to be made concretely valid through being 
interpreted. Similarly, a religious proclamation is not there to be understood as 
a merely historical document, but to be taken in a way in which it exercises its 
saving effect. This includes the fact that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is 
to be understood properly, i.e., according to the claim it makes, must be under- 
stood a t  every moment, in a particular situation, in a new and different way. 
Understanding here is always application. 
H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  275, 289-305. Both judicial and theological interpretation 
see the task as an effort to mediate the temporal distance between the historic text and 
the present situation. Thus, interpretation is not the objective reconstruction of another 
world in its own terms, nor the subjective determination of the world in terms of the 
interpreter's own vision and thoughts. 
123. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  265-66. 
124. Id. at  265. 
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cussion of its historicality is fundamentally different from objec- 
tive and subjective interpretivism. Interpretation is a dynamic 
interaction, between the interpreter (his pre-judgments) and the 
text (its historical meaning), from which meaning is determined. 
The interpreter's pre-judgments contribute to the determination 
of meaning by providing the basis on which the text is made 
intelligible to the interpreter. But these pre-judgments do not 
prescribe meaning. So long as the text is allowed to have expres- 
sion and to challenge the interpreter's pre-judgments, the text 
contributes to the determination of meaning by compelling re- 
vised understandings of it. As a result, interpretation is neither 
free nor constrained, but is free and constrained. I t  is free in the 
sense that the interpreter approaches the text in accordance 
with his pre-judgments concerning it. But it is also constrained 
in the sense that these pre-judgments, shared by both inter- 
preter and text in their common historical medium, are subject 
to modification and revision in the interaction between the in- 
terpreter and the text. 
B. The Dialogical Structure of Interpretation 
As maintained in section A, interpretation requires open- 
ness to the text, meaning that the interpreter lays open the pos- 
sibility that the text may have something to say different from 
the interpreter's expectation of its meaning. But in so doing, the 
interpreter assumes the risk that the suitability of his pre-judg- 
ments for understanding the text may be called into question by 
the claims of the text itself. Indeed, the laying open of possibili- 
ties for other meanings of the text is the "essence of the ques- 
tion."l2Vor this reason, interpretation is said to have the struc- 
ture of q~es t i0n ing . l~~  The text asserts its claims, calling into 
question the interpreter's pre-judgments; the interpreter an- 
swers with revised judgments of the text that are drawn in terms 
of his prior understandings and the message of the text, but 
125. Id.  at 266. Gadamer indicates elsewhere that the openness that is "questioning" 
is not intermittent, but continuous and infinite. 
Dialectic, as the art of asking questions, proves itself only because the person 
who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which 
involves being able to preserve his orientation towards openness. The art of 
questioning is that of being able to go on asking questions, [i.e.,] the art of 
thinking. It is called "dialectic", for it is the art of conducting a real 
coversation. 
Id .  at 330. 
126. Id.  at 266. 
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which may be called into question again by other textual 
passages. 
This question-answer-question structure suggests that the 
interpretive interaction between the interpreter and the text is 
dialogical. Indeed, dialogue is precisely the relationship the in- 
terpreter achieves with the text. The dialogues of Plato are para- 
digmatic of the character of the dialogue that occurs in interpre- 
tation.12? The purpose of the Platonic dialogues is for the 
interlocutors to reach a transcendent understanding about an is- 
sue of common concern. Importantly, the individuality of each 
interlocutor is not to be neutralized but is significant in achiev- 
ing of this understanding. For instance, the confrontation be- 
tween Socrates, the man of contemplation, and Callicles, the 
man of action, in the G o r g i a ~ l ~ ~  casts their peculiar pre-judg- 
ments into contrasting relief for their mutual scrutiny. The re- 
sult of their confrontation is thus more likely to be true under- 
standing because it is accomplished in terms of each others' pre- 
judgments and transcends each one's purely subjective 
perspective. 
The interlocutors of a Platonic dialogue move beyond their 
subjective perspectives when they inquire into the subject mat- 
ter of the dialogue. In other words, the more an interlocutor 
opens himself to the subject matter, the more his personal opin- 
ions cease to prescribe his understanding. An interlocutor be- 
comes engaged in an inquiry with the other interlocutors and 
falls out of an interrogation of them.12@ He gets "caught up" in 
127. Id. at  325-41. 
128. THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 299-307 (E. Hamilton and H. Cairns ed. 
1961). 
129. The distinction is crucial. Genuine dialogue is a focus on some subject matter, 
not on the particular interlocutors. To conduct a conversation "requires that one does 
not try to out-argue the other person, but that one really considers the weight of the 
other's opinion." H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  330. The effort to "out-argue" is an 
undertaking that presumes the validity of one's own position and focuses on changing 
another person's views to conform with one's own. However, this kind of dialogue is in- 
consistent with the requirement of openness that leads to understanding because it is so 
uninterested in the other. Genuine dialogue is openness to another person's views, which 
changes the tenor of the undertaking into a common inquiry about some issue of com- 
mon concern. 
Just as there are legitimate and illegitimate pre-judgments, see supra text accompa- 
nying notes 111-12, so there are legitimate and illegitimate inquiries (or questionings). 
Legitimate (or "true") questioning is an inquiry with the answers still undetermined. 
Illegitimate (or "false") questioning is an inquiry with predetermined answers; it is con- 
cerned with hearing only what it has already decided is worthwhile to hear. This kind of 
questioning is illegitimate because it is so one-sided. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  326- 
27. 
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the conversation; he becomes engaged or possessed by the back- 
and-forth movement of the dialogue. At this point, the dialogue 
takes on a life of its own that is filled with unanticipated devel- 
opments that carry the interlocutor beyond his present perspec- 
tive.130 Although we frequently say that one may "conduct" a 
conversation, or dialogue, "the more fundamental a conversation 
is, the less its conduct lies within the will of [the parties]. . . . 
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects illegitimate questioning in all its forms, including 
methods of prescribed inquiry. Methods are rejected as illegitimate because of their pre- 
scription of a correct answer to their inquiries: 
Strictly speaking, method is incapable of revealing new truth; it only renders 
explicit the kind of truth already implicit in the method. The discovery of the 
method itself was not arrived at  through method but dialectically, that is, 
through a questioning responsiveness to the matter being encountered. In 
method the inquiring subject leads and controls and manipulates; in dialectic 
the matter encountered poses the question to which he responds. 
R. PALMER, supra note 4, at  165. The philosophical roots for the rejection of methods are 
found in M. HEIDEGGER, Question, supra note 5, at  3; M. HEIDEGGER, Age, supra note 5, 
a t  115. 
130. "What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours and 
hence so far transcends the subjective opinion of the partners to the dialogue that even 
the person leading the conversation is always ignorant." H. GADAMER. supra note 101, a t  
331. Later, Gadamer argues that the phenomenon of "hearing" illustrates the impossibil. 
ity of subjectivity in genuine dialogue. Id. at  419-21. 
Unlike seeing, where one can look away, one cannot "hear away" but must 
listen, unless the language is an alien one or is mere chatter. Even idle chatter 
has a way of captivating the listener against his will. Hearing implies already 
belonging together in such a manner that one is claimed by what is being said. 
D. HOY, supra note 4, at  66. 
The notion of being carried by the dialogue is illuminated by a second phenomenon 
used to support the hermeneutic view of interpretation-the phenomenon of a game (or 
"playing"). H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  91-114. The fundamental characteristic of 
the phenomenon of playing is the total absorption of the player in the back-and-forth 
movement of the game. In genuine playing, a player does not hold himself back in self- 
awareness, reflecting on the game as an object of definable procedures and rules. A 
player who cannot lose himself in earnest in the playing is a "spoilsport"-one who can- 
not play. Id. a t  91-92. Similarly, playing "cannot be taken as an action of subjectivity. . . 
.and self-possession. The real subject of playing is the game itself." Linge, supra note 101, 
a t  xxiii. The playing possesses the players; it has primacy over the players engaged in it. 
Moreover, 
[tlhe movement of playing has no goal in which it ceases but constantly renews 
itself. That is, what is essential to the phenomenon of play is not so much the 
particular goal it involves but the dynamic back-and-forth movement in which 
the players are caught up-the movement that itself specifies how the goal will 
be reached. 
Id. In other words, playing has its own momentum and carries its players along with it. 
The point is that interpretation involves the same kind of absorption of the interpreter 
in the question-answer-question movement between himself and the text. 
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[Tlhe people conversing are far less the leaders of it than the 
led. No one knows what will 'come out' in a con~ersation."'~~ 
This phenomenon of dialogue illustrates the nature of the 
relationship to be achieved between the interpreter and the text. 
Like dialogue, interpretation is an inquiry into a subject matter 
that concerns both the interpreter and the text. Like dialogue, 
interpretation also requires an openness to the particular view- 
point of another, meaning "acknowledgment that [the inter- 
preter] must accept some things that are against [him~elf]." '~~ 
Only in this way do both the interlocutor and the interpreter 
permit themselves to be engaged by the dialogical interaction 
and carried by it beyond their present perspectives. In short, 
both [dialogue and interpretation] are concerned with an ob- 
ject that is placed before them. Just as one person seeks to 
reach agreement with his partner concerning an object, so the 
interpreter understands the object of which the text 
speaks. . . . 
. . . [In] the successful conversation they both come under 
the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to 
one another in a new community . . . [it is] a transformation 
into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were.'33 
Again, this dimension of the philosophical hermeneutic 
characterization of interpretation differs fundamentally from the 
presumption of objective and subjective interpretivism. Inter- 
pretation is not an essentially free and discretionary activity for 
which the existence of constraints is in dispute. Because inter- 
pretation does not occur independently of the dialogical relation 
between the interpreter and the text, it makes no sense to view 
the interpreter as essentially free to construe the text according 
to his subjective values. Interpretation is not a manipulative ac- 
tion of the interpreter's subjectivity, but is rather his placing of 
himself in dialogue with the text so that both the interpreter 
and the text move into a new understanding. 
C. The Linguisticality of Interpretation 
In sections A and B, interpretation has been shown to be a 
131. H GADAMER. supra note 101, at 345. 
132. Id at 324. 
133. Id.  at 341 (footnote omitted). The elevation of the interpreter's pre-judgments 
and the claims of the text into a higher generality, or "communion," is what philosophi- 
cal hermeneutics terms the "fusion of horizons." Id.  at 273. 
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transsubjective event. Both the interpreter and the text are ab- 
sorbed in a dialogical interaction from which new understand- 
ings arise. But the peculiar perspective of neither the interpreter 
nor the text is to be extinguished. The confrontation of these 
perspectives initiates the dialogical movement towards under- 
standing because of their contrast. In previous sections of this 
comment, the medium in which the dialogical interaction of in- 
terpretation occurs has been referred to simply as the common 
history of the interpreter and the text. However, this historical 
relation is not to be construed as something vague and intangi- 
ble; i t  has its concrete manifestation in language. For this rea- 
son, language is seen as being the "concretion of effective-histor- 
ical ~ o n s ~ i o ~ s n e ~ s . " ~ ~ ~  
The history of both the interpreter and the text makes itself 
known in the present by way of language. Language is the con- 
crete means by which the judgments and understandings of the 
past are carried into the present. Thus, the interpreter's effec- 
tive-history that provides his present pre-judgments exists in 
the language he employs. 
To say that the horizons of the present are not formed at all 
without the past is to say that our language bears the stamp of 
the past and is the life of the past in the present. Thus the 
prejudices [that philosophical hermeneutics] identifies as more 
constitutive of our being than our reflective judgments can now 
be seen as embedded and passed on in the language we use. 
Since our horizons are given to us prereflectively in our lan- 
guage, we always possess our world linguistically. Word and 
subject matter, language and reality, are inseparable, and the 
limits of our understanding coincide with the limits of our 
common language.lS5 
Thus, the mediation that occurs between an interpreter and the 
text, as in the dialogue between interlocutors, can be seen as 
"the full realisation of conversation, in which something is ex- 
pressed that is not only [the interpreter's] or [his text's], but 
The linguisticality of effective-history means that interpre- 
tation can occur neither prelinguistically nor extralinguistically. 
Not only does the text appear to the interpreter in terms of lan- 
134. Id. at 351. 
135. Linge, supra note 101, at xxviii. 
136. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, at 350. 
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guage, but the interpreter can approach the text only in terms of 
language. There is no world outside language.I3' 
[Tlhe linguistic quality of our experience of the world is prior, 
as contrasted with everything that is recognised and addressed 
as being. The fundamental relation of language and world does 
not, then, mean that world becomes the object of language. 
Rather, the object of knowledge and of statements is already 
enclosed within the world horizon of language. The linguistic 
nature of the human experience of the world does not include 
making the world into an 0 b j e ~ t . l ~ ~  
In other words, there is no world outside its presence as the sub- 
ject matter of some language community. One cannot experience 
language prior to experiencing the world, nor the world prior to 
experiencing language. "We cannot see a linguistic world from 
above in this way, for there is no point of view outside the expe- 
rience of the world in language from which it could itself become 
an 
Consequently, language is not simply an optional function 
that the interpreter engages in or does not engage in a t  will.I4O 
137. The idea of "world" has peculiar significance in philosophical hermeneutics. 
The idea has its origins in Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of man. See supra note 
102. World is not the environment, the sum total of all objects; i t  is rather the entire 
relational context in terms of which every object is pregrasped. Therefore, the world is 
never separate from man; it is prior to any separation from the objects of the world. M. 
HEIDEWER. supra note 102, a t  91-148. Philosophical hermeneutics carries forward 
Heidegger's notion of world by making explicit that  the human experience of world is 
linguistic. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  397-414. 
138. H. GADAMER. supra note 101, a t  408. 
139. Id. a t  410. The peculiar world of a language community is known to any person 
who has mastered a foreign language. The language is a repository of cultural-historical 
experience. Consequently, many of its words and phrases have a richness of meaning 
that reflects that experience and, therefore, can be fully understood only by total immer- 
sion in the culture of the language community. Not surprisingly, translation of such 
words and phrases requires much more than mechanical synonym finding; it requires 
explanation of the foreign context of understanding. However, even with such an expla- 
nation there is always a sense of the loss of the dimensions of the language. See id. a t  
345-51. 
140. The fact that the world cannot be grasped prelinguistically or extralinguisti- 
cally is illustrated by our complete possession by language in even thinking about 
language: 
[All1 thinking about language is already once again drawn back into language. 
We can only think in a language . . . . 
Language is not one of the means by which consciousness is mediated with 
the world. . . . Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool. For i t  is 
in the nature of the tool that we master its use, which is to say we take it in 
hand and lay i t  aside when it has done its service. That  is not the same as 
when we take the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and with their 
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Language is beyond the interpreter's manipulative control be- 
cause it is between him and the text, making possible his very 
relating to it. The interpreter cannot first have an extralinguistic 
contact with the text and then put the text into the instrumen- 
tation of language. "Language is not just one of man's posses- 
sions in the world, but on it depends the fact that man has a 
world at  all."141 Language is the very relational context in terms 
of which any text is pregrasped. Indeed, because language is pre- 
supposed in every act of interpretation of any text, it is prior to 
any separation of the interpreter and the text. Language is, 
therefore, prior to all objectivity and subjectivity since both are 
conceived within a schema that separates subject from object. 
Philosophical hermeneutics is a theory of interpretation 
that directly conflicts with the view of interpretation assumed in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The assumption is that interpre- 
tation is free and discretionary, meaning that no common stan- 
dards exist between the interpreter and the text to provide guid- 
ance for evaluating and judging the text. In a fundamental 
sense, the interpreter and text are assumed to be independent of 
each other. This assumption yields two approaches to adjudica- 
tion. The objective interpretivist approach constructs preestab- 
lished norms for inquiry that reflect the characteristics of the 
text itself so that the interpreter's judgment identifies with the 
text. The subjective interpretivist approach insists that judg- 
ments of the text will be drawn only in terms of the interpreter's 
preconceptions of the text. In other words, while the objectivist 
sees an independent text as determining understanding, the sub- 
jectivist sees an independent interpreter as determining 
understanding. 
The hermeneutic theory of interpretation, on the other 
hand, views interpretation as a dialogical interaction of inter- 
use let them sink back into the general store of words over which we dispose. 
Such an analogy is false because we never find ourselves as consciousness over 
against the world and, as it wore [sic], grasp after a tool of understanding in a 
wordless condition. Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowl- 
edge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is 
our own. 
H. GADAMER, Man and Language (1966), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 62 (1976). 
141. H. GADAMER, supra note 101, a t  401. 
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preter and text that is mediated by their common history and 
language. As a result, neither interpreter nor text is sufficiently 
independent to be determinative of meaning. The text prevents 
the interpreter from being the sole determiner of meaning by 
providing a contrasting relief against which the interpreter's pre- 
judgments are brought to awareness for critical scrutiny. Like- 
wise, the interpreter prevents the text from being the sole deter- 
miner of meaning since the text is intelligible only in terms of 
the interpreter's pre-judgments. In these fundamental ways, the 
determination of meaning is beyond the control of either inter- 
preter or text; indeed, both contribute to the determination of 
meaning interdependently. 
In contrast to Anglo-American jurisprudence, philosophical 
hermeneutics concludes that interpretation is never an activity 
in need of constraints because it is a structure of existential con- 
straints. These existential constraints are the interrelations that 
exist between the interpreter and the text prior to  interpreta- 
tion. The interpreter's access to the text is made possible only 
because of the a priori mediation provided by their shared his- 
torical and linguistic context. This contextual interrelatedness 
provides both the possibilities and the limitations of the inter- 
~ r e t a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  Moreover, the interpreter and text stand in a dia- 
logical relation without which interpretation cannot possibly oc- 
cur. The dialogical relation is prior to interpretation in the sense 
142. A similar idea has been expressed by Professor Stanley Fish in a critical re- 
sponse to Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy for adjudication. Fish criticizes Dworkin for 
presuming the interpretive freedom of the first author in the chain. See supra note 41. 
[Tlhe first author has surrendered his freedom (although, as we shall see, sur- 
render is exactly the wrong word) as soon as he commits himself to writing a 
novel . . . . He must decide, for example, how to begin the novel, but the deci- 
sion is not "free" because the very notion "beginning a novel" exists only in 
the context of a set of practices that a t  once enable and limit the act of begin- 
ning. One cannot think of beginning a novel without thinking within, as op- 
posed to thinking "of," these established practices, and even if one "decides" 
to "ignore" them or "violate" them or "set them aside," the actions of ignoring 
and violating and setting aside will themselves have a shape that is constrained 
by the preexisting shape of those practices. This does not mean that the deci- 
sions of the first author are whollv determined. but that the choices available 
to him are "novel writing choices," choices that depend on a prior understand- 
ing of what it means to write a novel, even when he "chooses" to alter that 
understanding. In short he is neither free nor constrained (if those words are 
understood as referring to absolute states), but free and constrained. He is free 
to begin whatever kind of novel he decides to write, but he is constrained by 
the finite (although not unchanging) possibilities that are subsumed in the no- 
tions "kind of novel" and "beginning a novel." 
Fish, supra note 5, a t  553. 
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that interpretation cannot be undertaken without the open dia- 
logical interaction of interpreter and text. Importantly, these in- 
terrelations are said to be existential because they constitute the 
very manner of the interpreter's existence with the text.14= 
Again, the implication is that interpretation is so fundamental 
to the interpreter's means of knowing the text that the act of 
interpretation cannot be manipulatively controlled by the 
interpreter. 
The view of interpretation provided by philosophical her- 
meneutics represents a direct theoretical challenge to Anglo- 
American jurisprudence. Because Anglo-American jurisprudence 
presumes that interpretation is an essentially unrestrained activ- 
ity, the jurisprudential debate has focused on the availability of 
constraints for interpretation. Unfortunately, this debate has 
proceeded without a specific and systematic examination of the 
nature of interpretation upon which the entire debate rests. 
Philosophical hermeneutics is challenging because its examina- 
tion of the nature of interpretation concludes that interpretation 
is not what traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence has 
blindly presupposed. Therefore, the ground upon which the ob- 
jective and subjective interpretivist debate stands is gone. 
This theoretical challenge deserves careful attention from 
the Anglo-American jurisprudential c~mmunity."~ Anglo-Ameri- 
143. The fundamental existentiality of these constraints in the act of interpretation 
prompted one commentator to conclude as follows: 
The task of philosophical hermeneutics, therefore, is ontological rather than 
methodological. It  seeks to throw light on the fundamental conditions that un- 
derlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and non- 
scientific alike, and that constitute understanding as an event over which the 
interpreting subject does not ultimately preside. 
Linge, supra note 101, at  xi. Consequently, philosophical hermeneutics "pervades all 
human relations to the world." H. GADAMER, supra note 101, at  xi. Its issue is "not what 
we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and 
doing." Id. a t  xvi. See generally M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 102. 
144. The purpose of this comment is to direct Anglo-American jurisprudential at- 
tention to its unexamined assumption about the nature of interpretation and to the phil- 
osophical hermeneutic challenge to this assumption. The presentation of a philosophical 
hermeneutic theory of law is beyond the scope of this comment. However, the present 
avoidance of an articulation of this theory does not mean that philosophical hermeneu- 
tics offers little or nothing that is directly relevant to the judicial context. Several ideas 
of jurisprudential relevance may be derived from the outline of philosophical hermeneu- 
tics provided herein. 
First, the idea of the historical mediation of the past with the present is relevant. A 
judicial interpreter can be easily characterized as situated in a historical present, facing 
the present expectations of litigants that are based on prior judgments drawn by legisla- 
tive writers or other judicial interpreters. The judicial interpreter's adjudicative task is 
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can jurisprudence can only stand to benefit by directing its at- 
tention to the theory of interpretation provided by philosophical 
hermeneutics. In the very least, attention to the hermeneutic 
theory of interpretation, even if it were ultimately rejected, 
could induce the critical and systematic jurisprudential study of 
the nature of interpretation that has heretofore been assumed 
but never studied. However, careful attention to the hermeneu- 
tic theory of interpretation will more than likely lead to an 
abandonment of the prevailing jurisprudential assumption about 
the nature of interpretation and a transcendence of the objective 
and subjective interpretivist debate that preoccupies Anglo- 
American jurisprudence. 
James J. Hamula 
to mediate these conflicting historically-based expectations, including his own pre-judg- 
ments that may come into play with the interests of the present case. See supra note 
122. 
Second, the idea that this mediation occurs in language is relevant to the judicial 
context. Law is language-bound because all the materials of the law have their existence 
in language. Any use of these materials in any context, including negotiation, litigation, 
and adjudication, occurs in language as well. In a very important sense then, the judicial 
interpreter is a necessarily obligated participant in language. The consequence of his 
participation is that his resolution of the litigants' claims is regulated by the same terms 
and conditions of language that regulated the linguistic articulation of those claims. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the idea of the dialogical structure of interpre- 
tation is ,relevant to the judicial context. In the adjudicative process, the judicial inter- 
preter is obligated to hear claims that he might not otherwise want to hear, to listen to 
all persons who will be directly affected by his resolution of their claims, and to respond 
specifically to these claims by resolving them and assuming responsibility for that resolu- 
tion. In other words, the adjudicative process institutionally compels the judicial inter- 
preter to confront openly and directly the interests and expectations of others. Philo- 
sophical hermeneutics indicates the significance of this confrontation for the judicial 
interpreter. The judicial interpreter's pre-judgments are brought to awareness (for him 
as well as for others) only when cast into contrasting relief against judgments that are 
different from his own. Once his pre-judgments are illuminated, they are more easily 
subject to critical evaluation (by him as well as -by others) for their suitability in the 
resolution of the dispute. In sum, the judicial interpreter is restrained by the very nature 
of his undertaking from interpreting in a free and discretionary manner. 
The Right to Life of the Unborn-An 
Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the 
Irish Constitution 
The late President of Ireland and former Chief Justice of 
the Irish Supreme Court, Cearbhall O'Dalaigh, once stated, 
"Constitutional rights are declared not alone because of bitter 
memories of the past but no less because of the improbable, but 
not-to-be-overlooked, perils of the future."' This statement de- 
scribes the rationale behind the eighth amendment to the Irish 
Constitution. Viewed in popular terms as a prolife amendment, 
its genesis lies in fear that the almost universal trend to liber- 
alize abortion legislation may creep into Ireland. The amend- 
ment attempts to strike the appropriate balance between the 
mother's constitutionally protected personal rights and the un- 
born's right to life. Although it was strongly supported by the 
people, the amendment contains some technical problems, as 
well as some broad language that may permit rather than pre- 
vent the introduction of abortion legislation in Ireland. How- 
ever, in light of the strong public opinion against any liberaliza- 
tion of abortion laws, and the legislative and judicial 
development of Irish family law, the more realistic view is that 
the amendment is a powerful endorsement of Ireland's prolife 
position. 
In order to understand the legal and political atmosphere in 
Ireland a t  the time the amendment was passed, it is necessary to 
understand (1) the historical development of the Irish Republic, 
(2) the effects of foreign legislation on Irish law, and (3) the de- 
velopment of Irish abortion law. 
Because English rule was imposed for several centuries, En- 
glish common law directly applied -in Ireland.2 Abortion was 
viewed by early English commentators as a serious crime. Black- 
stone stated: 
1. McMahon v. Attorney Gen., 1972 Ir. R. 69, 111. 
2. Henchy, Precedent in the Irish Supreme Court, 25 MOD. L. Rev. 544 (1962). 
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Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in 
every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon 
as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a wo- 
man is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it 
in her womb; or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in 
her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not 
murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But 
the modern law doth not look upon this offence in quite so 
atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous mi~demeanor.~ 
Ireland was incorporated into the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland in 1800 by the Union with Ireland Act.4 The 
English Parliament became the sole legislator for both England 
and Ireland and thereafter all enactments specifically stated 
whether they were to apply to England, Ireland, or both.6 
In the nineteenth century, the English Parliament codified 
the law governing abortion in the Offences Against the Person 
The Act specifically declared that it applied to Ireland.7 
Sections 58 and 59 provided: 
58. Every Woman, being with Child, who with Intent to pro- 
cure her own Miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to 
herself any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall unlaw- 
fully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with 
the like Intent, and whosoever, with Intent to procure the 
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with 
Child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be 
taken by her any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall 
unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatso- 
ever with the like Intent, shall be guilty of Felony, and 
being convicted thereof shall be liable, a t  the Discretion 
of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life or for 
any Term not less than Three Years, or to be imprisoned 
3. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129-30 (4th ed. 1771); see also E. COKE, THIRD 
INSTITUTE 50 (1979) (1st ed. London 1628). 
4. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67 (1800), reprinted in 23 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 
832 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1970). The union was codified by an identical Irish act, the Act of 
Union (Ireland) 1800. The Act abolished the separate Irish Parliament that had existed 
since the thirteenth century. The Act received the Royal Assent on August 1, 1800. 
5. For example, The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, 5 7(3) specifically provides that it 
does not apply to Northern Ireland. 
6. 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100 (1861). 
7. Id. The preamble to the Act states, "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and 
amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland in relation to offences against the person 
. . ." (emphasis in original). 
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for any Term not exceeding Two Years, with or without 
Hard Labour, and with or without Solitary Confinement. 
59. Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any Poison 
or other noxious Thing, or any Instrument or Thing 
whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be un- 
lawfully used or employed with Intent to procure the 
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with 
Child, shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor, and being con- 
victed thereof shall be liable, a t  the Discretion of the 
Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for the Term of 
Three Years, or to be imprisoned for any Term not ex- 
ceeding Two Years, with or without Hard Labour. 
This Act continues to be the law concerning abortion in Ireland 
today.8 
In 1921 a treaty was signed between Ireland and England 
forming the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) out of twenty- 
six of the thirty-two Irish counties.' Although it remained a 
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Irish Free 
State ceased to be part of the United Kingdom. In 1922 an Irish 
Constitution was established.1•‹ This constitution was amended 
twenty-seven times in the next fifteen years" and was finally 
superceded in 1937 when the present constitution was approved 
by plebiscite. The eighth amendment discussed in this comment 
has been incoporated into the 1937 con~titution.'~ 
The 1937 constitution virtually severed Ireland's ties to 
Great Britain.13 However, i t  provided (as did the 1922 constitu- 
tion) that all laws previously in force would continue to be of 
full force and effect so long as they were consistent with the 
1937 constitution, or until they were repealed or amended by the 
Oireachtas (Irish Parliament).14 Thus, the "unlawful miscar- 
8. Binchy, Abortion and the Law, in ABORTION OW 69 (1983) (published by Life 
Education and Research Network). 
9. Codified in The Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 4, 
reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 636 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). The re- 
maining six counties now constitute Northern Ireland and remain under English rule. 
10. Codified in The Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) Constitution Act, 1922, 13 
Geo. 5, ch. 1, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 641 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 
1968). 
11. 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 642 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). 
12. IRISH CONST. art. 40.3.3. 
13. The final step occurred in 1948 when the Irish Free State left the British Com- 
monwealth of Nations. I t  is now internationally recognized as the Republic of Ireland. 
See The Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 41, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S STAT- 
UTES OF ENGLAND 670 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). 
14. IRISH CONST. art. 50.1. 
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riages" provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act were 
carried over into Irish law by the new constitution. 
Although sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act specifically prohibit abortion in Ireland, there have 
been few  prosecution^.'^ In 1945 William Henry Coleman was 
charged with two counts of attempting to perform an abortion.I6 
He was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years of penal ser- 
vitude on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. 
The most infamous Irish abortionist was a woman known as 
Nurse Cadden, who "was a well known figure . . . on the Dublin 
scene for 20 years."17 Her medical services came to an end in 
1956, when she was convicted of murder after the body of a wo- 
man, who died following an abortion, was found on the public 
footpath outside her apartment.ls Nurse Cadden was sentenced 
to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. 
In neither of these cases, nor in any other case to date, has 
an Irish court analyzed the scope of sections 58 and 59." How- 
ever, the English courts have analyzed these sections and an ex- 
amination of their analysis is instructive because of its poten- 
tially persuasive influence on Irish law. 
The most pertinent case is Rex v. Bourne.20 Dr. Aleck 
Bourne, a respected obstetrician, performed an abortion on a 
fourteen-year-old girl who had been violently raped. Dr. Bourne 
stated that he felt he had a duty to perform the abortion after 
deciding that continuance of the pregnancy would probably 
cause her serious injury.21 Justice MacNaghten, in his instruc- 
tions to the jury, stated that since sections 58 and 59 used the 
word "unlawfully" in relation to procuring a miscarriage, i t  im- 
plied that procuring a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in 
certain circumstances. In defining these circumstances he bor- 
rowed language from the Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 
15. P. JACKSON. THE DEADLY SOLUTION TO AN IRISH PROBLEM-BACKSTREET ABORTION 
2 (1983) (published by the Women's Right To Choose Campaign). Jackson suggested 
that there have been 58 illegal abortion cases investigated or tried in Ireland between 
1926 and 1974. 
16. People v. Coleman, 1945 Ir. R. 237 (Crim. App. 1944) (the conviction was later 
reversed on other grounds). 
17. P. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 4. 
18. Id. at 5. 
19. Binchy, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine: A Legal Perspective, in ETHI- 
CAL ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE M DICINE 95, 102 (M. Reidy ed. 1982). 
20. [I9391 1 K.B. 687. 
21. Id. at 688. 
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1929,22 which provided that the killing of a child capable of be- 
ing born alive was not an offense if the act was done "in good 
faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."23 
Though sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act did not provide such an exception, Justice MacNaghten in- 
terpreted the Act as though it did. He added that this standard 
ought to be given a reasonable interpretation: 
[I]f the doctor is of opinion, on reasonable grounds and with 
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the con- 
tinuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a physi- 
cal or mental wreck, the jury are [sic] quite entitled to take the 
view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in 
that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of pre- 
serving the life of the mother.=' 
Based on this sweeping instruction, the jury acquitted Dr. 
Bourne.26 
The impact of Bourne on Irish law is unclear. I t  is not bind- 
ing precedent and opinions vary about its persuasive value. Wil- 
liam Binchy, a member of the Irish Law Reform Commission, 
and an authority on Irish family law stated: 
I t  will be recalled that that decision [Bourne] held that neces- 
sity was a defence to a prosecution for abortion, and that an 
abortion performed to save the life of the mother would thus 
be permissible. It seems that this part of the judgment would 
represent the law in this country. But where that judgment 
went on to hold that an abortion would be lawful if designed to 
save the mother from becoming a "physical or mental wreck", 
this would surely not represent our law, since i t  goes far be- 
yond what the defence of necessity can e n c o m p a s ~ . ~ ~  
On the other hand, Father Bernard Treacy, a staunch anti-abor- 
tion campaigner noted: 
However, the judge did state that the words "for the pur- 
pose only of preserving the life of the mother" represented the 
common law, and thus were implicit in the 1861 Act by virtue 
of the word "unlawfully". 
If these words do represent the pre-1861 common law, i t  
22. 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 304 (A. 
Yonge 3d ed. 1969). 
23. Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, 5 l(1). 
24. [I9391 1 K.B. at 694. 
25. Id. at 696. 
26. Binchy, supra note 19, at 103. 
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could be argued that they thereby declare the position in Irish 
law. If so, an Irish court could validly adopt the view that pro- 
curing a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in regard to Sec- 
tion 58 of The Offences Against the Person Act if it were pro- 
cured in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life 
of the mother. However, the doctrine in [sic] unclear; and,clari- 
fication would be welcome.27 
However, it is clear that Bourne opened the door to the lib- 
eralization of abortion laws in England. In 1967, in response to 
the thalidomide tragedy of the early 1960~,~ '  the English Parlia- 
ment, with the encouragement of the Abortion Law Reform As- 
sociation, passed The Abortion Act.29 The Act provided: 
l(1) . . . [A] person shall not be guilty of an offence under the 
law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated 
by a registered medical practitioner if two registered 
medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good 
faith- 
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve 
risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury 
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant wo- 
man or any existing children of her family, greater 
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were 
born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handi~apped.~' 
The Abortion Act did not overrule sections 58 and 59 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act; however, it significantly nar- 
rowed the definition of what an unlawful abortion entailed.31 
Furthermore, although the Abortion Act, as an act of the British 
Parliament, has no legally binding effect in Ireland, it has had a 
significant impact in that an increasing number of Irish women 
27. Treacy, The Constitution and Right to Life, in ABORTION AND LAW 74, 80 (A. 
Flannery ed. 1983). 
28. For a complete account of the Abortion Law Reform Association and the impact 
of the thalidomide tragedy on the movement to reform abortion law in England, see K. 
HINDELL & M. SIMMS. ABORTION LAW REFORMED 108 (1971). 
29. 1967, ch. 87. 
30. Id. •˜ l( l)(a)-(b).  
31. Effectively, abortion is now available on demand in England. Official statistics 
indicate that in the last three months of 1983 there were 37,628 abortions performed. 
OFFICE OF POPULATION CENSUSES & SURVEYS, OPCS MONITOR (August 7, 1984). 
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are now having safe, lawful, and relatively inexpensive abortions 
in English clinics.32 
A modern trend toward liberalization of abortion laws in 
western democracieP caused conservative Irish lawyers and 
doctors to be concerned that the Irish abortion laws might be 
subject to change. Much of this concern was due to the fact that 
the Irish Constitution provided no explicit protection for the un- 
born child. Article 40.3 provides: 
(1) The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the per- 
sonal rights of the citizen. 
(2) The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best 
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice 
done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property 
rights of every ~it izen.~'  
However, these provisions only apply to "citizens." The consti- 
tution provides that citizenship is "determined in accordance 
with law."s6 The law defining citizenship is contained in the 
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act and provides: 
(1) Every person born in Ireland is an Irish citizen from 
birth. 
(2) Every person is an Irish citizen if his father or mother 
was an Irish citizen a t  the time of that person's birth or 
becomes an Irish citizen under subsection (1) or would be 
an Irish cit izen under that subsection if alive a t  the pass- 
ing of this 
Although it is clear from this language that an unborn child is 
not a citizen, the Irish Supreme Court in State (Nicolaou) u. An 
Bord U ~ h t a l a ~ ~  left open the possibility of affording constitu- 
tional protection for a noncitizen. Nicolaou, a British subject, 
32. In 1968 fewer than 100 Irish women had abortions in English clinics, whereas by 
the end of 1981, the number had risen to almost 4,000. MEDICO-SOCIAL RESEARCH BOARD, 
TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY, ENGLAND 1983, WOMEN FROM THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 9 
(1984) (citing MEDICO-SOCIAL RESEARCH BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 49 (1982)). 
33. Abortion was legalized in England in 1967, the United States in 1973, France in 
1975, Germany in 1976, Italy in 1978, and Holland in 1981. 340 DAIL DEB. 1585 (1983). 
34. IRISH CONST. arts. 40.3.1 & 40.3.2. 
35. Id. art. 9.1.2. 
36. PUB. GEN. ACTS, no. 26, 55 6(1) & (2) (1956). 
37. 1966 1r. R. 567. 
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sought a court order to prevent the adoption of his illegitimate 
son. He claimed that the Adoption Act was unconstitutional be- 
cause it violated his rights as a natural father. The court stated: 
"This Court expressly reserves for another and more appropriate 
case consideration of the effect of non-citzenship upon the inter- 
pretation of the Articles in question . . . ."38 Even if Article 40.3 
were interpreted to apply to noncitizens, it would take quite a 
liberal interpretation of the word "citizen" to encompass the un- 
born 
The parameters of the constitutional rights of the unborn 
became less clear following decisions of the Irish Supreme Court 
that provided constitutional protection of individual personal 
rights that were not explicitly granted in the constitution. This 
trend began in 1963 with Ryan v. Attorney GeneraL40 Mrs. 
Ryan sought to have the Health (Floridation of Water Supplies) 
Act struck down as uncon~titutional.~~ The supreme court af- 
firmed the high court's decision that, based on the facts, Mrs. 
Ryan's suit could not succeed. However, the court confirmed 
that the right to bodily integrity was included as part of the gen- 
eral constitutionally guaranteed personal rights.42 Quoting Jus- 
tice Kenny of the high court, the supreme court held that "the 
personal rights which may be invoked to invalidate legislation 
are not confined to those specified in Article 40 but include all 
38. Id. a t  645. 
39. Heuston, Personal Rights under the Irish Constitution, 11 IRISH JURIST 205, 213 
(1976), reprinted in 11 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 294, 304 (1977), stated in this regard: 
The phrase "of the citizen" has given rise to difficulties here and elsewhere 
throughout the fundamental rights Articles. At least two questions arise-first, 
whether the constitutional guarantees extend to aliens and secondly, whether 
they extend to artificial as distinct from natural persons. The Supreme Court 
seems to be uncertain whether the constitutional guarantees protect aliens, al- 
though in one case on the matter (In Re Singer) [97 I.L.T.R. 130 (1960)l in 
which the issue might have arisen, counsel for the State expressly disclaimed 
any reliance on it. Clearly it would be very embarrassing for the Court, espe- 
cially since the State has joined the European Economic Community, to be 
obliged to hold that an alien was not entitled to the same degree of protection 
as a citizen. On the other hand, simply as a matter of the interpretation of 
words, it is very difficult to see how the word "citizen" can be held to mean 
"any person whether a citizen or an alien." 
40. 1965 Ir. R. 294. 
41. The Health Act authorized the adding of flouride to public water in order to 
protect against dental decay. Mrs. Ryan challenged the state action as an infringement 
of (1) her parental rights to raise her children, and (2) her individual rights to personal 
integrity. Id. a t  341. 
42. Id. a t  295. 
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those rights that flow from the Christian and democratic nature 
of the State."43 
The court soon recognized other personal most no- 
tably the right of marital privacy recognized in the 1973 
landmark decision of McGee u. Attorney General.45 In three 
years Mrs. McGee bore four children, two of them twins. Mrs. 
McGee had a long history of medical problems and each of her 
pregnancies had been difficult; she nearly lost her life while 
pregnant with her second child. Her doctor advised her that an- 
other pregnancy would endanger her life, so she was fitted with a 
diaphragm to be used with an intrauterine contraceptive jelly.46 
She brought this action after a supply of contraceptive jelly she 
was attempting to import from England was seized by customs 
officials pursuant to the Criminal Law Amendment Act.47 
Strangely, the Act prohibited the importation and sale of con- 
traceptives, but not their use.48 By a four-to-one majority, the 
supreme court held that the importation restriction was a viola- 
tion of the right to marital privacy provided by articles 40.3.1 
and 41.1 of the Irish Cons t i t u t i~n .~~  
Those opposed to abortion were not so much concerned by 
the narrow holding of McGee as they were by the cases the court 
cited as support for the decision. The court relied extensively on 
two United States Supreme Court decisions, Griswold u. Con- 
necticutS0 and Eisenstadt u. B ~ i r d . ~ l  In Griswold, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the right of married persons to 
use contraceptives was part of the constitutionally protected 
right of marital Eisenstadt extended that right to the 
43. Id. a t  312. 
44. See State (Healy) v. Donoghue, 1976 Ir. R. 325 (the right to justice and fair 
procedure); Murtagh Properties v. Cleary, 1972 Ir. R. 330 (the right to work & earn a 
livelihood); I n  re Haughey, 1971 Ir. R. 217 (the right to defend one's name). 
45. 1974 Ir. R. 284. 
46. Id. 
47. PUB. GEN. ACTS, no. 6 (1935). 
48. Id. $ 17(1) provides, "It shall not be lawful for any person to sell, or expose, 
offer, advertise, or keep for sale or to import or attempt to import into Saorstat Eireann 
for sale, any contraceptive." 
49. 1974 Ir. R. a t  284-85. IRISH CONST. art. 40.3.1 states, "The State guarantees in its 
laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state recognizes the family as the natu- 
ral, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possess- 
ing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law." 
50. 381 US.  479 (1965). 
51. 405 US.  438 (1972). 
52. 381 US.  a t  484-86. 
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unmarried,53 and was the stepping-stone from Griswold to one of 
the major United States abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade.54 In 
Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that the word "per- 
son", as used in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not include the unborn child.55 The United 
States Supreme Court also held that the constitutionally pro- 
tected right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass a wo- 
man's decision whether or not to terminate her p regnan~y ."~~  
The American cases disturbed conservative Irish lawyers67 
and doctors because of the similarity of the equal protection 
clauses of the United States and Irish  constitution^.^^ I t  was 
feared that McGee would lead to the liberalization of abortion 
laws in Ireland, particularly since the Irish Supreme Court looks 
upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with the 
greatest of respect.69 
I t  is questionable whether these concerns were justified. 
Justice Walsh, speaking for the court in McGee, addressed the 
abortion issue in somewhat veiled terms: "[Alny action on the 
53. 405 U.S. a t  453-54. 
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an interesting look at  how Justice Brennan prompted 
Justice Blackmun with a reference to Eisenstadt to assist him in bridging the gap from 
Griswold to Roe see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG. THE BRETHREN 175-76 (1979). 
55. 410 U.S. a t  157. 
56. Id. a t  153. 
57. THE IRISH ASSOCIATION F LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE UNBORN. EWSLET- 
TER 2 (1983) stated, "The great abortion debate in America grew around the word 'per- 
son' and whether or not the word 'person' extended to include the unborn child. The 
similarity to our own situtation is disturbing." 
58. IRISH CONST. art. 40.1 provides, "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held 
before the law. This shall not be held to mean that the state shall not in its enactments 
have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function." 
59. In O'Brien v. Stoutt, No. 326413 (High Ct. May 5, 1982), Justice D'Arcy said that 
"decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States will always be received by this 
Court with the greatest of respect." See Binchy, The Need for a Constitutional Amend- 
ment, in ABORTION & LAW 116, 121, n.16 (A. Flannery ed. 1983); see also State (Quinn) v. 
Ryan, 1965 Ir. R. 70. Justice Walsh stated: 
I reject the submission that because upon the foundation of the State our 
Courts took over an English legal system and the common law that the Courts 
must be deemed to have adopted and should now adopt an approach to Consti- 
tutional questions conditioned by English judicial methods and English legal 
training which despite their undoubted excellence were not fashioned for inter- 
preting written constitutions or reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. 
In this state one would have expected that if the approach of any Court of final 
appeal of another State was to have been held up as an example for this Court 
to follow it would more appropriately have been the Supreme Court of the 
United States rather than the House of Lords. 
Id. a t  126. 
3711 RIGHT TO LIFE 381 
part of either husband and wife or of the State to limit family 
sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily 
not only be an offence against the common good but also against 
the guaranteed personal rights of that human life in q u e s t i ~ n . " ~ ~  
McGee was decided eleven months after Roe, and Justice Walsh, 
presumably aware of this major decisionY6' appeared to stress 
that McGee was a narrow decision that selectively recognized 
the right of married couples to use contraceptives and it was not 
to be interpreted as anything more. Six years later, Justice 
Walsh was even more explicit in G. u. An Bord U c h t a l ~ : ~ ~  
[A child] has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded 
against all threats directed to its existence whether before or 
after birth. . . . The right to life necessarily implies the right to 
be born, the right to preserve and defend (and to have pre- 
served and defended) that life . . . .63 
Despite these dicta the potential effect of McGee on Irish 
abortion law remains open to debate.64 Professor James Casey of 
University College Dublin Law School stated, "Those who argue 
that since the matrimonial privacy of Griswold u. Connecticut 
60. 1974 Ir. R. a t  312. 
61. Surprisingly, one leading commentator has suggested that the Irish Supreme 
Court was unaware of the Roe decision. W. Binchy, Sexual Behavior and the Law in 
Ireland 22 n.70 (1978) (unpublished manuscript). This seems inconsistent with the pub- 
licity surrounding Roe and the deference given by the Irish Supreme Court to United 
States Supreme Court decisions. See supra note 59. 
62. 1980 Ir. R. 32. 
63. Id. a t  69. 
64. Proponents of the prolife amendment have rejected the persuasive value of these 
dicta: 
Whilst these views expressed by the learned judge are encouraging they do not 
in themselves, of course, afford any adequate legal Constitutional protection 
for the unborn. The other judges in these decisions made it clear that they 
were not expressing any view on this issue. Obiter dicta bind no judge in any 
subsequent decision, not even the judge who made them originally. Mr. Justice 
Walsh would be the first to acknowledge that his view could not bind the 
Court in a future decision: as he pointed out in McGee's case, constitutional 
interpretation is not rooted in the past but is a continuous process through 
time. 
THE IRISH ASSOCIATION F LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE UNBORN, NEWSLETTER 2 
(1983). Professor Kelly, a constitutional law professor and member of the Irish Parlia- 
ment, thinks otherwise. 
Obiter dicta in cases of this importance are not lightly uttered, they are re- 
garded as the next best thing to a binding authority and are freely cited in 
court by counsel. They are treated for all practical purposes as though they 
were authority, even though they do not have a status in the ordinary 
heirarchy of binding precedent that we respect here. 
339 DAIL DEB. 1399 (1983). 
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led to the proabortion decision in Roe u. Wade, the same must 
follow here from McGee u. A.G. are guilty of an absurdly 
mechanical view of the judicial process."6s Professor James 
O'Reilly, another professor of law at  University College Dublin 
Law School, was even more assertive in declaring, "One wonders 
if the commentators who regard the finding of a right to abor- 
tion lurking behind McGee have actually read that decision and 
noticed not only the small print but the implications of the 
small print."" Referring to such people as "prophets of doom," 
he concluded, "Any commentator who seriously suggests that 
one can expect the Irish Supreme Court to arrive at  a situation 
similar to Roe u. Wade or Doe u. Bolton simply has not read the 
Irish Constitution, the judgment in McGee, nor understands all 
the issues involved."67 
Professor Binchy, a key figure in the movement for a prolife 
amendment, saw it otherwise: 
In my view, these commentators are guilty of too much vigour 
in ridiculing the possible developments in this country. No one 
seriously suggests that our Supreme Court would tomorrow 
recognise a constitutional right to abortion. Equally clearly, 
however, attitudes among the judiciary towards abortion may 
change in the coming years. If this happens, the introduction 
by McGee of the privacy concept into our jurisprudence may 
well serve to assist the constitutional case for abortion. With- 
out such a concept, the constitutional argument in favour of 
abortion would be that much more difficult to e~tablish.~' 
Additionally, there were concerns among staunch anti-abortion- 
ists that Ireland, as a signator and contracting party to the Eu- 
ropean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free- 
doms, might be obligated to modify its laws in relation to 
abortion. This could happen if article two of the Convention, 
which states that "[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by 
law,"6s were interpreted by the European Commission on 
Human Rights as giving women a limited right to abortion. 
65. Casey, The Development of Constitutional Law Under Chief Justice O'Dalaigh, 
1978 DUBLIN U.L.J. 3, 10. 
66. O'Reilly, Marital Privacy & Family Law, 65 STUDIES 8, 17 (1977). 
67. Id. at 22. 
68. Binchy, supra note 19, at 104. 
69. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION F HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS, 
art. 2(1) [hereinafter cited as CONVENTION], reprinted in J. FAWCETT. HE APPLICATION F 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION  HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (1969). 
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Prolife supporters argued that Ireland would be required to 
comply with such a finding, since article 53 of the Convention 
provides, "The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by 
the decision of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties."'O 
Fears that abortion might be legalized in Ireland were also 
increased by statistics showing an increase in the number of 
Irish women having abortions in England from 64 in 1968 to 
more than 3,600 in 1981.'l Such figures lent credibility to fears 
that Irish legislators might be more willing to adopt some form 
of abortion legislation, particularly in light of references to ther- 
apeutic abortion made previously in Irish parliamentary 
debates.'* 
Proposals (1) to extend jurisdiction to allow criminal prose- 
cution of Irish women who had abortions abroad, (2) to enjoin 
women from leaving Ireland for abortions, and (3) to criminally 
prosecute abortion referral agencies were dismissed as either un- 
manageable or ~ndesireable.'~ Conservative lawyers considered 
an amendment to the constitution as more effective in preserv- 
ing the existing laws against ab~rt ion. '~ They argued that an 
amendment would have the double effect of prohibiting the Oi- 
reachtas from introducing abortion legislation, while at  the same 
time preventing the Irish Supreme Court from holding that sec- 
tions 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act were 
unc~nstitutional.'~ 
In light of these developments, on April 27, 1981 "a group of 
organisations acting with the full support of the Professors of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology in the Irish Univer~ities"'~ launched 
70. CONVENTION, supra note 69, art. 53, reprinted in J. FAWCET~, supra note 69, at 
337. 
71. O'Leary, The Management of Problem Pregnancies, in ABORTION OW 69 
(1983). These figures only represent the number of Irish women having abortions at En- 
glish clinics who used their Irish addresses. 
72. See SEN. DEB. 560-62 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973). 354-56 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1974). 
73. Binchy, supra note 19, at 106-08; see generally Findlay, Criminal Liability for 
Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside Ireland, 15 IRISH JURIST 88 (1980). 
74. Binchy, supra note 19, at 108. 
75. THE IRISH ASSOCIATION F LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE UNBORN, THE 
ABORTION REFERENDUM 2 (1983). 
76. SEN. DEB. 554-55 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Cam- 
paign for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981). 
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the campaign for a constitutional amendment to protect the life 
of the unborn. Under the Irish Constitution, an amendment 
must be initiated as a bill in the Dail (house of representatives), 
passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, and submitted by ref- 
erendum to the people.77 The amendment is considered ap- 
proved if it receives a majority of the votes in the referend~m.'~ 
Because of these constitutional requirements, the Pro-life 
Amendment Campaign (PLAC) sought the support of the lead- 
ing political parties for an amendment to the constitution that 
would provide for an "absolute right to life."79 
The campaign was timed perfectly because a general elec- 
tion was called within six weeks of its inception. Opposition to 
the amendment by any political party might have been inter- 
preted by the electorate as a proabortion stance-a position no 
party could afford in a country that is ninety-five percent Catho- 
l i~.~O Three weeks after the campaign had been launched, the 
Fianna Fail Government and the opposition Fine Gael Party 
publicly stated that they were totally and unalterably opposed 
to abortion and promised to introduce an amendment to the 
cons t i t u t i~n .~~  The other major party, Labour, stated that it was 
"unequivocally opposed to abortion and would give serious con- 
sideration" to the idea of an amendment.82 
The Fine Gael Party achieved a narrow victory in the June 
77. IRISH CONST. art. 46.2. 
78. Id. art. 47.1. 
79. SEN. DEB. 555 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Campaign 
for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981). The statement provided: 
While the precise wording of the actual amendment will be a matter for 
others, in accordance with legal advice available to us it is proposed that it be 
along the following lines: 
"The State recognises the absolute right to life of every unborn child from 
conception, and accordingly guarantees to respect and protect such rights by 
law." 
80. W. Binchy, supra note 61, a t  1 n.2. 
81. The official Fianna Fail statement read: 
The Government are [sic] totally opposed to abortion, and an appropriate con- 
stitutional amendment to give effect to the position will be brought forward as 
soon as circumstances permit. The Government will also continue to take the 
necessary steps to prevent abortion referral and seek to alleviate the causes 
which may lead to abortion. 
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, Information Sheet No. 2 (June 1981). The Fine Gael 
Party statement stated, "Fine Gael is unalterably opposed to the legalisation of abortion 
and in Government will initiate a referendum to guarantee the right to life of the unborn 
child. Fine Gael recognises that a pro-life policy places an obligation upon us to support 
the single mother." Id. 
82. Id. 
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election. Once in power the new Taoiseach (prime minister), 
Garret FitzGerald, confirmed his party's preelection commit- 
ment to the amendment,s3 but lacked the time to act because a 
second general election restored power to the Fianna Fail party 
in March 1982.s4 In November of the same year, the third gen- 
eral election in eighteen months was called.s5 The narrowly 
elected governments and the successive election campaigns ena- 
bled the organizers of PLAC to exert pressure on deputies 
(members of parliament) and aspiring deputies to support a con- 
stitutional amendment. 
On November 2, 1982, during its final days in power, Fianna 
Fail introduced a bills6 that proposed what eventually became 
the wording of the amendment. I t  provided, "The State ac- 
knowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vin- 
dicate that right."87 
Within days, the Fine Gael Party issued a statement sup- 
porting the wording of the amendment,ss and FitzGerald stated 
that the wording was "about as good a formula as you could 
get."8B He later regretted this statement. 
The third general election also failed to produce a clear win- 
ner. This caused Fine Gael and Labour to form a coalition gov- 
ernment that continues in power today.B0 By this time, liberal 
members of Fine Gael and Labour were beginning to be con- 
cerned about the wording of the abortion referendum. It was 
83. The Prime Minister stated: "The Government is unalterably opposed to the 
legalisation of abortion and is committed to taking whatever steps are necessary to en- 
sure that an appropriate amendment is brought forward. The Attorney General is now 
examining the form such an amendment might take." Letter from Garret FitzGerald to 
Dr. Julia Vaughan (Aug. 5, 1981), reprinted in SEN. DEB. 557 (daily ed. May 4,1983) (Dr. 
Julia Vaughan was chairman of PLAC). 
84. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1982, a t  3, col. 4. 
85. Under the Irish system of government, a general election is called if the National 
Parliament, by a simple majority, gives a vote of "no confidence" in the government. 
86. Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (1982). 
87. Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983, pt. 11. 
88. 339 DAIL DEB. 1374 (1983) (quoting a statement issued by Fine Gael Party on 
Wednesday, Nov. 3, 1982). The statement declared, "The Fine Gael Party welcomes the 
form of the Amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Government. The Amend- 
ment as proposed is worded in positive terms, designed to strengthen the Constitutional 
protection of life, as proposed by the leader of Fine Gael . . . ." 
89. SEN. DEB. 860 (daily ed. May 11, 1983) (quoting from a transcript of "Today 
Tonight," Radio Telefis Eireann [Irish National Television], November 4, 1982). 
90. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, a t  14, col. 3. 
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feared that the amendment might provide for an absolute, une- 
quivocal right to life. There was also discomfort a t  the growing 
criticisms from protestant churches about the matter and appre- 
hension that the amendment would not fit into the Prime Minis- 
ter's plans for a pluralist, secular state.s1 As a result, the coali- 
tion government refused to support the amendment as it was 
worded, arguing that it was sectarian and ambiguou~.'~ This 
spawned a national controversy described by one commentator 
as "our moral civil war."s3 
A major division soon emerged. The prolife groups consisted 
of conservative members of the legal and medical profession. 
Such groups were strongly supported by the Fianna Fail Party 
and the Catholic The anti-amendment groups were a 
loose coalition of proclioice groups-feminists, trade unions, and 
liberal politicians-and somewhat more conservative groups 
made up of politicians, concerned members of the legal and 
medical professions, and most of the protestant churches and la- 
91. Uniting the Catholic Right, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE 
AGAINST 13, 23 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
92. See 339 DAIL DEB. 1353-68 (1983). 
93. Rights for the Unborn, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1984, at  39, 40 (quoting an 
editorial in The Irish Press, Aug. 29, 1983). 
94. The Catholic Church enthusiastically encouraged its members to vote for the 
amendment. In a letter read to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese on Sun- 
day, Apr. 10, 1983, Archbishop Ryan stated: 
Attempts have been made to raise issues which have little or nothing to do 
with the central point. Sectarianism has been mentioned, as if it were a ques- 
tion of deciding between the views of various churches. It  is not. The question 
is whether the people of Ireland want, or do not want, to give to the unborn 
child a greater legal protection than it has at  present. This is not in any sense a 
"Church" matter. It  is rather a matter of the basic human right to life. It  can 
hardly be called "sectarian" to say that this right to life belongs to all, not just 
to some. 
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Apr. 4, 
1983). 
A statement from the Irish Episcopal conference concluded: "A decisive 'Yes' to the 
Amendment will, we believe, in the words of Pope John Paul I1 in Limerick, constitute a 
'witness before Europe and before the whole world to the dignity and sacredness of all 
human life, from conception until death.' " The Amendment-A Statement from the 
Irish Episcopal Conference, (Veritas Publications Aug. 22, 1983). 
Finally, a statement by the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Ryan, read at  all Catholic 
churches three days before the national referendum concluded: 
Over the last few weeks many people have been asking me for guidance. My 
advice to them, and to all of you, is that a "Yes" vote on Wednesday will pro- 
tect the right to life of the unborn child; it will not create a threat to expectant 
mothers; it will block any attempt to legalise abortion in this country. 
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Sept. 
1, 1983). 
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ity, who, although opposed to the introduction of abortion legis- 
lation, either opposed the need for an amendment or objected to 
its sectarian nature." 
Allegations of sectarianism resulted from the similarities in 
the proposed amendment to the Catholic doctrine of "double ef- 
fect." This doctrine, which permits an operation to remove a wo- 
man's cancerous womb with the resultant inevitable death of the 
fetus, is based on the rationale that the primary intention-the 
removal of a diseased organ-justifies the secondary effect-the 
death of the fetus.96 Right wing prolife supporters argued that 
such actions are not abortions but are merely unfortunate conse- 
quences that result from such operations. Dr. Julia Vaughan, 
Chairman of the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign explained: 
Doctors who participate in these procedures are not performing 
abortions. I t  cannot be too strongly emphasized that they are 
not abortions in either medical or legal terms. In each case, the 
removal of a pathological organ is carried out to save women's 
life, not in order to kill the fetus. The pregnancy is not directly 
attacked, even though its loss may be the inevitable conse- 
quence of treatment which has as its objective the "good" of 
saving the life of the mother." 
Prolife supporters argued that the rights of the unborn were ab- 
solute and unequivocal, and that no exceptions existed to a gen- 
eral prohibition on abortion.98 Protestants and prochoice sup- 
porters considered this a flagrant attempt by right wing prolife 
supporters who, while claiming to be nonsectarian, were at- 
tempting to have the permissible parameters of Irish abortion 
law defined in a very Roman Catholic way." 
In contrast, Fine Gael's opposition was directed toward the 
wording of the amendment. The Director of Public Prosecutions 
and the Attorney General issued statements that mirrored these 
concerns. The Director of Public Prosecution stated that while 
he would have no difficulty prosecuting an unlawful abortion 
under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, he would expe- 
95. For a sizeable but not exhaustive list of statements, see Protestant Churches' 
Statements, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE AGAINST 61-65 (M. Arnold & 
P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
96. Uniting the Catholic Right, supra note 91. 
97. J. Vaughan, Pro-Life Amendment Campaign-A Response to Prof. O'Mahony 
(May 19, 1982). 
98. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE 
AGAINST 35, 37 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
99. Id. 
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rience "grave difficulty" in maintaining prosecutions in many 
cases if the amendment passed.loO The Attorney General at- 
tacked the wording of the amendment. 
[The] wording is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. It will lead in- 
evitably to confusion and uncertainty, not merely amongst the 
medical profession, to whom it has of course particular rele- 
vance, but also amongst lawyers and more specifically the 
judges who will have to interpret it. Far from providing the 
protection and certainty which is sought by many of those who 
have advocated its adoption, it will have a contrary effect. 
In particular it is not clear as to what life is being pro- 
tected; as to whether "the unborn" is protected from the mo- 
ment of fertilisation or alternatively is left unprotected until 
an independently viable human being exists at 25 to 28 weeks. 
Further, having regard to the equal rights of the unborn 
and the mother, a doctor faced with the dilemma of saving the 
life of the mother, knowing that to do so will terminate the life 
of "the unborn," will be compelled by the wording to conclude 
that he can do nothing. Whatever his intentions, he will have 
to show equal regard for both lives, and his predominent intent 
will not be a factor. 
In those circumstances I cannot approve of the wording 
proposed.'O1 
Fianna Fail, the party that proposed the wording of the 
amendment, and the members of PLAC maintained that the 
wording was adequate to protect the rights of the unborn. They 
argued that  there was no justification for the "needless anxiety" 
that  had been generated concerning the consequences of the 
amendment's adoption.lo2 The  Irish Association of Lawyers for 
the Defence of the Unborn stated bluntly, "We unequivocally 
maintain that there is nothing in the original wording which 
would oblige an  Irish Court to  make such a grotesque decision as  
that suggested by Mr. Sutherland [Attorney General]."lo3 
On April 27, 1983, in response to  these concerns, Fine Gael 
introduced a more simply worded version of the amendment 
which stated, "Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to 
invalidate, or to deprive of force or effect any provision of a law 
100. 340 DAIL DEB. 474 (1983) (statement of the Director of Public Prosecutions). 
101. SEN. DEB. 520 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Pe- 
ter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983). 
102. SEN DEB 1265 (daily ed. May 26, 1983). 
103. Id. (quoting statement of The Irish Association of Lawyers for the Defence of 
the Unborn). 
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on the ground that it prohibits abortion."lo4 Fine Gael argued 
that this wording avoided the multiple interpretations of the Fi- 
anna Fail amendment and made it easier for the public to un- 
derstand. At the same time, the proposal fulfilled Fine Gael's 
commitment to introduce an amendment to the constitution 
that would prohibit the introduction of abortion in Ireland.lo5 
However, the wording proposed by Fine Gael proved unaccept- 
able because it did not preclude future legislative repeal of the 
1861 Act and provision for some form of legalized abortion. As a 
result, the Fine Gael proposal was soundly defeated.lo6 
Several other proposals to clarify the wording of the original 
amendment were also presented in the Dail. These included: (I)  
a proposal to delete the word "unborn" and substitute "unborn 
human being,"lo7 (2) a proposal to delete "with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the mother7' and substitute "subject to the 
right of the mother to life and bodily integrity,"lo8 and (3) a pro- 
posal to insert after "practicable" the words "without interfer- 
ence with any existing right or lawful opportunity of any citi- 
zen."lo9 Each proposal was soundly defeated.l1•‹ Similar 
proposals were made in the Senate (1) to modify the wording of 
the amendment by inserting "which shall not include the fer- 
tilised ovum prior to the time a t  which such fertilised ovum be- 
comes implanted in the wall of the uterus" after the word "un- 
born"ll' and (2) to delete the word "equal" and substitute the 
word "prior."l12 Each of these proposals was also defeated. 
The amendment, as originally worded by Fianna Fail, 
passed overwhelmingly in the Dail,l13 with Fine Gael abstaining 
from the vote and Labour voting against it. Thereafter, Garret 
FitzGerald, the Taoiseach, issued a statement expressing his re- 
gret that he had supported the idea of an amendment. FitzGer- 
ald asked the people to vote against the amendment because it 
104. 341 DAIL DEB. 2001 (1983). 
105. SEN. DEB 935 (daily ed. May 18, 1983). 
106. 341 DAIL DEB. 2225-30 (1983). 
107. Id. at 2229. 
108. Id.  at 2230. 
109. Id. at  2231. 
110. Id.  at 2233-38. 
111. SEN. DEB 1092 (daily ed. May 25, 1983). The proposal was defeated by a vote of 
18 to 10. Id. at 1149-50. 
1.12. Id. at 1154. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 15 to 8, SEN. DEB. 1281-82 
(daily ed. May 26, 1983). 
113. 341 DAIL DEB. 2235-38 (1983). 
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was "ambiguous and unclear"'14 and could lead to the death of 
women "whose lives are now saved in all hospitals in accordance 
with universal medical practi~e.""~ Despite FitzGerald7s plea, on 
September 7, 1983, in one of the smallest voter turnouts in Irish 
history, the electorate voted by a two-to-one majority to include 
the amendment in the Irish Constit~tion."~ 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT 
The eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution grew out of 
the desire of prolife groups and concerned citizens to further 
protect the rights of the unborn. The challenge faced by the 
drafters was to produce an amendment that would legally pro- 
tect the rights of the unborn, while at  the same time not create 
an absolute right that would supersede the already guaranteed 
personal rights of the citizen."' 
Despite the powerful endorsement the amendment received 
at  the polls, it poses several problems. The most serious chal- 
lenge is likely to be directed at  thelanguage of the amendment 
itself. The amendment guarantees the "right to life of the un- 
born" but fails to indicate at  what point that "unborn" life be- 
gins. Admittedly, this is not an easy question, but it is a funda- 
mental question that must be answered. The United States 
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wadells noted that due to the "wide 
divergence of thinking" among philosophers, theologians and 
physicians, it could not resolve the "difficult question of when 
life begins."l19 Yet, the United States Supreme Court's failure to 
resolve the question combined with their refusal to protect the 
fetus until the time of viability (24-28 weeks) practically re- 
sulted in recognition that life does not exist prior to that time. 
114. Keenan, A Verbal War of Morality, MACLEAN'S, ept. 19, 1983, a t  53. 
115. Kirby, A Pyrrhic Victory-Disarray Over Abortion, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 7, 1983, 
a t  519, col. 1. As a result of this statement, the anti-amendment groups adopted the 
slogan, "This amendment could kill women." 
116. Id. a t  518. The turnout a t  the polls was only 5470, extremely low compared to 
the 70% plus that usually turn out to vote in Ireland. This may be a reflection of the 
difficulty people had in deciding which way to vote. Significant, too, is that in Dublin the 
vote was split almost evenly, with 48% for the amendment and 51% against, indicating 
that the rural vote was mainly responsible for the passage of the amendment by the 2-1 
margin. 
117. O'Mahony, Medical Ethics in the Pluralistic State, in ABORTION AND LAW 40, 
46 (A. Flannery ed. 1983). 
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
119. Id. a t  159-60. 
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This avoidance of the question of when life begins has been 
sharply criticized by one Irish commentator: 
This failure of either English or American law to resolve the 
basic question of the humanity of the unborn child must be 
criticised, whatever the true motives of the courts or legislature 
may be. If, on the one hand, there is a genuine reluctance to 
determine the issue, this may be criticised on the basis that the 
question is so fundamental that it requires to be resolved 
before any other subsidiary issues are determined. Moreover, a 
Court which is too timid to resolve such a basic moral issue 
could scarcely feel itself competent to determine other equally 
important moral questions in the legal forum. 
If, on the other hand, the apparent failure to determine 
the issue amounts in reality to a decision that the unborn child 
is not a human being, then the courts and legislature should 
have the courage to say so clearly and be judged accordingly. 
From the standpoint of the child, the failure to resolve the is- 
sue of his humanity amounts in result to a finding that he is 
not a human being.lZ0 
This criticism is particularly applicable to  the Irish legisla- 
;ure because i t  holds the exclusive constitutional power to make 
laws for the state.121 This makes legislators responsible for vigor- 
ously debating the issues, considering all possible ramifications, 
and coming up with the clearest language possible before 
presenting to the people a proposed amendment of the constitu- 
tion. This does not require legislators to determine the exact 
moment when human life begins for all purposes. However, it 
does require the election of a specific cognizable time a t  which 
the law is prepared to  protect the unborn's right to life. 
The  amendment's failure to define when the unborn is con- 
stitutionally protected means the judiciary will eventually have 
to  formulate the definition; the very result the prolife campaign- 
ers sought to  avoid.122 This has caused uncertainty about the ef- 
fect of the amendment. The Attorney General has stated: 
In the event that the Supreme Court is called upon to con- 
strue the proposal, it could come to a number of different con- 
clusions as to the definition of the class which is afforded pro- 
120. Binchy, supra note 19, a t  99 (emphasis in original). 
121. IRISH CONST. art. 15.2.1 provides that "[tlhe sole and exclusive power of making 
laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has 
power to make laws for the State." 
122. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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tection. Undoubtedly a view which might commend itself to 
the court is that all human beings fall within the ambit of the 
amendment, and that a human being comes into existence 
when the process of fertilisation is complete. 
If, as would appear to be the case, it is correct to state that 
certain contraceptives can operate after fertilisation, then these 
would be abortifacient if human life commences on conception. 
Thus the importation, dissemination and use of such contra- 
ceptives would be prohibited, and as an example, the use of the 
"morning-after" pill in the treatment of rape victims will not 
be permissable, nor will the use of such contraceptives in cer- 
tain conditions of the health of a woman-e.g. valvular heart 
disease or diabetes. 
. . . .  
However, the point of time for which the most compelling 
legal argument could be made, other than the time of fertilisa- 
tion, as being the moment of commencement of protection, 
could be said to be the time when the foetus becomes indepen- 
dently viable. I understand that this is probably at some time 
between 25 and 28 weeks of pregnancy. 
Such a construction could be supported by an argument 
that "unborn" could be regarded as being applicable only to 
something capable of being born. The word "unborn" used as a 
noun must, as a matter of language, mean "unborn person", 
"unborn child" or "unborn human being". I t  could be argued 
that neither a fertilised ovum, a fertilised and implanted ovum, 
an embryo or even a foetus prior to the time when it is inde- 
pendently viable, would come within this definition. 
The consequences of such a finding could be that there 
would be no constitutional prohibition on abortion prior to this 
stage of pregnancy.lZ3 
I t  is possible that a future Irish Supreme Court may choose 
to interpret the amendment in a liberal manner, particularly if 
Irish public opinion moves toward acceptance of some form of 
abortion. This could place Ireland in a situation similar to that 
of the United States where the generally proabortion courts 
have thus far succeeded in liberalizing abortion legislation de- 
spite the contrary views of generally prolife legislatures. In real- 
ity, this is not likely to occur because of past developments in 
123. SEN DEB 524-26 (daily ed May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr 
Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983) 
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Irish family law and the happenings accompanying the move- 
ment to amend the constitution. 
The justices cannot avoid being influenced by the strong 
public stance against the introduction of abortion legislation in 
Ireland. Even prior to passage of the amendment, the Irish Su- 
preme Court intimated that the right to life of the unborn would 
be ~ r 0 t e c t e d . l ~ ~  Although dicta,12& these statements have not 
been challenged and cannot go unnoticed. Admittedly, the Irish 
Supreme Court looks upon decisions of the United States Su- 
preme Court with great respect,12'j and has even made extensive 
use of American decisions in formulating the concept of marital 
privacy in McGee.12' However, it does not necessarily follow that 
the Irish Supreme Court will track the judicial trend developed 
in the United States in relation to abortion. Past experience in- 
dicates the opposite may be true. In the decade since Roe, the 
United States has become more liberal,lZ8 while Ireland has be- 
come more conservative. 
At most, the impact of McGee is limited to the 1979 passage 
of the Health (Family Planning) Act,129 which permits limited 
access to contraceptives. In drafting the Health Act, the Irish 
legislature clearly stated the Act was not to be used as a step- 
ping-stone to some form of abortion legislation. Section 10 pro- 
vides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing . . . 
the procuring of abortion . . . ."130 The act is so restrictive to- 
ward abortion that it provides that the Censorship Board may 
ban a book that "advocates or might reasonably be supposed to 
advocate the procurement of abortion or miscarriage or any 
124. See supra notes 60 & 63 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 64. 
126 See supra note 59. 
127 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
128 See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 
(1983) (an abortion performed after the first trimester need not be performed in a hospl- 
tal, state may not Impose a blanket provlslon requiring parental consent for an abortion 
for an unmarried minor; state cannot require instructions by attending physician as to 
fetal development and alternatives to abortion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1978) 
(struck down a statute that requ~red postviability abort~ons to  be by such method as to 
give the fetus the best opportunity of surviving); Planned Parenthood v Danforth, 428 
U S. 52 (1976) (a woman's decision to have an abortion cannot be made subject to paren- 
tal or spousal consent). 
129. PUB GEN ACTS, no. 20 (1979). 
130. Id •˜ 10(a). 
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method, treatment or appliance to be used for the purpose of 
such pr~curement." '~~ 
Other operative acts also suggest that the unborn child is a 
persona judicata. Section 58 of the Civil Liability pro- 
vides for recovery, by a child, of damages for injuries caused 
before birth: "For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared 
that the law relating to wrongs shall apply to an unborn child 
for his protection in like manner as if the child were born, pro- 
vided the child is subsequently born alive."133 Similarly, the 
Succession gives inheritance rights to a child en ventre sa 
mere who is not illegitimate, provided the child is subsequently 
born a 1 i ~ e . l ~ ~  
More significantly, the parliamentary debates during the 
campaign to amend the constitution were devoid of any sugges- 
tion that abortion in any form ought to be legalized. Each of the 
major parliamentary parties also publicly stated that they op- 
posed ab0rti0n.l~~ Similarly, nearly all of the churches that re- 
leased statements indicated their opposition to the introduction 
of abortion legislation, and their support of the right to life of 
the unborn.13' Moreover, the Irish people approved the amend- 
ment by a two-to-one margin.138 Indeed, just four months before 
the amendment inevitably passed,138 the Irish Supreme Court, in 
Norris u. Attorney General,140 a case concerning the constitu- 
tionality of legislation against homosexuality, commented on the 
abortion issue. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice O'Higgins 
stated: 
A right to privacy or, as it has been put, a right "to be let 
alone," can never be absolute. There are many acts done in pri- 
Id •˜ 12(1). 
PUB GEN ACTS, no. 41, •˜ 58 (1961). 
Id. 
PUB GEN ACTS, no. 27 (1965). 
Id  •˜ 3(2). 
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 94-95. 
See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
The Women's Right to Choose Campaign, in a recent discuss~on of their ad- 
- - 
mendment campaign, admitted, "The function of our organization was to present a rlght 
to choose argument against the amendment's provisions. We were in existence as a point 
of principle-we had no illusions about the likely effectiveness of our propaganda." 
Fighting for Control-The Ongozng Struggle for Reproductive Rights 7, 16, in THE IRISH 
FEMINIST REVIEW (Womens Community Press 1984). 
140. W BINCHY, A CASEBOOK ON IRISH FAMILY LAW (1984) (Ir Sup Ct., Apr. 22, 
1983, as yet unreported in Ir. R.). 
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vate which the State is entitled to condemn, whether such be 
done by an individual on his own or with another. The law has 
always condemned abortion, incest, suicide attempts, suicide 
pacts, euthanasia or ,mercy killing. These are prohibited simply 
because they are morally wrong and regardless of the fact, 
which may exist in some instances, that no harm or injury to 
others is involved.'"' 
Justice McCarthy was even more effusive. In a dissenting opin- 
ion, he stated: 
I cannot delimit the area in which the State may constitu- 
tionally intervene so as to restrict the right to privacy, nor can 
I overlook the present public debate concerning the criminal 
law, arising from the statute of 1861, as to abortion-the kill- 
ing of an unborn child. I t  is not an issue that arises in the in- 
stant case, but it may be claimed that the right of privacy of a 
pregnant woman would extend to a right in her to terminate 
pregnancy, an act which would involve depriving the unborn 
child of the most fundamental right of all-the right to life 
itself.'"* 
He then suggested that the right to life of the unborn was pro- 
tected by the preamble to the constitution that acknowledges 
Jesus Christ and the principles of Chri~tianity."~ He concluded: 
For myself, I am content to say that the provisions of the 
Preamble which I have quoted earlier in this judgment would 
appear to lean heavily against any view other than that the 
right to life of the unborn is a sacred trust to which all organs 
of government must lend their support.14" 
Against this background, it is unlikely that any member of the 
141. Id. a t  379. 
142. Id. a t  387. 
143. IRISH CONST. preamble. It states: 
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to 
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, 
We the People of Eire [Ireland], Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to 
our divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of 
trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain 
the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common 
good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dig- 
nity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, 
the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves, this Constitution. 
144. W. BINCHY, supra note 140, at 387. 
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Irish Supreme Court would interpret the amendment in such a 
manner as to defeat the right to life of the ~ n b 0 r n . l ~ ~  
The language of the amendment is deliberately general, just 
as is every other article of the constitution. The amendment was 
not intended to outline every possible eventuality, but rather to 
give adequate guidelines to the courts to enable them to make 
reasonable decisions.146 The amendment is modelled after and 
uses language nearly identical to that found in the constitutional 
provision that protects the rights of the citizen. That provision 
states: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as 
practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen."147 Because this wording has provided ade- 
quate protection for the rights of Irish citizens since 1937, it is 
not surprising that similar wording was used to protect the 
rights of the unborn. 
Opponents of the amendment have also been critical of the 
phrase "with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother." 
The Attorney General elaborated: 
The meaning of "with due regard to" is entirely unclear. These 
words are generally perceived to allow for, at  least, termination 
of the life of the foetus in the cases of ectopic pregnancy or 
cancer of the uterus. The words "with due regard to" have 
been understood by many to suggest that the right to life en- 
joyed by the unborn was to be confined in some way. That in- 
terpretation is in my opinion incorrect. (The word 
"comhcheart" in the Irish text is literally "the same right.") 
The right to life of both the unborn and the mother is stated in 
the proposed text to be equal, and in these circumstances I 
cannot see how it could be possible knowingly to terminate the 
existence of the unborn even if such termination were the sec- 
ondary effect of an operation for another purpose. 
. . . .  
If a doctor were to be faced with the choice as to saving 
the life of one, and thereby terminating the life of the other, 
then I believe that the only lawful conclusion to this dilemma 
would be that he could do nothing, absolutely nothing, which 
145. Similarly, criticism of the amendment because it may effectively ban contra- 
ceptives that are considered abortifacient is misguided since such contraceptives are al- 
ready prohibited by the Health (Family Planning) Act. See supra notes 129-30 and ac- 
companying text. 
146. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, The Pro-Life Amendment- 
Questions and Answers, Fact Sheet No. 3 (1983). 
147. IRISH CONST. art. 40.3.1. 
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infringed on either right. I t  is only where there is no possibility 
of the foetus surviving, even without the doctor's intervention, 
that no difficulty will a r i~e . "~  
While this argument is superficially appealing, the only al- 
ternative is to resolve the equality issue between the mother and 
the unborn by giving one or the other greater rights. This 
presents even greater difficulties. Affording greater rights to the 
mother would cater to the prochoice lobby, which views the 
rights of the mother as always superior to those of the unborn. 
This is not in keeping with the purpose of the amendment to 
further protect the right to life of the unborn. Conversely, af- 
fording greater rights to the unborn would cater to the right 
wing prolife lobby, which views the rights of the unborn as abso- 
lute and unequivocal, with no exceptions save those covered by 
the Catholic doctrine of double effect. This position is also unac- 
ceptable because there really is no such thing as an absolute 
right to life. The common law, based on the biblical command, 
"Thou shall not kill"14@ admits to exceptions such as self-de- 
fense. The right to life of the unborn is subject to exceptions as 
well. Even some staunch prolife supporters recognize this. Fa- 
ther Haring, a noted Catholic theologian, has stated: 
I consider probable the opinion of those who justify the re- 
moval of a foetus that surely cannot survive, when the action is 
taken in order to prevent grave damage to the mother. For in- 
stance, an anencephalic foetus not only cannot develop into a 
conscious human life but cannot survive. To remove it in order 
to spare great damage to the mother is truly therapeutic, while 
no injustice is done to the life of the foetus already doomed to 
death.lS0 
Under these circumstances, the only logical solution was to 
give both mother and unborn an equal statutory right to life, 
allowing the judiciary to decide each case on the facts. The fact 
that both mother and unborn have equal rights does not prevent 
any action from being taken in cases of conflict as suggested by 
the Attorney General. Such a conclusion defies common sense, 
suggesting that if two patients needed a life support system to 
148. SEN. DEB. 540 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Pe- 
ter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983). 
149. Exodus 20:13 (King James). 
150. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION REFERENDUM"-THE CASE 
AGAINST 35, 38 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983). 
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stay alive, but only one was available, the doctor could not util- 
ize the system for either patient since it would interfere with the 
equal right to life of the other. 
In addition, the amendment merely states that the equal 
rights of the mother and the unborn will be defended and vindi- 
cated by Irish laws only "as far as practicable." The Irish trans- 
lation, recognized by the constitution as the prevailing language 
in cases of conflict,161 reads: "sa mheid gur feidir e," which liter- 
ally translated means "as far as possible." This phrase also ap- 
pears as part of the article of the constitution into which the 
amendment was inc~rporated. '~~ Under either translation, the 
language makes allowance for situations that may arise where it 
is not "practicable" or even "possible" to protect the right to life 
of the unborn. 
The equal rights provision of the Irish Constitution, in- 
cluded in the same article as the prolife amendment, also recog- 
nizes this. I t  states: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be 
held equal before the law. This shall not be held to mean that 
the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differ- 
ences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function."153 
In 1972, in O'Brien v. Keogh,154 the Irish Supreme Court sug- 
gested that "equal" may not mean a mathematical equality. 
Chief Justice OyDalaigh stated that, "Article 40 does not require 
identical treatment of all persons without recognition of differ- 
ences in relevant circumstances. It only forbids invidious 
discriminati~n."'~~ 
Justice Walsh previously commented in State v. An Bord 
Uchtala:166 
In the opinion of the Court section 1 of Article 40 is not to be 
read as a guarantee or undertaking that all citizens shall be 
treated by the law as equal for all purposes, but rather as an 
acknowledgment of the human equality of all citizens and that 
such equality will be recognised in the laws of the State. The 
section itself in its provision, "this shall not be held to mean 
that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to 
151. IRISH CONST. art. 25.4.6. This article provides: "In case of conflict between the 
texts of a law enrolled under this section in both the official languages, the text in the 
national language shall prevail." 
152. Id. art. 40.3.1. 
153. Id. art. 40.1. 
154. 1972 Ir. R. 144. 
155. Id. at 156. 
156. 1966 Ir. R. 567. 
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differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social func- 
tion," is a recognition that inequality may or must result from 
some special abilities or from some deficiency or from some 
special need and it is clear that the Article does not either en- 
visage or guarantee equal measure in all things to all citizens. 
To do so regardless of the factors mentioned would be 
ineq~ality. '~~ 
More realistically, the weakness of the constitutional right 
to life for the unborn is that the unborn, by its nature, cannot 
assert that right. Therefore, this right must be capable of being 
asserted by a third party. Those opposed to the amendment 
feared that individuals concerned about the rights of the un- 
born, might be able to obtain injunctions to prevent Irish women 
from going abroad to have abortions. Technically this appears 
possible. The Irish Supreme Court stated in Cahill u. S u t t ~ n , ' ~ ~  
that, while the general rule of standing is that "the challenger 
must adduce circumstances showing that the impugned provi- 
sion is operating, or is poised to operate, in such a way as to 
deprive him personally of the benefit of a particular constitu- 
tional right,"159 third parties, in "exceptional cases, hopefully 
rare," may also be heard on behalf of persons who cannot assert 
their own rights.leO The pertinent question is the likelihood that 
third parties will stalk women they suspect may go abroad to 
have an abortion. In all probability, it can be expected that such 
injunctive actions, if they are permitted by the Irish courts, 
would generally be brought by the father. If such a situation 
were to arise, the judiciary would have to resolve the matter 
with due regard for the rights of all parties. 
Lastly, Ireland is a signator of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.lel Therefore, the 
validity of the Irish constitutional amendment may be chal- 
lenged in the European courts. The European Commission, 
charged with ensuring compliance with the provisions of the 
Convention, could find Ireland in violation of one of the articles 
of the convention. However, this is unlikely in view of previous 
abortion decisions by the Commission, which demonstrate its re- 
luctance to interfere with abortion legislation in individual 
157. Id. at 639. 
158. 1980 Ir. R. 269. 
159. Id. at 282. 
160. Id. at 277. 
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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member countries.ls2 Even if the amendment was determined to 
162. The first abortion case before the Commission was brought in the 1960s by a 
Norwegian man challenging a Norwegian abortion law as violative of the rights of the 
unborn. He claimed the unborn was protected under the language of article two of the 
Convention which provided, "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law." The 
Commission found the petition was inadmissible on the grounds that "only a victim of 
an alleged violation of the convention may bring an application" and that the Norwegian 
petitioner, who declared that he acted in the interest of third persons, "could not claim 
to be himself the victim of a violation of the Convention." Gorby, The West German 
Abortion Decision before the European Commission on Human Rights, in NEW PER- 
SPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 264 (1981) (quoting Application No. 86760, Collection of 
Decisions 6, a t  34). 
The first abortion case actually decided by the Commission was Bruggerinann & 
Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 638 
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights). Two West German women claimed that (1) a decision 
of the West German Constitutional Court that invalidated part of a 1974 abortion law 
permitting abortions in the first trimester with approval of a doctor and the mother, and 
(2) a subsequent law that prohibited abortion a t  any time absent exceptional circum- 
stances, violated Article 8(1) and other Articles of the Convention. Article 8(1) provides, 
"[Elverybody has the right to respect for his private or family life, his home and his 
correspondence." The Commission held that neither the German abortion legislation nor 
the Federal Constitutional Court's decision violated any Convention right. 
This decision has raised questions about whether the Commission will interfere with 
the abortion laws of individual member States. One commentator suggested that in view 
of the wide divergence of abortion laws among member nations "a decision in Brug- 
gemann and Scheuten's favor would have had the effect of declaring the law on abortion 
in most of the member States incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights-a decision which would hardly inspire confidence in the Commission on Human 
Rights. Gorby, supra, a t  274. He postulated that the decision "reflects the caution of an  
international legal body whose powers of enforcement are minimal." Id.  
The most recent case to come before the Commission, Paton v. United Kingdom, 3 
EUR. HUM. RTS. REP 408 (1980). seems to provide support for this theory. Paton applied 
to the English courts for an  injunction to prevent his wife from getting an abortion. The 
English courts refused to grant the injunction, holding that the father had no right to 
stop the mother from having an abortion, even if he was her husband. Id. a t  410. Paton 
appealed the decision to the Commission, which concluded: 
The Commission . . . does not find that the husband's and potential father's 
right to respect for his private and family life can be interpreted so widely as 
to embrace such procedural rights as claimed by the applicant, i.e. a right to be 
consulted, or a right to make applications, about an  abortion which his wife 
intends to have performed on her. 
Id. a t  417. Before deciding that the application was inadmissible, the Commission con- 
sidered whether article two, while not providing any express limitation concerning the 
fetus, is to be interpreted (1) as not covering the fetus a t  all, (2) as recognizing a right to 
life with certain limitations, or (3) as recognizing an absolute right to life. Id.  a t  415. The 
Commission readily dismissed the idea that the fetus had an absolute right to life, noting 
that almost all signators a t  the time of the signing of the Convention permitted some 
form of abortion legislation. Id. However, the Commission circumvented the more diffi- 
cult questions by concluding: 
The Commission considers that i t  is not in these circumstances called upon to 
decide whether Article 2 does not cover the foetus a t  all or whether it 
recognises a "right to life" of the foetus with implied limitations. I t  finds that 
the authorisation, by the United Kingdom authorities, of the abortion com- 
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violate the Convention, the Commission has no power to order 
changes in the domestic laws of Ireland; Ireland has previously 
ignored decisions of the Commission without any detrimental 
con~equences .~~~  
The Irish prolife amendment grew out of fears that the 
nearly universal trend to liberalize abortion legislation might 
plained of is compatible with Article 2(1), first sentence because, if one as- 
sumes that this provision applies at  the initial stage of the pregnancy, the 
abortion is covered by an implied limitation, protecting the life and health of 
the woman at  that stage, of the "right to life" of the foetus. 
Id. at  416. 
163. The Commission is not a traditional court of appeal. It  may find that a particu- 
lar piece of legislation violates one of the articles of the Convention, but it has no power 
to overrule any domestic law of a member state. Telephone interview with Professor 
John Gorby (Nov. 8, 1984). Admittedly, article 53 does provide, "The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties." This means that, while the Convention, as a treaty, is binding on all states that 
have ratified it, the Commission's decisions are still not enforceable until the Convention 
has been adopted into the domestic law of the state. Ireland has not done this. 
The Irish Constitution provides, "No international agreement shall be part of the 
domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas." IRISH CONST. 
art. 29.6. I t  further states, "The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is 
hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws 
for the State." Id. art. 15.2.1. In 1960, the Irish Supreme Court indicated its refusal to 
apply the provisions of the Convention in In re O'Laighleis, 1960 Ir. R. 93. The Court 
stated: 
The Oireachtas has not determined that the Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is to be part of the domestic law of the State, and 
accordingly this Court cannot give effect to the Convention if it be contrary to 
domestic law or purports to grant rights or impose obligations additional to 
those of domestic law. 
Id. at  125. The situation remains the same today. One commentator recently concluded, 
"Nearly thirty years after ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights, Ireland 
has still failed to incorporate it into domestic law. As a consequence the Irish Courts 
have, for the most part, refused to take cognisance of the provisions of the Convention in 
domestic cases." Comment, The Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights before the Irish Courts, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 856, 860-61 (1982). 
No action has been taken against Ireland for failing to incorporate the Convention 
into domestic law. It is possible that Ireland could be asked to withdraw or even be 
expelled from the Commission if it were determined that Irish abortion laws violated one 
of the articles of the Convention, and Ireland refused to modify its stance on abortion. 
However, this is highly unlikely in view of what appears to be a clear reluctance on the 
part of the Commission to interfere with abortion legislation in member countries. In the 
35 year existence of the Commission only one country, Greece, has been asked to with- 
draw. and that was for flagrant violations of numerous articles. For a discussion of the - 
relationship between the Convention and the domestic law of the signatories generally, 
and Ireland specifically, see Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the European Conven- 
tion on Human Rights, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 354 (1964). 
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eventually reach Ireland. The amendment attempts to constitu- 
tionally establish the ultimate balance between the mother's 
rights and the unborn's right to life. Viewed against the long- 
standing Irish legislative, judicial, and public policy of protect- 
ing the life of the unborn, it appears that the real motivation for 
the amendment was not that the prior law did not adequately 
prevent abortion. Rather, the amendment stemmed from a polit- 
ical and social fear that a clear and dramatic rejection of abor- 
tion was necessary to prevent the country from drifting into a 
slow acceptance of abortion over time, as has happened in most 
other western nations. Once the amendment had been proposed, 
it was also critical that it or some equally strong anti-abortion 
amendment be passed, because a defeat could have been inter- 
preted as a signal that Ireland was ready for some form of abor- 
tion legislat i~n. '~~ 
Interestingly enough, the broad language of the amendment 
may permit rather than prevent the introduction of abortion leg- 
islation in Ireland. However, in spite of the potential problems, 
passage of the amendment by such a large margin can be ex- 
pected to lend a powerful endorsement to the existing prohibi- 
tion of abortion in Ireland.ls6 
John A. Quinlan 
164. This is consistent with a statement made by the Women's Right to Choose 
Group (a separate organization from the Women's Right to Choose Campaign) that con- 
cluded, "[Tlhe current political objective is the defeat of the amendment, the pro-abor- 
tion lobby comes later." Address by Professor Cornelius O'Leary, Vice-chairman of the 
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (Aug. 16, 1983) (quoting sunday Tribune, May 15, 
1983). 
165. The Women's Right to Choose Campaign has even accepted this conclusion. 
They recently stated: 
By winning the referendum PLAC [Pro-Life Amendment Campaign] have 
[sic] indeed made it impossible for abortion to become legal without another 
referendum on the issue. That does make our long-term task more diffi- 
cult-but only marginally so, because there had been no prospect of achieving 
any liberalisation of the law in the foreseeable future anyway. 
. . . . 
Apart from the Post-Referendum Solidarity March in July 1984 which 
highlighted SPUC's [Society for the Protection of Unborn Children] pickets on 
Open Line [an abortion referral agency in Dublin] and a right to choose 
counter-picket a t  SPUC's referendum anniversary vigil on September 7th this 
year, next to nothing was heard publicly of a pro-abortion nature in 1984. To 
some extent this may be due to sheer weariness, but it also suggests a certain 
level of dismay among right to choose supporters. 
Fighting for Control-the Ongoing Struggle for Reproductive Rights, in THE IRISH FEMI- 
NIST REVIEW 7, 23-24 (Women's Community Press 1984)." 
In Search of the Role of the Private Producer in 
the Argentine Petroleum Industry 
Nowhere can the vicissitudes of business life be experienced 
more acutely than in the private sector of the petroleum indus- 
try of the Argentine Republic. The discovery of oil in Argentina 
in 1907 precipitated an internal economic and political struggle 
to develop a national oil policy that has continued to this day.' 
On one side are the extreme economic nationalists who assert 
that state ownership of all minerals and state monopoly of the 
petroleum sector are fundamental to Argentina's industrial de- 
velopment and economic self-sufficiency. On the other side are 
the aristocratic economic liberalists who thrive on an export- 
based economy, support high importation levels, and encourage 
local foreign investment. Playing the middle of the field are the 
less radical economic nationalists who maintain that the state 
should be involved in energy production, but that private invest- 
ment and enterprise, under close scrutiny, should be allowed to 
supplement government  effort^.^ Historically, changes in govern- 
mental control among these forces have resulted in dramatic pe- 
troleum policy changes, usually in the form of executive decrees. 
federal intervenors, or new legi~lation.~ 
For the present time, it is clear the Yacimientos Petroliferos 
Fiscales (YPF), the official Argentinian state petroleum enter- 
1. C SOLBERG, OIL AND NATIONALISM IN ARGENTINA-A HISTORY 9 (1979); South 
America Cash Troubles Cloud Preurous Projections-Argentrna, WORLD OIL, Aug. 15, 
1982, at  124 (major revisions in Argentina's petroleum legislation are probable) [herein- 
after cited as WORLD OIL]. 
2. See C SOLBERG, supra note 1, a t  1-7, 13-14, 34-37, 82-86, 116-29, 176-79; UNITED 
NATIONS CENTRE FOR NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND TRANSPORTATION, STATE PETRO- 
LEUM ENTERPR~SES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CNRET]. 
3. See, e.g , Decree No. 744163, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 15, 1963 (annulling oil 
production controls), reprrnted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO, SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC 
OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) A-1 (Supp. IV 1964). The basic 
hydrocarbons laws now in effect were instituted in 1967 under President Ongania. See 
Memorandum from Minister Krieger Vassena and Secretary Gottelli to President On- 
gania (June 23, 1967) (submitting Hydrocarbons Law 17,319), repr~nted In PETROLEUM 
LEGISLATION CO, SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS {ORIGI- 
NAL TEXTS) B-1, B-24 (Supp. XV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of June 23, 
19671; ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, GENERAL SECRETARIAT, MINING AFD PETRO- 
LEUM LEGISLATION I  LATIN AMERICA ND THE CARIBBEAN 19 (1980). President Ongania 
assumed his executive role in 1966. 
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prise, is not, by itself, capable of satisfying Argentina's drive for 
energy self-suffi~iency.~ Although YPF has served as a forerun- 
ner and model for state petroleum enterprises in Latin America, 
labor problems, capital goods shortages, and financial struggles 
have plagued the company since its incep t i~n .~  Formed in 1922, 
YPF was not clothed with significant official public authority 
until 195€L6 The role of the company has constantly varied based 
on the prevailing political climate. Further, YPF has never ma- 
tured to the point of being able to fulfill the country's petroleum 
needs without assistance from private investors and producers.' 
Currently, YPF is heavily in debt and is not receiving adequate 
prices for its production. In addition, government taxes are 
stripping the company of much of its  revenue^.^ Thus, based on 
YPFYs history and present status, Argentina will likely have a 
strong appetite for private petroleum investment and private 
hydrocarbon-seeking activities for the foreseeable f u t ~ r e . ~  
This comment explores the role of the private producer in 
the Argentine oil and gas industry. This comment does not focus 
on the political and economic turmoil in Argentina, but rather 
centers on the key legal arrangements under which a private en- 
tity can enter the country and engage in exploration and produc- 
tion activities. In addition, the philosophy and principles under- 
lying the country's petroleum legislation are examined, with 
special emphasis on the implications for a private petroleum 
producer considering entering the country to conduct business 
operations. By examining these two areas of consideration, a pri- 
vate producer can better understand how to conduct hydrocar- 
bon-seeking and -producing activities in Argentina, and will 
have a framework for anticipating and protecting himself against 
Argentina's volatile political and economic trends. 
4. C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 173-75 (charts showing historical production 
records); WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
5. C. SOLBERC, supra note 1, at 40-45, 66-69, 98-99, 158-59, 164-65, 172; CNRET, 
supra note 2, at 161; Parker, Argentina Eyes More Private Oil Work, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 
6, 1982, at 121; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
6. [I9581 Law No. 14,773 (Argen.) (nationalization of fields of hydrocarbons), re- 
printed in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION Co., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCES- 
SION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) F-1 (SUPP. XIV 1967). 
7. C. SOLBERC, supra note 1, at 173-75 (production charts); WORLD OIL, supra note 
1. 
8. WORLD OIL, supra note 1; see also C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 172-73. 
9. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 45; Parker, supra note 5; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
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Argentina's basic petroleum law is Hydrocarbons Law 
17,319 of 1967, as amended by Law 21,778 of 1978." Under the 
provisions of these laws, private companies can participate in ex- 
ploration and development of hydrocarbons in three distinct 
ways: 
(1) Through "work or service contracts;"" 
(2) Through a concession-type approach;'* or 
(3) Through "risk contracts" with state enterprises.I3 
This comment focuses on the viability of the second and third 
types of arrangements. The first type of arrangement has been 
employed in various forms over the years and can be highly lu- 
crative for private companies.14 However, service contract trans- 
actions did not prove successful, from Argentina's point of view, 
in promoting sufficient exploration and development activities.'" 
Argentina's response to this shortcoming of service contracts has 
10. H. GREEN, ENERGY LAW GUIDE-WORLD PETROLEUM POLICY REPORT 3 13, a t  C-87 
(1981). 
11. [I9671 Hydrocarbons Law No. 17,319, arts. 11, 95 (Argen.), reprinted in PETRO- 
LEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS 
(ORIGINAL TEXTS) A-4, A-31 (Supp. XIV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Law 17,3191. 
12. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  5, 9-10. 
13. Decree 2658, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 6, 1978 (Regulations to Risk Contracts, 
Law 21,778, cl. 1, Apr. 14, 1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH 
AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LIII 
1978) [hereinafter cited as Regulations]; Memorandum to the President of Argentina 
from Ministers of Justice, Economy & Interior (explaining Law No. 21,778 of Apr. 14, 
1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO, SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAW AND 
C o ~ c E s s l o ~  CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 12 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 19781. For examples of actual risk contracts, see Contract Re- 
sulting from the Bid (Licitacion No. 14-035/79) for the Development and Exploitation of 
Hydrocarbons of the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area-San Jorge Gulf Ba- 
sin-Argentine Sea, reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO. SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC 
OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LXV 1981) [hereinaf- 
ter cited as Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area]; Contract Result- 
ing from Bid No. 14-029179 for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hy- 
drocarbons (Law No. 21,778) in "Llancanelo" Area-Neuquen Basin-Province of 
Mendoza, reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS 
AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LXVII 1981) [hereinafter cited 
as Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area]; Contract Resulting from the Bid (Licitacion No. 
14-023/79) for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons (Law 
No. 21,778) of the "Malargue Sur" Area-Meuquina Basin-Mendoza Province, re- 
printed in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCES- 
SION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LXIII 1980) [hereinafter cited as Contract 
for the "Malargue Sur" Area]. 
14. CNRET, supra note 2, a t  31; see also C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, a t  168. 
15. Memarandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  B-5. 
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been the enactment of its current laws. While these laws still 
allow for service contract transactions,le they emphasize involve- 
ment, through risk contracts or concession arrangements, in a 
three-tier structure consisting of surface prospecting, explora- 
tion, and exploitation activities. Each of these phases furnishes 
the private operator with unique rights and opportunities. 
A. Surface Prospecting 
Any civilly competent party, including universities and 
other research organizations, may conduct surface prospecting 
for the existence of hydrocarbons without being encumbered by 
the rigidity and burdens of the country's general exploration 
systems." By obtaining consent from surface owners and a per- 
mit from the government prescribing the scope and conditions of 
the reconnaissance, such a party may engage in "any . . . 
method appropriate for petroleum exploration."18 The prospect- 
ing can occur both onshore and offshore but it cannot infringe 
upon areas where exploration and exploitation permits have 
been awarded, most areas reserved for state enterprises, or areas 
that have been expressly banned from such activity by the Na+ 
tional Executive Power.'" Although this last restriction gives the 
state great discretion, the state does have important incentives 
for agreeing to such studies. First, the exercise of these rights 
does not generate any legal claim in the prospector to conduct 
more extensive exp l~ ra t i on .~~  Second, the prospector must de- 
liver "the primary data" of his surface inspection to the state.21 
Although the state cannot reveal the data for two years without 
the gatherer's permission, this restriction on divulgence is 
greatly weakened by an exception that provides for the release 
of the data in the event that a permit or concession is awarded 
in the area 
Consequently, if the state (which has the right to process 
16. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-31 (arts. 11,95); Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-9, B-23. 
17. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15); Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-12. 
18. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15). Some methods will necessi- 
tate obtaining approval from the state. The state can also inspect and control all of the 
works involved. Id. 
19. Id. at A-4, A-5 (art. 14). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at A-5 (art. 15). 
22. Id. 
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the information, by itself or through the use of third persons, 
and to use the information for its own purposes) concludes that 
the property has hydrocarbon potential, it can put out a tender 
for bids on the property and then release the prospecting infor- 
mation to the party whose bid is selected.23 Also, the law does 
not indicate whether the prospecting information is available to 
state petroleum companies during this two-year period of confi- 
d e n t i a l i t ~ . ~ ~  The result is that the state gains a lot and gives up 
very little. On the other hand, the prospective producer could 
gain some very valuable information, but it is of no significant 
exploratory value to him unless he is prepared to compete for 
additional rights through a public bid. 
B. Exploration 
Under Laws 17,319 and 21,778, the most aggressive and po- 
tentially profitable petroleum activities are classified into two 
types: exploration and exp lo i t a t i~n .~~  Any given project may in- 
volve one or both of these types of activities, but it is not likely 
to intentionally include only an exploration phase. After all, the 
exploration phase is simply used to discover commercial deposits 
of hydrocarbons that justify commencing the exploitation stage. 
Under Law 17,319, and probably under Law 21,778, exploration 
rights are awarded only for "possible" zones.26 These are zones 
in which the presence of hydrocarbons in commercial quantities 
has yet to be proven.27 Properties containing proven reserves of 
commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are classified as 
66 proven," and only exploitation rights are awarded in such ar- 
e a ~ . ~ ~  Consequently, a program on "possible" lands involves 
23. Id. a t  A-14 (art. 45). Awards of permits and concessions under Law 17,319 are 
based on the bid which is "most conducive to the interest of the Nation." Id. at  A-15 
(art. 48). 
24. The National Executive Power can enlarge the areas reserved to the state com- 
panies. Id. at  A-4 (art. 11). 
25. [I9781 Hydrocarbons Law No. 21,778, art. 25 (Argen.), reprinted in PETROLEUM 
LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGI- 
NAL TEXTS) 1, 11 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as Law 21,7781; Law 17,319, supra 
note 11, a t  A-5, A-9 (arts. 16, 27). 
26. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-8 (art. 24). Law 21,778 operations are governed 
by ~ a w  17,319 in any matter that was not modified or specifically provided for under 
Law 21,778. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  11 (art. 26). For a definition of "possible 
zones," see Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-4 (art. 10). 
27. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-4 (art. 10). 
28. See id. (arts. 24, 29); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, 
supra note 13, a t  2 (art. 1). 
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more risk and entails both an exploration phase and, if hydro- 
carbons are discovered in commercial quantities, an exploitation 
phase. A plan to develop a proven area presents less risk and 
only involves an exploitation phase.29 
The purpose of the exploration phase is to both require and 
authorize the private operator to search for commercial deposits 
within the bid area. This is a weeding out period for the state 
because a t  the end of the exploration period, any property that 
has not been explored or proven worthy of exploitation is relin- 
quished to the state.30 Activities during this period are con- 
ducted pursuant to work and investment commitments made in 
the bid.31 
Under Law 17,319 an exploration permit confers exclusive 
rights to search for hydrocarbons within the permit area during 
the period s p e ~ i f i e d . ~ ~  An exploration permit also authorizes the 
holder to undertake all works "conducive to the discovery of hy- 
drocarbons," including surface prospection, exploratory drilling, 
and construction of transportation, communication, and other 
necessary f a~ i l i t i e s .~~  Inherent in each exploration permit is an 
exclusive concession of the exploitation of any and all hydrocar- 
bon deposits found within the permit area.34 Within indicated 
time periods and under threat of specified penalties, a permit 
holder that discovers hydrocarbons must announce (1) the dis- 
covery of the hydrocarbons, (2) if the discovered deposit is com- 
mercially exploitable, and (3) his intentions concerning ob- 
29. See, e.g., Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-9 (art. 29, concessions on proven 
lands); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t  2 
(art. 1) (purpose of the contract is development and exploitation with no exploration 
phase included). 
30. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-8, A-9 (art. 26); Regulations, supra note 13, at  
14-15 (cls. 10.1, 10.4). As an additional incentive to encourage prompt exploration, the 
exploration period is divided into smaller periods of time and, at the end of each small 
period, a minimum of 50% of all lands not converted to exploitation parcels or previ- 
ously relinquished are returned to the state. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-8, A-9 (art. 
6); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  2, 14 (cls. 2.9, 10.1). 
31. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at  3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-6, A- 
7, A-15 (arts. 20, 47, 48). 
32. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-5 (art. 16). The basic unit of an exploration 
permit is 100 square kilometers and a single permit cannot exceed an aggregate of 100 
units for an onshore permit or 150 units for an offshore permit. Id. at  A-8 (arts. 24, 25). 
33. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-6 (art. 19); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at  B-13. 
34. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-6 (art. 17); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at  B-13. 
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taining a concession and exp l~ i ta t ion .~~  Thus, the conclusion 
that commercially exploitable hydrocarbons have been discov- 
ered moves the Law 17,319 operator into the exploitation phase 
for that particular deposit. The awarding of an exploitation con- 
cession, however, does not terminate the permit holder's explo- 
ration rights for remaining lands not converted to a concession. 
As these residual lands are explored, they can enter the conces- 
sion phase or be relinquished to the state. At the end of the ex- 
ploration phase, all lands within the permit area that have not 
been converted into an exploitation concession must be given 
up.=' 
The exploration procedure under Law 21,778 closely resem- 
bles that of Law 17,319. The regulations to Law 21,778 provide 
that contracted works shall be carried out in two stages, one for 
exploration and the other for development and p r o d ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  
The 1980 Unionoil International Exploration Company, Ltd./In- 
alruco S.A. Petrolera Risk Contract explains that during the ex- 
ploration phase, the "Contractor must determine and notify . . . 
Y.P.F. whether . . . the . . . field . . . is considered commer- 
cially e~ploi table ."~~ The regulations also define (for investment 
and work commitment purposes) an exploration well as one 
drilled where no productive well has been previously drilled, or 
where a stratigraphic trap is sought, or, in some cases, where the 
purpose of drilling a well or wells is to delineate a field. In addi- 
tion to drilling wells, a Law 21,778 contractor is obligated to 
carry out a program of "exploration works" that will generate 
locations for drilling exploratory wells.39 A Law 21,778 contrac- 
tor who makes a discovery must present YPF with a plan for 
determining if the "deposit is commercial or not or if i t  can be- 
come one when exploited along with other disco~eries."~~ This 
moves the contractor into the exploitation phase for that 
deposit. 
Unlike Law 17,319, Law 21,778 does not set out stringent 
penalties for failure to announce a discovery or for concealment 
35. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7, A-8 (arts. 21-22); Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-14. 
36. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7 to A-9 (arts. 22-23,26); Memorandum of June 
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-14. 
37. Regulations, supra note 13, at 4 (cl. 3). 
38. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13. 
39. Regulations, supra note 13, at 3-4 (cls. 2.13, 11.4). 
40. Id. at 5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 
13, at 6-7 (art. 3.2.1) (maximum term for such a program is twenty-four months). 
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of a commercially exploitable field. I t  is possible that the provi- 
sions of Law 17,319 which pr-ovide for penalties also apply to 
Law 21,778. However, another explanation for the lack of speci- 
fied penalties in Law 21,778 may be the fact that a Law 21,778 
producer must sell all of his production, and provide extensive 
information, to state oil companies. Consequently, the state is 
more likely to know about a Law 21,778 disc~very.~' In contrast, 
a Law 17,319 operator has free marketing opportunities and thus 
more opportunities and incentives to conceal his disc~veries.'~ 
The Law 21,778 exploration period terminates, like the Law 
17,319 exploration period, with the relinquishment of lands not 
committed to exploitation lots and the cessation of the right to 
drill additional exploration wells.43 
C .  Exploitation 
The exploitation phase is designed to allow the private op- 
erator to reap the benefits of his exploration discoveries. Pursu- 
ant to work plans submitted to the state, the operator tries to 
realize the full potential of the deposits discovered, hopefully 
within the time period allotted. A Law 17,319 exploitation con- 
cession confers an exclusive right to exploit any hydrocarbon 
fields existing within the area specified by the concession during 
the established time period." Law 17,319 obligates the conces- 
sionaire to seek for and produce the maximum production that 
is consistent with economic and conservation concepts. Also, the 
operator must strive to develop the entire concession acreagesd6 
To assist the Law 17,319 producer in doing this, the statute 
gives the concessionaire the right to obtain a nonexclusive trans- 
portation concession, and various other ancillary privileges such 
as the right to build treating and refining plants, communication 
systems, and  building^.'^ 
Under Law 21,778, the basic unit for production and devel- 
41. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1, 5 (art. 4, 9(h)); Regulations, supra note 13, at 
20-22 (cls. 1.0, 15.0); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 
15-16, 51-54 (art. 9, Annex IV). 
42. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11. 
43. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(d)); Regulations, supra note 13, at 14-15 
(CIS. 10.1, 10.2, 10.4). 
44. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-9, A-11 (arts. 27, 33-34). 
45. Id. at A-10 (art. 31). 
46. Id. at A-9, A-10 (arts. 28, 30); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at 
B-15. 
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opment is the "exploitation lot." These lots are defined as "the 
fraction within the area [originally] being bidded on in which 
the commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are l~calized."~' The 
Law 21,778 contractor agrees to promptly delineate the bounda- 
ries of the field'18 and to employ the most "reasonable and effi- 
cient techniques" in an effort to "obtain [the] maximum produc- 
tion of hydrocarbons compatible with the appropriate 
exploitation of same."4n 
1.  Direct exploitation activities 
Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, there are two paths 
that lead to exploitation projects. The first is by way of an 
agreement to enter directly into exploitation activities without a 
preliminary exploration period.50 In this situation, a private 
party is concerned with (1) the land available to him, (2) the 
time limitations on his rights, (3) the work and investment com- 
mitments he is obligated to undertake, and (4) the fiscal regime 
he is subject to during the life of his concession. 
The state determines both the locations and the size of the 
properties that are available under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778.51 
Although only Law 17,319 specifies maximum acreages for an ex- 
ploitation concession, it does not appear that the size of an ex- 
ploitation parcel is a negotiable matter, especially when the orig- 
inal agreement is to perform exploitation operations only. A 
private entity interested in a particular area may submit a pro- 
posal concerning that area. If the state decides that such a rec- 
ommendation should, in the best interests of the nation, be fol- 
lowed, then a tender for bids will be put out on that area. The 
author of the proposal will be given preference only if his bid 
offer is equal to the best of all the offers made.s2 
In addition to land constraints, the rights of private petro- 
leum producers are of limited duration under the Argentine 
47. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  2, 5 (cls. 2.8, 3.2). 
48. Id. a t  19 (cl. 13.10) (six month period allotted). 
49. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  2 (art. 6(a)). Law 21,778 does not mention ancil- 
lary privileges so Law 17,319 rights should apply. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  11 (art. 
26) (matters not modified or expressly provided for in Law 21,778 are covered by Law 
17,319). 
50. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-9 (art. 29); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, a t  A-14. 
51. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-3 (art. 
9). 
52. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-14, A-15 (art. 46). 
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laws.63 When these lands revert to the state, operating equip- 
ment, fixed installations, and, in some cases, mobile accouter- 
ments are also transferred free of encumbrance to the state.64 A 
private operator must assure himself that, within the time frame 
allotted, the economics will be favorable to him based on how 
many wells will be drilled, expected production rates and pro- 
ductive lives of wells, and projected percentages of wells that 
will be dry. 
The operator will also be required to make work and invest- 
ment commitments for achieving his exploitation goals. Law 
17,319 provides that a concessionaire shall be "bound to make 
such investments as may be necessary, within reasonable periods 
of time, for the execution of the works required for the develop- 
ment of the entire acreage comprised in the area of his conces- 
sion . . . ."nn Law 21,778 requires a contractor to submit his 
timetable and investment plans to YPF.6B Except where force 
majeure, acts of God, or certain technical difficulties intervene, 
failure to meet Law 17,319 or Law 21,778 commitments can re- 
sult in penalization of the private entity including damages or 
cancellation of the agreementsn7 
Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 each have their own fiscal re- 
gime (i.e., taxes, rents, royalties) governing operations conducted 
under their provisions. The Law 17,319 fiscal regime tries to aid 
a private entity in preparing for a permit or concession and in 
realizing those plans. Law 17,319 does this by identifying in ad- 
vance, by type and amount, all of the financial obligations that a 
permit holder or concessionaire is liable for during the term of 
the agreement." These obligations include payment of: 
(1) All provincial and municipal taxes extant on the date of 
the award. Governing bodies cannot levy new taxes or in- 
crease preexisting taxes except when the changed rates re- 
present a defrayment of costs of services rendered or 
53. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 14; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, a t  B-10. 
54. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-11, 
A-12, A-29 (arts. 37,85); Regulations, supra note 13, at 17 (cl. 12); Memorandum of June 
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-22; see also Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal 
Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t  8 (art. 5). 
55. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-10 (art. 31). 
56. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  21 (cl. 15.3). 
57. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4-5 (art. 9(g)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-27 
to A-30 (arts. 80, 87-88). 
58. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  B-17. 
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when the tax change constitutes a contribution toward 
improvements or a general increase of taxesbg 
All national tributes assessed on imported items, ex- 
change surcharges, and capital gains taxes. Aside from 
these, and the other taxes set forth below, the operator is 
exempt from all other national taxation (as to activities 
related to  his permit or concession) except for adjust- 
ments which defray costs of services provided or contrib- 
uted toward improvements or where the entity has as- 
sumed responsibility for a third party's tax liability.60 
A special income tax of 55% of the operator's net profits. 
The statute prescribes a formula for computing net 
 profit^.^' 
A progressive annual surface tax during the exploration 
period.62 
An annual surface tax during the exploitation period of 
20,000 pesos per square kilometer or fraction thereof.6s 
A 12% royalty on liquid hydrocarbons and natural gas 
that the National Executive Power can reduce by 5% if 
production conditions merit such a decrea~e.~' 
Any special benefits (e-g., bonuses, deferred or cumulative 
payments) that the private party committed to in the bid- 
ding proces~.'~ 
Additionally, any hydrocarbons lost through the fault or 
negligence of the operator shall be included as production 
in making these calc~la t ions .~~ 
This scheme is a benevolent effort by Argentina to be fair to 
private entities. The exceptions provided for in (1) and (2), how- 
ever, seem to open wide gaps tha t  minimize the  restrictions laid 
on new or increased taxes; and, unfortunately, the guaranty of a 
stable tax regime does not encompass a guaranty of a stable 
economy to operate in. 
Law 21,778 approaches the tax treatment of its contractors 
from a different angle than does Law 17,319. Rather than pre- 
scribing an intentionally stagnant fiscal regime, Law 21,778 per- 
59. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-17 (art. 56(a)). 
60. Id. at A-17, A-18 (art. 56(b)). Shareholders and direct pecuniary beneficiaries 
also come under this tax umbrella. Id. at A-20, A-21 (art. 56(d)). 
61. Id. at A-18 (art. 56(c)). 
62. Id. at A-21 (art. 57(a)). 
63. Id. (art. 58). 
64. Id. at A-21, A-22 (arts. 59, 62). 
65. Id. at A-15, A-23 (arts. 47, 64). 
66. Id. at A-23 (art. 65). 
414 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
mits the use of price escalator clauses in risk contracts to adjust 
prices paid to operators for their production in response to "the 
precise incidence" of tax  fluctuation^.'^ However, similar to the 
provisions of Law 17,319, "service rates and betterment taxes" 
are excluded.6s Law 21,778 contractors must abide by Argen- 
tina's "tax regulations of general appl i~abi l i ty"~~ with two op- 
tions concerning a modified depreciation rule and an option to 
update tax losses based on the general level of the wholesalers 
price index.?O The nation's stamp tax assessment is based on the 
contractor's investment commitment in the risk contract and is 
payable over a term that commences on the date the contractor 
is notified of the decree approving the risk contract.?' 
An annual surface fee (per square kilometer or fraction 
thereof) is set in the call for bids. The amount of the fee relates 
to the characteristics of the particular bid area.72 A special 100% 
deduction is granted for certain investments that underwrite the 
stock of Argentine companies engaged in risk con t r a~ t i ng .~~  
Goods, special tools, parts, components, and some spares and ac- 
cessories are exempted from import duties upon entry into the 
country and from export duties upon leaving Argentina when 
the contract expires.74 Investments made by contractors are not 
subject to certain foreign investment regulations and YPF is lia- 
ble for the 12% royalty on production that is payable to the 
state.76 Obviously, a more thorough knowledge of the country's 
general tax structure is needed before potential risk contractors 
should attempt interpreting these provisions. 
67. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  24-25 
(cl. 17.2). 
68. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  24-25 
(cl. 17.2). 
69. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  6-7, 10 (arts. 14, 20). 
70. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  6-7 (arts. 14(a), 14(b)); Regulations, supra note 13, 
a t  24 (cls. 17.1, 17.l(a), 17.l(b)). For an example of tax regimes in actual risk contracts, 
see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t  27 (art. 
13). 
71. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  7 (art. 16). 
72. Id. (art. 17); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  25 (cl. 17.4). 
73. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  8-9 (art. 18); Memorandum of Apr. 14,1978, supra 
note 13, a t  14-15. 
74. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  9-10 (art. 19) (compensation for services is ex- 
pected from this.exemption; there are limitations on the sale and movement of these 
imported goods); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t  15. 
75. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  10 (art. 23); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  25 (cl. 
17.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t  15-16. 
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2. Exploitation following exploration activities 
The second way a private producer can enter into an ex- 
ploitation phase is through exploratory discoveries that precipi- 
tate conversions of exploration lands into exploitation lands.76 
For a Law 17,319 exploration permit holder, this is triggered 
when "the permit holder through the application of approved 
technical criteria shall have determined the existence of com- 
mercially exploitable  hydrocarbon^."^^ When this vague stan- 
dard has been met, the permit holder must declare his plans 
concerning an exploitation conce~s ion .~~  Then, a concession will 
be awarded and the new concessionaire must submit his work 
and investment commitments for the exploitation phase for ap- 
proval by the state.78 A Law 17,319 concessionaire has a duty to 
delimit the productive area (which the concession boundaries 
will conform to) as promptly as possible.80 This is likely to be a 
natural goal of the concessionaire anyway owing to the imperma- 
nent nature of his rights. 
The Law 21,778 approach to exploitation ensuing from ex- 
ploration shows more oilfield sense than the Law 17,319 provi- 
sions do for such a conversion by laying out a more extensive 
and practical procedure for the changeover. When a Law 21,778 
contractor discovers a deposit of hydrocarbons, he begins the 
transition into exploitation by announcing to YPF his plans for 
determining if the accumulation has, by itself or in combination 
with other discoveries, commercial p ~ t e n t i a l . ~ ~  The pursuance of 
such a program will then result in one of three conclusions con- 
cerning the investigated hydrocarbon traps: it is commercial, it 
is not commercial, or its commerciality is still unclear. 
If a deposit is labelled noncommercial, the contractor must 
immediately release all areas coinciding with the trap that was 
tested.82 However, if the operator is hesitant to label a property 
76. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-6, A-9 (arts. 17, 29). 
77. Id. a t  A-7, A-8 (art. 22). 
78. Id. Indeed, an exploration permit holder who makes a discovery cannot proceed 
with field exploitation until he has committed to opt for an exploitation concession. Id. 
a t  A-7 (art. 21). 
79. Id. a t  A-10 (art. 32). 
80. Id. a t  A-10, A-11 (art. 33). 
81. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Llan- 
canelo" Area, supra note 13, at  7-8 (art. 3.2.1) (contractor has up to twenty-four months 
to carry out its program for determining commerciality). 
82. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  6 (cl. 3.2.3); see also Contract for the "Malargue 
Sur" Area, supra note 13, a t  7 (art. 3.2.3). 
416 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
noncommercial and, at  the same time, is not convinced of the 
prospect's commerciality (e.g., it could be commercial if ex- 
ploited with other discoveries or if prices were to increase 
slightly), the contractor is permitted to postpone the declaration 
of his conclusion. The maximum permissible length of this post- 
ponement will be set out in a "document of particular condi- 
tions," but in no event shall it extend beyond the end of the 
exploitation stage time period.83 
If a deposit is determined to be commercial, then the con- 
tractor must submit all of his geologic and engineering informa- 
tion to YPF along with a plan for full e~p lo i t a t ion .~~  Law 
21,778's enactment was specifically aimed a t  encouraging the 
discovery and development of Argentina's offshore  reserve^.^^ 
Accordingly, Law 21,778 has a unique provision. When an off- 
shore gas field is discovered, the exploitation period may be sus- 
pended for up to ten years to await the development of a market 
and transportation facilities for the gas.86 
An operator who commences exploitation as a result of con- 
version from exploration must still concern himself with the ap- 
plicable fiscal regime, time periods limiting his rights, and work 
and investment commitments as described above. The quantity 
of land available to him will be based largely on the initiative he 
takes and his success in finding exploitable fields. Both Law 
17,319 and Law 21,778, therefore, provide a legal mechanism for 
converting new discoveries into production and development 
programs, but the Law 21,778 system is clearer and better calcu- 
lated to conform to oilfield practices. 
This section analyzes the underlying principles of Argen- 
tina's petroleum laws and the impact those principles have on 
private producers. Two of these principles, state dominance of 
the petroleum industry and Argentina's need for private activity 
in the petroleum industry, are in constant tension. The dynam- 
ics of the conflict between these principles help to explain 
changes in the country's petroleum policy. Another one of the 
83. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6 (cl. 3.2.4). 
84. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6, 21 (cls. 3.2.2, 15.3); see also Contract for the 
"Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 7, 16 (arts. 3.2.2, 9.3). 
85. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 16. 
86. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)). 
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fundamental principles, private responsibility for the mining 
risks of exploration and exploitation, does not present a new 
concept for private producing entities. The final principle deals 
with ownership of the hydrocarbons that are produced and the 
consequences of ownership or nonownership to a private entity. 
After studying these essential principles, a private producer will 
recognize and understand the general concerns he should have 
about the Argentine petroleum industry. 
A. State Dominance us. Dependence on Private Investment 
and Activity 
"[I]ndespensable [sic] . . . control of the state over all as- 
pects involved inwB7 the exploration, exploitation, transportation, 
and marketing of hydrocarbons characterizes Argentina's petro- 
leum leg i s la t i~n .~~  Undergirding this philosophy of state domi- 
nance is Law 17,319's pronouncements that the nation's hydro- 
carbons are "inalienable and imprescriptible assets" of the 
state.8s The National Executive Power controls the legal mecha- 
nisms of the petroleum industry by making major policy deci- 
sions under Law 17,319 and by approving all risk contracts 
under Law 21,778." The Secretary of Energy assists the Na- 
tional Executive Power by applying and executing these laws.81 
"State companies" are the "essential agents" for the state in its 
petroleum activities and these companies play a dominant role 
in the accomplishment of the national  objective^.^^ Strategic 
proven and prospective hydrocarbon lands are reserved for the 
sole dominion of the state companies to aid them in fulfilling 
their assigned  function^.^^ 
The National Executive Power sets its policies in accor- 
dance with the express national objective of meeting the coun- 
87. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1. 
88. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-4. 
89. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 1). This approach solves a multiplicity of 
jurisdictions problem that has plagued the development of a national policy, but it also 
raises constitutional issues concerning ownership and procedural jurisdiction over hydro- 
carbon reserves. These issues have been hotly debated for many years. See id. at A-4 
(art. 12) (provinces to participate equally with the national government in provincial 
production). 
90. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 5-6 (arts. 12,13); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A- 
1, A-32 (arts. 3, 98). 
91. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-26, A-32 (arts. 75, 97). 
92. Id. at A-4, A-30 (arts. 11, 91). 
93. Id. 
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try's petroleum needs from indigenous produ~tion.'~ Law 17,319 
was directed toward accomplishing this goal through the grant- 
ing of exploitation concessions. When it became evident that 
Law 17,319 alone would not meet this Law 21,778 was 
enacted to stimulate further activity by allowing the state com- 
panies to enter into risk contracts with private en ti tie^."^ These 
nonpublic entities were to assist state companies in developing 
those lands reserved to them, especially offshore  prospect^.'^ 
Another basic theme, partially expressed and partially im- 
plied, of Argentina's petroleum laws is the country's great need 
for the economic and technical assistance that private invest- 
ment and other private involvement provide. In the petroleum 
sector itself, private entities can supply the tremendous financial 
resources required for petroleum exploration, particularly in off- 
shore projects." Private companies also have technical abilities 
that the state  need^.'^ Both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778'0•‹ re- 
quire private operators that want to participate in Argentina's 
petroleum industry to possess the technical competence and fi- 
nancial resources necessary to perform the works that will be re- 
quired of them. By surpassing the "dubious efficiency (resulting 
from) . . . subordinating the extraction of hydrocarbons to the 
technical and economic resources of the state,"'O1 a petroleum 
industry buoyed up by private money and ingenuity gives des- 
perately needed support to the country's quest for "economic 
expansion on reasonable technical and economic bases."'02 Aside 
from boosting the petroleum industry, private participation is 
expected to stimulate local industry and increase employment.'03 
Despite "the acknowledged competence of Argentine technical 
94. Id. at A-1 (art. 2);  Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-8 to B-10. 
95. CNRET, supra note 2, at 45. 
96. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra 
note 13, at 12. 
97. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 12-13, 16; WORLD OIL, supra 
note 1, at 125-32. 
98. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-4; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45. 
99. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2).  
100. Id.; Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2 (art. 5);  Regulations, supra note 13, 
at 1, 8-9 (cls. 1, 5.2); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-13. 
101. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-2. 
102. Id. at B-1. 
103. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 16; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-4. 
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personnel and  labourer^,"'^^ a private producer is required 
under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 to employ a high per- 
centage of Argentinians.lo5 
Even though the Argentine petroleum legislation is founded 
on the principle of state control, this principle is in constant ten- 
sion with and must be balanced against Argentina's genuine 
need for private involvement in accomplishing its petroleum and 
economic goals. Unfortunately, Argentina's administration of its 
hydrocarbon laws sometimes does not reflect the country's sub- 
stantial need for private involvement and, when this happens, 
both Argentina and the private operators suffer.lo6 
The exact impact this struggle between state dominance of 
natural resource development and reliance upon private invest- 
ment and technology will have on the private operator is diffi- 
cult to anticipate. Some general observations would be more ap- 
propriate. A private producer planning to operate in Argentina 
for the entire duration of a risk contract or concession agree- 
ment should expect to experience all ranges of the spectrum of 
government dominance.'07 An initial indicator of the tenor of the 
Argentine government at  a particular time is the political ideol- 
ogy of the governing authorities. Economic nationalist leaders 
favor energy self-sufficiency spawned by active government in- 
volvement. Government involvement can range from tariff pro- 
tection and an infrastructure base designed to stimulate private 
Argentine exploration and production efforts, to complete state 
dominance of the petroleum industry. Economic liberalist lead- 
ers, on the other hand, welcome foreign investment and involve- 
ment in petroleum-seeking and -producing activities. Economic 
liberalism in Argentina is export based and is founded on cordial 
foreign relations and interchange. 
These philosophical labels are of limited value, however, be- 
cause Argentine politicians do not always remain loyal, a t  least 
in practice, to their ideological classifications. Still, even though 
theoretical bases are of limited value in predicting how Argen- 
104. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-21. 
105. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-25 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 19-20 
(cl. 13.12). 
106. Parker, supra note 5; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
107. This is exemplified by the varying treatment afforded to Standard Oil Com- 
pany of New Jersey and its subsidiaries. See generally C. SOLBERG, supra note 1. See 
also R. MIKESELL, W. BARTSCH, J. BEHRMAN, P. CHURCH. G EDWARDS, H. GOMEZ, W. HAR- 
RIS, M. MAMALAKIS, D. WELLS, M. WIONCZEK & J. ZINSER, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES 157-88 (1971). 
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tine rulers will direct the petroleum industry, it is important to 
monitor the country's political development as effectively as 
possible because political developments may prove to be the sin- 
gle most critical factor in the progress or lack of progress of Ar- 
gentina's petroleum i n d ~ s t r y . ' ~ ~  
In many ways, the Argentine conflict between state control 
of and private contribution to the oil and gas industry typifies 
the petroleum technology transfer battle that developing coun- 
tries have waged with private oil cornpanie~. '~~ Hydrocarbon ex- 
ploration and exploitation activities are markedly enhanced by 
technological abilities and advancements. Historically, private 
multinational corporations have provided the technology re- 
quired for worldwide petroleum operations. Naturally, sovereign 
countries want to control the use and depletion of their indige- 
nous natural resources. Hence, as in Argentina, an ensuing 
struggle sets the governments of developing countries (that .want 
to regulate the development of their own energy resources) 
against the private oil companies (that are seeking to fulfill their 
own ends) possessing the technology needed for resource utiliza- 
tion. Initially, this confrontation produced concession arrange- 
ments giving wide latitude to the oil companies and providing 
limited financial benefits but no technological benefits to the 
host countries."O Such concession arrangements were present 
under early Argentine oil laws.''' Gradually, developing coun- 
tries began using petroleum contracts and other means to de- 
velop petroleum technology among their own industries and la- 
bor  market^."^ 
Provisions under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 that require 
the hiring and training of Argentine nationals, the delivery of 
oilfield information to the state, and the reversion of production 
equipment and facilities to the state are examples of Argentine 
efforts to acquire te~hnology."~ Additionally, Argentina has a 
108. At least one business advisor feels that energy progress is closely related t o  
politics. See Wanniski, Energy In Abundance, LANDMAN, Jan. 1983, at 7-12. 
109. See generally Zakariya, Transfer of Technology Under Petroleum Deuelop- 
ment Contracts, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 207 (1982). 
110. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 109-10, 152; Zakariya, supra note 109, at 211. 
111. See Memorandum of  June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1, B-2; C.  SOLBERC, 
supra note 1, at 14-15. 
112. See Zakariya, supra note 109, at 210-22. 
113. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4, 5 (arts. 9(e), 9(h)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, 
at A-11, A-12, A-24, A-25 (arts. 15, 37, 70, 71); see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 211- 
15. 
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petroleum technology training institute and belongs to ARPEL, 
a Latin American association of state petroleum enterprises.l14 A 
complete transfer of technology 
lies in the ability of the developing country to purchase or hire 
directly the most advanced technical means of petroleum ex- 
ploration and development, if and when it so wishes, at a rea- 
sonable price. It also lies above all, in developing the mental 
skills of its citizens to utilize these technical means effectively, 
alone if they choose to do so."' 
However, a full technology transfer is closely tied to economic 
and industrial development in the developing country.l16 Argen- 
tina's shortcomings in these areas make it probable that a com- 
plete technological transfer is a distant dream for Argentina, but 
it is likely that private operators in the country will be faced 
with demands from the government to assist this transfer of 
technology. 
Finally, in understanding the state dominance versus pri- 
vate participation conflict, the concepts of political ideology and 
technology transfer must be set afloat on the underlying sea of 
social, economic, and political problems that plague Argentina. 
As a developing country, Argentina seems like a child that is dis- 
satisfied with what it has and yet does not know what it wants. 
For the oil industry, the result of Argentina's uneasiness is a 
constantly changing oil p01icy."~ The country would like to pay 
fair oil prices to producers, yet economic problems make this 
difficult. Socially and politically, some forces in Argentina would 
like to achieve energy self-sufficiency, but the country lacks the 
financial and technological ability to do so."8 The consequences 
to the private operator are uncertainty and instability in the pe- 
troleum industry. 
B. Risk and Ownership 
Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, the private opera- 
114. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 82-91; see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 208, 
220. 
115. Zakariya, supra note 109, at 219. 
116. Id. at 222. 
117. See C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 156-76. Law 21,778 was enacted in 1978 and, 
by 1982, the country was considering new major changes in its oil legislation. See gener- 
ally WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
118. See Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 3); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at A-8; C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 172-77; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45. 
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tor assumes all "hazards defined as mining r i~k.""~ Producers 
operating under Law 17,319 own the hydrocarbons they produce, 
including the right to transport, refine, and market their produc- 
tion.120 This system is designed to provide "substantial incen- 
tives" by opening up the vistas of vertical integration (e.g., mar- 
keting, exportation) to nonpublic entities.lZ1 The exercise of 
nonproduction rights, however, is subject to regulation by the 
National Executive Power. Some initial regulations are set forth 
in Law 17,319. For example, liquid hydrocarbons can be sold 
only in domestic markets until the objective of petroleum self- 
sufficiency is met.lZ2 In addition, all natural gas produced in Ar- 
gentina is subject to a first purchase option granted to the 
"State-owned enterprise responsible for the public service of gas 
d is t r ib~t ion." '~~ 
In contrast to Law 17,319, companies contracting under 
Law 21,778 receive no legal rights under applicable mining laws, 
"nor will they have ownership of the hydrocarbons so ob- 
tained."lZ4 However, if domestic needs are satisfied from indige- 
nous production and an adequate supply of reserves has been 
accumulated, the contractor may receive payment in kind.lZ6 AS 
a limitation on this practice, however, YPF can restrict payment 
in kind to crudes so that even when national requirements are 
met, natural and liquified gas may not be available in kind.lZ6 
In the simplest sense, the procedures under Law 17,319 and 
Law 21,778 are very similar and, from a producer's viewpoint, 
the ownership distinctions between the laws are not crucial. 
Both laws prescribe a system mandating delivery of a specified 
119. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2 
(art. 5). 
120. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11. 
121. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-5, B-15. 
122. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at B-2, B-3 (art. 6). This limitation is subject to 
exceptions justified on technical grounds. Id.; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 
3, at B-10. The Executive Power may prescribe rules which assure an equitable and ra- 
tional participation by all companies in the domestic market. Law 17,319, supra note 11, 
at B-2, B-3 (art. 6). 
123. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-3, B-2 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-11 (operators can consume hydrocarbons as needed for their 
operations). 
124. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra 
note 13, at 13. 
125. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 
(cls. 1, 16.2.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 14. 
126. Regulations, supra note 13, at 23 (cl. 16.2.3). 
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amount of production into internal markets, after which the pro- 
ducer may dispose of any excess output as he chooses.127 Within 
these basic procedural frameworks, however, differences between 
the Law 21,778 operator and the Law 17,319 concessionaire do 
emerge. These disparities, which are largely rooted in ownership 
rights, can be recognized and managed by the producer by stud- 
ying the price the producer can receive for his production and 
the likelihood that the producer will have an available market 
for all of this production. Additionally, the producer must con- 
sider the quantity of his production over which he will have ex- 
portation rights. These factors, and not ownership differences, 
become critical in the producer's analysis of his opportunities for 
profitable operations in Argentina. 
In evaluating the prices available for his production, a pro- 
ducer interested in exploring in Argentina should ascertain the 
relative prices obtainable under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 
transactions. Also, since the producer is committed to serving 
local markets until domestic needs are met, the producer must 
compare prices available in Argentina to world oil prices.128 For 
liquid hydrocarbons, Law 17,319 concessionaires have more price 
latitude than Law 21,778 contractors because concessionaires 
have transportation and marketing rights to their p roduc t i~n . '~~  
Law 21,778 operators are obligated, until payment in kind is al- 
lowed, to sell their output to "the state company,"130 whereas 
the only significant restriction put on crude prices by Law 
17,319 is that the National Executive Power might set prices.131 
However, the statute tries to temper this possibility by assuring 
that "reasonable profits" will be attainable and that even if 
prices are set by the National Executive Power, they will be 
equal to those established for the state oil company and will not 
be lower than those prevailing for imported crudes of similar 
127. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  B-2, B-3 (arc. 6) (operator must obtain a com- 
mercially reasonable price for exported crude). 
128. See Argentine Contract Talks Hit Snags, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 10, 1983, a t  44. 
Sagging prices have proven to be a major flaw in the Argentine oil industry and, com- 
bined with soaring inflation and political instability, have resulted in a downward pro- 
duction trend in the country. Enright, World Oil Flow, Refining Capacity Down 
Sharply; Reserves Increase, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 27, 1982, a t  75,77,79; Parker, supra note 
5; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
129. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of  June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, a t  B-5. 
130. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  1 (cl. 1). 
131. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-2, A-3 (art. 6). 
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quality and under similar  condition^.'^^ This latter provision 
should serve to keep Law 17,319 prices a t  the world market 
level. 
Law 21,778 crude producers are subject to a more nebulous 
price structure, with the payment in cash being based on "the 
unit of measurement corresponding to the type of hydrocarbon 
obtained and delivered . . . Since these price standards are 
set by the state and a risk contractor can sell crude only to the 
state until payment in kind is made, the Law 21,778 risk con- 
tractor has no control over the price he receives for his domesti- 
cally marketed crude. He will be paid according to the state's 
established price structure. 
For gas, Law 17,319 provides that gas prices shall be set by 
agreement and that the prices "shall assure the operator an eq- 
uitable return on the corresponding inve~trnent."'~~ This provi- 
sion, combined with the state company's preemptive right to 
purchase a concessionaire's gas output, puts the Law 17,319 gas- 
producing concessionaire in much the same position as the Law 
21,778 gas-producing contractor that must sell under contract to 
the state company based on the same price framework that Law 
21,778 crude contractors are subject to.13' The similarity is fur- 
ther enhanced by Law 21,778's authorization allowing YPF to 
prevent payment in kind for natural and liquid gas (i.e., YPF 
can limit payment in kind to crude pe t r~ l eum) , ' ~~  which, in ef- 
fect, gives the state a first option to purchase on all of a Law 
21,778 risk contractor's gas production. 
Before a petroleum producer commences an exploration 
program, the producer wants to be assured that he will be able 
132. Id. at  A-2, A-31 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  B-11. 
It  appears that this last guarantee has not been abided by. A. IGLESIA, POLITICA PE- 
TROLERA ARGENTINE 263 (1980). Perhaps this failure to meet world prices can be ex- 
plained by the sudden upturn in the world price in recent years and by the Law 17,319 
exception which provides that "[s]hould the prices of imported crudes be substantially 
increased due to exceptional circumstances, such prices shall not be taken into consider- 
ation for establishing the domestic marketing prices . . . ." Law 17,319, supra note 11, 
a t  A-2 (art. 6). 
133. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, a t  
1 (cl. 1). For an example of crude price formulas in risk contracts, see Contract for the 
"Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 22-23 (art. 11.1). 
134. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-3 (art. 6). 
135. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  1 (cl. 1); 
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t  13. For an example of risk contract gas 
formulas, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, 
a t  23-24 (arts. 11.2, 11.3). 
136. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  23 (cl. 16.2.3). 
4031 ARGENTINE PETROLEUM 425 
to market his product commercially. This should not present a 
major problem for a Law 17,319 producer. The free market ac- 
cess allowed to such a producer provides him with the opportu- 
nity to solve any major marketing obstacles during both 
nonexportation and exportation periods. Even though a Law 
17,319 gas producer must first offer his gas to the state company, 
such option to purchase must be exercised by the state within 
"reasonable time limits" and the producer can, with appropriate 
approval and subject to prescribed regulations, decide on the 
disposition of any gas not purchased by the state.13' 
The Law 21,778 producer, on the other hand, has only one 
buyer prior to payment in kind-the state.'38 Such a contractor 
could find himself in a difficult position if the state company is 
unwilling (e.g., because the quality of the crude is not suited to 
the state company's refining facilities) or unable (e.g., lack of 
storage capacity) to take the contractor's product while, a t  the 
same time, domestic production has not satisfied domestic needs 
so that the payment in kind alternative is also not available to 
the contractor. The Law 21,778 operator must contractually an- 
ticipate these eventualities and obtain either guarantees of re- 
ceipt of his production in reasonable geographic locations with 
penalties against the state for failure to comply, or the right to 
dispose freely of any excess production not taken by the state 
company. Additionally, provisions should be made stipulating 
who bears the costs when additional storage or transportation 
facilities are required to sustain receipt of the private operator's 
production by the state company. Various provisions along this 
line have been used by risk contractors including: 
(1) A guarantee of reception of a specified volume of crude oil 
by YPF with options for the contractor to dispose of any 
excess. 
(2) Specification of the reception standards that the hydro- 
carbons must meet (e.g., water content, salinity levels). 
(3) Agreements on when the contractor will not be obliged to 
make certain production related investments. 
(4) Provisions for reinjection or commercial disposal (with a 
137. Law 17,319, supra note 11, A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12. 
138. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1). 
For an example of actual production, delivery, and transportation clauses in risk con- 
tracts, see Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 21-30 (art. 10, Annex V, 
Annex VI). 
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partial payment to YPF) of gas that YPF cannot receive 
or for which transportation facilities are not available. 
Allowance of construction and operation by the private 
contractor of equipment for obtaining liquified gas. 
Assessment of penalties against YPF for failure to comply 
with its reception requirements for any causes other than 
force majeure or fortuitous case. 
Provision for who bears the cost of storage and treatment 
facilities. 
Provision, as part of two thermal stimulation pilot 
projects, that the contractor and YPF shall agree on the 
conditions under which the contractor may dispose of 
crude oil not disposed of by YPF. 
Provisions concerning transportation to YPF's point of 
reception.lsg 
Obviously, a private operator can make only limited de- 
mands when dealing with a foreign sovereign in a competitive 
bidding situation. Nevertheless, the contracting company must 
protect itself by assuring reception of its production on the most 
favorable terms possible. 
A final important concern of a private operator working in 
Argentina is the quantity of his production that will be available 
for exportation. In a country such as Argentina that has severe 
economic problems and chronic political instability, an operator 
wants t o  have free rein, including the right t o  export as much of 
his production as is possible. The ability to export provides an 
opportunity to circumvent unfavorable market conditions within 
the country. Nevertheless, Argentine production must satisfy 
Argentine petroleum needs before any private operator may 
truly claim freedom to dispose of his production, especially the 
freedom to export that p roduc t i~n . ' ~~  Additionally, the restric- 
tions on export rights to natural gas are more stringent than 
those for crude petroleum.141 A Law 17,319 producer of 'liquid 
hydrocarbons has to be authorized by the National Executive 
139. For examples, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, 
supra note 13, at 14-15, 18-19, 20 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Llancanelo" 
Area, supra note 13, at 23-26 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur" 
Area, supra note 13, at 17-19, 21 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3). 
140. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra 
note 13, at 1-14; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-10, B-11. 
141. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3). 
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Power to export crude supplies that are "in excess of the normal 
needs of the internal market."lq2 
Aside from meeting domestic production goals, the only 
statutory restrictions placed on the right to export are that the 
prices received for the exported production be commercially rea- 
sonable in 'light of the international market and that the opera- 
tor submit to any promulgated rules designed to accomplish eq- 
uitable participation in the internal market by all producers 
within the Similar in nature, but slightly more re- 
strictive, is the Law 21,778 proviso that a contracting company 
may receive payment in kind when domestic production meets 
domestic demand and an "adequate margin of reserves [as de- 
creed by the National Executive Power] has been estab- 
li~hed.""~ 
One further drawback that a contractor might experience is 
that if crude risk contract prices in Argentina are low and pay- 
ment in kind is made based on the cash price, the operator may 
be disappointed at  the quantity of crude received as payment in 
kind. However, both the 1980 Unionoil International Explora- 
tion Company, Ltd./Inalruco S.A. Petrolera Risk C o n t r a ~ t ' ~ ~  and 
the 1979 Occidental De Argentina Inc./Bridas/Union Texas1 
Compania Quimica Risk Contractlq6 provide that once the con- 
tractor has invoiced YPF for crude for which payment is due in 
kind, the contractor may "dispose of said Crude Oil immedi- 
ately."lq7 So the Law 21,778 crude oil threshold point for export 
rights is higher than the Law 17,319 threshold level, but once a 
Law 21,778 contractor that has contracted to receive payment in 
kind reaches the payment in kind stage for crude, he has un- 
restricted rights of disposition. 
For natural gas exportation rights, a private operator must 
overcome more legal obstacles than for crude exportation rights. 
142. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11. 
143. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11. 
144. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, at 
1 (cl. 1). Payment in kind is available only if "clauses contemplating such possibility and 
the basis for pricing the hydrocarbons delivered in payment have bcen incorporated to 
the corresponding contract." Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4). 
145. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13. 
146. Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13. 
147. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 37 (art. 11.4); Contract 
for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 28 (art. 11.5). 
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Under Law 17,319, a concessionaire may, upon obtaining appro- 
priate consent, decide upon the disposal and utilization of any 
natural gas not purchased by the state company. There is no 
limit, though, on how much of his production the state company 
can purchase,148 making uncertain the availability of export 
rights. Even more restrictive is the Law 21,778 reservation by 
the state of the right to refuse any payment in kind on any "nat- 
ural and liquid gas produced."149 Thus, a Law 21,778 gas pro- 
ducer may not receive payment in kind even after domestic de- 
mand is met and an adequate reserve is established. 
Some risk contracts provide that when gathering and trans- 
portation facilities are lacking, a contractor may, in some in- 
stances, commercially market (and export) the gas produced and 
pay YPF 25% of the price the contractor would have received if 
the gas had been delivered to the state.150 Underlying these nu- 
ances for Law 21,778 natural gas disposition is the same basic 
Law 21,778 standard-satisfaction of domestic demand and an 
adequate supply of reserves-that applies to crudes.161 In sum- 
mary, the essence of the exportation right is that a producer's 
right to export revolves around the whims of the state and the 
achievement of national production goals. 
The private sector of the Argentine petroleum industry does 
present exploration and production opportunities for entities 
that possess sufficient technical and financial competence. This 
industry, however, is highly regulated by the state and should 
not be entered without a thorough investigation of the prevailing 
political and economic climates within the country. In addition, 
whenever legally possible the private company must insist on in- 
telligent contractual safeguards anticipated to protect its inter- 
ests. In the private company's favor, and balanced against the 
state's desire to control its resources, is the fact that Argentina 
148. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12. 
149. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3); see also Contract for the 
"Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 36-37 (art. 11.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur" 
Area, supra note 13, at 27-28 (art. 11.4). 
150. Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 10 
(arts. 10.2.1, 10.2.3). 
151. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); 
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13-14. 
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cannot rely on its state-owned companies to satisfy the country's 
petroleum production goals. As a consequence, Argentina has a 
definite need for private investment and participation in this vi- 
tal industry. 
The private operator looking at  potential involvement in 
Argentina's oil and gas industry has three avenues to consider: 
service contracts, risk contracts, or concession arrangements. 
This comment analyzed the latter two alternatives from an ex- 
ploration and production perspective. Both the risk contract and 
the concession agreement provide exploitation rights and, as re- 
quired, exploration rights tailored to meet a specific prospect's 
requirements. Both, however, come burdened with work and in- 
vestment commitments and fiscal regimes that require an opera- 
tor to accurately and continuously plan and evaluate his activi- 
ties. In all, the demands of keeping up with all of these 
commitments, combined with the economic and political insta- 
bility of Argentina, furnish the private operator with an interest- 
ing and challenging legal and business venture. 
Stephen L. Snow 
A Comparative Look at the Reporter's Privilege 
in Criminal Cases: United States, Federal 
Republic of Germany, and Switzerland 
The reporter's privilege allows journalists to withhold the 
identity of news sources during investigatory proceedings.' This 
controversial privilege has received considerable attention from 
legislative bodies, courts and scholars in the United States, the 
Federal Republic of germ an^,^ and Switzerland. Unique na- 
tional ideas of the press and its role have caused each of these 
countries to reach different conclusions about granting a re- 
porter's privilege. 
The major developments involving the reporter's privilege 
in the United States, West Germany, and Switzerland occurred 
approximately ten years ago. However, questions about the exis- 
tence and scope of the privilege have continued to trouble the 
lower courts and scholars of each country. This comment com- 
pares the availability of the reporter's privilege in criminal ac- 
tions in the three countries and examines the structural and ide- 
ological developments leading to the enactment of their present 
laws.3 
A reporter in the United States has little protection against 
judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of his sources in a 
criminal prosecution because there is no federal statutory or ju- 
1. The terms reporter's privilege and Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht (the German term) 
are used in civil, administrative, and criminal proceedings. However, this comment dis- 
cusses only the criminal procedure aspect. The reporter's privilege is not limited to re- 
porters. The term is used here to refer to all those working in the news media who are 
accorded privileges by statutes and judicial decisions. (Translations of all German mater- 
ials are the author's.) 
2. The Federal Republic of Germany will hereinafter be referred to as West 
Germany. 
3. Much of the discussion about the present state of the law will center around 
landmark judicial decisions. The use of judicial decisions to explain the approaches of 
the various countries is not intended to emphasize the importance of the judiciary in 
formulating the reporter's privilege. The role of the judiciary has varied in the different 
countries, but the court opinions can serve as official statements about the reporter's 
privilege in the various legal systems. 
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dicially recognized reporter's pri~ilege.~ Congress has considered 
reporter's privilege' legislation several times, but has never 
adopted a federal reporter's privilege ~ t a t u t e . ~  The judiciary has 
been hindered in developing a common law reporter's privilege 
by Branzburg u. ha ye^,^ a 1972 Supreme Court decision holding 
that there is no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege. 
Branzburg u. Hayes is the only Supreme Court decision that 
discusses the reporter's pri~ilege.~ In Branzburg, the Court con- 
sidered the appeals of three journalists who had been subpoe- 
naed by grand juries to answer questions concerning the journal- 
ists' reports on certain criminal activities. On three occasions the 
journalists refused to appear before the grand juries. On two 
other occasions the journalists appeared, but refused to answer 
questions relating to the identity of their sources after claiming 
a reporter's privilege under the first amendment.s The Court re- 
jected the journalists' argument and held that requiring journal- 
ists to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries 
does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by 
the first amendment.9 
4. See generally Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L 
REV. 229 (1971); D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential 
Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J .  ON LEGIS. 307 (1969); Eckhardt & McKey, Reporter's 
Privilege: An Update, 12 CONN. L. REV. 435 (1980); Edelstein & LoBue, Journalist's 
Priuilege and the Criminal Defendant, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 913 (1979); Guest & Stan- 
zler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 18 (1969); Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 
TEX. L. REV. 829 (1974); Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confi- 
dential Sources and Information, 24 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1971); Note, Reporter's and 
Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 
317 (1970). 
5. See, eg . ,  Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 
750, S. 870, S. 917, S.  1128 and S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Newsmen's 
Privilege; Hearing on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 
n.28 (1972). 
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
7. The only other time the entire Court has considered similar issues was in Zurcher 
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), which involved the search and seizure of news- 
room materials.~Individual justices have, on occasion, stated opinions on reporter's privi- 
lege. See, e g . ,  In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers). 
8. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at  667-78. This was not the first time a first amendment 
claim had been made. However, such claims have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., 
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Good- 
fader, 45 Hawaii 317,367 P.2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244,436 P.2d 729, 
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). 
9. Branzburg, 408 U.S. a t  667. 
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Justice White's plurality opinion noted that "[tlhe heart of 
the claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from 
compelling reporters to disclose confidential information out- 
weighs any public interest in obtaining the information."1•‹ The 
Court weighed the importance of "the right to every man's evi- 
dence,"" especially in criminal grand jury proceedings, against 
the possible harm to a journalist's ability to gather news, and 
found the evidentiary interest more compelling.'* Although 
newsgathering does qualify for first amendment protection, the 
Court held that journalists are afforded no greater protection 
than the average citizen.13 The Court particularly emphasized 
that "[flrom the beginning of our country the press has operated 
without constitutional protection for press informants, and the 
press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not 
been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of 
confidential news sources by the press."14 
The Court did not grant journalists a conditional first 
amendment privilege because of the difficulty in (1) defining the 
terms and scope of the privilege, (2) distinguishing between dif- 
ferent crimes, and (3) providing journalists with a reliable rule.15 
According to the Court, the Constitution offers protection only 
when grand jury investigations are undertaken in bad faith to 
harass and "disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news 
s ~ u r c e s . " ~ ~  
Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion articulated a less 
rigorous standard that has been applied by many courts to limit 
the impact of Branzburg. Justice Powell stated the rule: 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by 
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press 
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony 
with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital 
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis ac- 
10. Id .  at 681. 
11. Id .  at 688 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, VIDENCE 5 2192 (rev. ed. 1961)). 
12. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. In considering the possible negative effects of com- 
pelled disclosure of the source's identity, the Court looked at articles by Blasi and Guest 
& Stanzler that contained surveys and empirical studies of the use of confidential infor- 
mation by journalists. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694 nn.32 & 33. Some commentators feel 
the Court misread the data in favor of its finding. See, e.g., Murasky, supra note 4. 
13. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-85. 
14. Id.  at 698-99. 
15. Id.  at 702-04. 
16. Id.  at 707-08. 
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cords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such 
questions." 
Courts have used the Powell approach to limit Branzburg to its 
facts. However, no common law reporter's privilege has been 
granted in criminal proceedings unless the investigation was un- 
dertaken in bad faith to harass the reporter or state statutory 
provisions specifically granted the privilege.ls 
Although the Branzburg decision has been uniformly criti- 
cized, neither the Court nor Congress has been persuaded to 
grant a reporter's privilege in criminal cases.lS However, the 
Court in Branzburg did recognize that state statutes may pro- 
vide for a reporter's privilege.20 At the time Branzburg was de- 
cided nineteen states accorded some form of statutory reporter's 
p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~  Today twenty-five states have reporter privilege stat- 
utes that grant varying degrees of privilege.22 However, despite 
17. Id. at 710 (emphasis added). 
18. See S. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND RE- 
PORTERS •˜ 3.09 (1982). 
19. The principles of the Branzburg decision appear to have been reinforced by 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). Nonetheless, Justice Brennan stated in 
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers), that he did 
"not believe that the Court has foreclosed news reporters from resisting a subpoena on 
First Amendment grounds." 
20. 408 US.  a t  688-89. 
21. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitu- 
tional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299,304-08 
(1979). 
22. ALA. CODE •˜ 12-21-142 (1977) (absolute privilege as to identity of source); 
ALASKA STAT. •˜• ˜  09.25.150-.220 (1983) (qualified privilege); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 12- 
2237 (1982) (absolute privilege as to identity of source); ARK. STAT. ANN. 3 43-917 (1977) 
(must be an initial showing of publication with malice to require disclosure); CAL. EVID. 
CODE 3 1070(a) (West Supp. 1984) (only protects newsmen from contempt); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, •˜• ˜  4320-4326 (1974) (qualified privilege); IND. CODE ANN. 34-3-5-1 (Burns 
Supp. 1983) (limited to identity of source); KY. REV. STAT. ANN 3 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 
1970) (directed only to identity of source of published information); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
45:1451-1454 (West 1982) (qualified privilege); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 9- 
112 (1984) (absolute privilege as to the identity of sources); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. •˜ 
767.5a (West 1982) (absolute privilege); MINN. STAT. ANN $3 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 
1984) (qualified privilege); MONT. CODE ANN. $3 26-1-901 to -903 (1983) (absolute privi- 
lege); NEB. REV. STAT. •˜• ˜  20-144 to -147 (1977) (absolute privilege); NEV. REV. STAT. $ 
49.275 (1981) (absolute privilege); N.J. STAT. ANN. •˜ 2A:84A-21, -21a, -21.1 to -21.9 (West 
Supp. 1983-84) (qualified privilege); N.M. STAT. ANN. •˜ 38-6-7 (Supp. 1983) (privilege 
does not apply to judicial proceedings: Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 
N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976)); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW •˜ 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1983- 
84) (absolute privilege); N.D. CENT. CODE $ 31-01-06.2 (1976) (qualified privilege); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. 2739.04, .12 (Page 1981 & Supp. 1984) (protects only identity of 
source: State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 441 N.E.2d 803 (1981)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, 2506 (West 1980) (limited privilege); OR. REV. STAT. $8 44.510-.540 (1981) (limited 
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the existence of numerous state reporter's privilege statutes, the 
judiciary has continued to restrict the privilege in criminal 
Thus, a reporter in the United States has little protection 
against being compelled to disclose the identity of sources. The 
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, which held that there is 
no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege, has limited ju- 
dicial development of the reporter's privilege to a case by case 
balancing of law enforcement interests against the function of 
- 
the press. Law enforcement interests have predominated. There- 
fore, Congress's failure to enact a federal reporter's privilege 
statute has left reporters dependent on state laws that often do 
not provide adequate protection in criminal cases. 
The reporter's privilege has also been the subject of consid- 
erable discussion in West Germany26 because of legislation 
privilege); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3 5942 (Purdon 1982) (broad protection); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS $8 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1983) (qualified privilege); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 24-1-208 
(1980) (qualified privilege). A characterization of the statutes is found in S. METCALF, 
supra note 18, a t  3 3.02. 
23. See, eg., H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND 
CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 372-75 (4th ed. 1982). Reporters who have 
personally witnessed a crime, as had two of the journalists in Branzburg, do not appear 
to be eligible to claim a reporter's privilege. Id. 
24. In German the term used to describe the reporter's privilege is 
Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht. 
25. See, eg., P. CRAMER, DAS ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT VON PRESSE UND 
RUNDFUNK (1968); L. HENNEMANN, PRESSEFRE~HE~T UND ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT 
(Berliner Abhandlung zum Presserecht Heft 23, 1978); H. HUPPERTZ, ZEUGNIS- 
VERWEIGERUNGSRECHT, BESCHLAGNAHME- UND DURCHSUCHUNGSVERBOT ZUGUNSTEN DES 
RUNDFUNKS IM STRAFPROZESS (Instituts fiir Rundfunkrecht an der Universitat zu Koln 
Band 8, 1971); U KLUG. PRESSESCHUTZ IM STRAFPROZESS. EIN RECHTSGUTACHTEN IM 
"SPIEGEL" -VERFAHREN (1965); Gross, Zum Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter 
uon Presse und Rundfunk, in FESTSCHRIFT UR GERHARD SCHIEDERMAIR ZUM 70. GEBURT- 
STAG 223 (1976); Gross, Neuregelung des journalistischen Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht, 
1975 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [N.J.W.] 1763; Kaiser, Die Verfassungsmas- 
sigkeit des Zeugnisoerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 1260; Kohlhaas, Das 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht der Journalisten, in PRESSERECHT UND PRESSEFREIHEIT: 
FESTSCHRIFT FUR MARTIN LOFFLER ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG 143 (1980); Kunert, Das Gesetz 
iiber das Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1975 
MONATSSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES RECHT 885; Loffler, Liicken und Mange1 irn neuen 
Zeugnisoerweigerungs- und Beschlagnahmerecht oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1978 
N.J.W. 913; Rengier, Die Reichweite des •˜ 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des na- 
mentlich preisgegebenen, aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 JURISTENZEITUNG 
[J.Z.] 797; Van Gelder, Die Verfassungswidrigkeit des landespresserechtlichen Zeugnis- 
uerweigerungsrechte, 1969 J.Z. 698; Note, Das Neue Zeugnisuerweigerungs- und 
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passed by the German Bundestag (parliament). Of the three 
countries considered in this comment, West Germany is the only 
one that has a federal statutory reporter's privilege. 
The origin of the West German reporter's privilege statute 
can be traced to statutes enacted in 1868 by three of the Ger- 
man Lander (states).26 These first statutes were enacted in re- 
sponse to the Prussian government's failure to pass a similar law 
that would have applied to all the German Lander controlled by 
Prussia. A federal reporter's privilege statute was not enacted 
until 1926, even though the unified German Reichstag had first 
considered passing such a federal law in 1874.27 By 1965, the 
federal reporter's privilege statute stated: 
Editors, publishers, distributors, printers and others who have 
worked in the production or publication of a periodic publica- 
tion [are permitted to withhold testimony] about the identity 
of an author, source or informant of a publication of punisha- 
ble contents, when an editor of the publication is punished or 
nothing prohibits his puni~hment .~~  
This formulation of the law gave reporters little protection 
from compelled disclosure for four reasons. First, there was no 
privilege for reporters who were not directly involved in the pro- 
duction or publication of a p e r i ~ d i c a l . ~ ~  This left many reporters, 
especially free-lance reporters, without protection. Second, even 
reporters granted the privilege could not withhold the identity 
of their sources unless their editor would be liable under the law 
if the material were published. A reporter's sources were pro- 
tected if an article was false or libelous, but not if the article was 
accurate. Consequently, only unreliable informants, whose infor- 
mation is of little value to society, were protected under the 
law.30 Third, the privilege did not arise until the information 
Beschlagnahmerecht im Presse und Rundfunkbereich, 1978 N.J.W. 1617; Note, Die 
Verfassungsmiissigkeit des Zeugnisuerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 2368. 
26. H. M ~ H L ,  DAS ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT DER PRESSE IM STRAF- UND DIS- 
ZIPLINARVERFAHREN 23-24 (Zeitungs-Verlag und Zeitschriften-Verlag Band 2, 1963). 
27. Id. at 25-26, 34. The federal law was not applied to the broadcast media until 
1953. Id. at 39-42. 
28. Strafprozessordnung [STPO] 1 53(1)(5), 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 1374 
(W. Ger.). Because this law was contained in the criminal procedure code it was only 
applicable to criminal procedure. Other statutes exist for other types of procedure. Pun- 
ishment in this context would apparently be for violation of the press laws. See generally 
H. MBHL, supra note 26, at 60-74. 
29. See L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 18. 
30. See P. CRAMER, supra note 25, at 19; L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 16; U. 
KLUG, supra note 25, at 21. 
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supplied by the informant was published. Thus, authorities 
could compel disclosure before publication, even if the material 
was subsequently p ~ b l i s h e d . ~ ~  Fourth, only the name of the 
source could be withheld. Information about the location of the 
informant had to be revealed even though such information 
might easily lead to the identification of the protected source.32 
In response to this weak federal statutory privilege, by 1966 
every West German Land had adopted a reporter's privilege 
statute. These state statutes appeared to grant journalists a 
broader privilege.33 However, the scope of the state statutory 
privilege was unclear because of differences between the state 
statutes.34 This confusion, combined with decisions by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) and a 
vast amount of scholarly work condemning the existing privilege, 
eventually persuaded the Bundestag to enact a more inclusive 
and comprehensible statute. 
The first decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht that en- 
couraged the enactment of a new federal statute was the Spiegel 
decision in 1966.35 Spiegel primarily involved the search and 
seizure of editorial material from a German magazine, but the 
opinion also discussed the federal reporter's p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~  The 
court stated that the federal reporter's privilege statute was con- 
stitutional and partially protected editorial secrecy. However, 
since the statute was not comprehensive, the court had to bal- 
ance editorial secrecy against law enforcement interests, giving 
editorial secrecy as much weight as possible until a new federal 
statute could be ena~ted.~ '  
The need for a new federal statute was underscored again in 
31. See R. GROSS. GRUNDZUECE DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSERECHTS 146 (1969). But see P. 
SCHNEIDER, PRESSEPREIHEIT UND STAATSSICHERHEIT 166. See generally L. HENNEMANN, 
supra note 25, at 17. 
32. L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 17. 
33. See, e.g., id. at 25-26; 1 LOWE-ROSENBERC, DIESTRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS 
GER~CHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR •˜ 53 ll37 (23d ed. 1976); see also Judg- 
ment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] 162, 189. 
34. L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, at 24. 
35. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 BVerfG 162, 
189 [hereinafter cited as Spiegel]. 
36. West Germany has a separate statute according protection against searches and 
seizures of media material in criminal procedure. It is codified under STPO 8 97(5). The 
federal reporter's privilege in criminal procedure discussed above and mentioned by the 
Court is codified at STPO 1 53(1)(5). 
37. Spiegel, supra note 35, at 189. 
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1973 when the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the reporter's 
privilege statutes of two Lander, Hesse and Hamburg, were un- 
constitutional in criminal actions.38 The court held that because 
the federal government had already enacted legislation in the 
area, articles 72 and 74 of the West German Basic Law (consti- 
tution) did not give the Lander power to promulgate criminal 
procedure laws.39 In dicta, the court also stated that a privilege 
to withhold testimony did not flow directly from the freedom of 
the press clause in the Basic Law.4o 
In 1975 the Bundestag enacted a new federal reporter's 
privilege statute applicable to criminal proceedings. The statute 
states: 
Persons, who in their profession participate or have partici- 
pated in the preparation, production or distribution of a peri- 
odic publication or broadcast [are permitted to refuse to tes- 
tify] about the identity of an author or source of contributions 
or documents, as well as about the statements made by them 
about their activity, to the extent that it concerns contribu- 
tions, documents and statements for the editorial portion [of 
the publication or b r ~ a d c a s t ] . ~ ~  
In a 1978 decision, the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen (the 
highest West German federal court for criminal matters) dis- 
cussed the new statute and noted that it eliminated three of the 
limitations found in t h e  previous reporter's privilege statute.42 
First, no violation of the press laws was required. Second, the 
editor did not have to be personally liable under the new law 
38. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 36 BVerfG 193 
[hereinafter cited as Hesse]; Judgment of Feb. 13, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. 
Ger., 36 BVerfG 314 [hereinafter cited as Hamburg]. 
39. Hesse, supra note 38, a t  317. Among other rules, GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 72(1), 
74(1) (W. Ger.) provide that the states have power to promulgate criminally and judi- 
cally related laws only if there are no conflicting federal laws. STPO 1 53(1)(5), the fed- 
eral reporter's privilege statute, was a criminal procedure statute, thus making the state 
legislation unconstitutional. See also Spiegel, supra note 35, a t  202. 
40. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t  317. This dicta was a response to the theory, pro- 
posed by numerous scholars, that a reporter's privilege could be derived from the Basic 
Law. See, e.g., P. CRAMER, supra note 25, a t  36 ff.; R. GROSS, supra note 31, a t  152; U. 
KLUG, supra note 25, a t  52-66; H. MBHL, supra note 26, a t  103; Kaiser, supra note 25; 
Note, 1968 N.J.W. 2368. Some of the speculation appears to have been fostered by the 
language of the Spiegel decision that appeared to indicate the privilege could be derived 
directly from the Basic Law. Spiegel, supra note 35, a t  176. 
41. STPO 8 53(1)(5), 1975 BGBl I 1973 (W. Ger.). 
42. Judgment of Dec. 28, 1978, B~ndes~erichtshof in Strafsachen, W. Ger., 28 
Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 240, 245-246 (hereinafter cited as 
Frankfurt]. 
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before the privilege attached. And third, identifying information, 
as well as the identity of the reporter's source could be withheld. 
The court stated that the new statutory privilege was intended 
to be "friendly to the press."43 I t  is an absolute privilege because 
there are no exceptions that relate to the type of crime involved. 
However, the statute does not protect journalists who have per- 
sonally witnessed criminal activity.'* Additionally, after a jour- 
nalist has revealed some information about the identity of the 
informant, the statute no longer provides automatic p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Instead, the court must weigh the competing law enforcement 
and confidentiality interests to determine if the privilege should 
be granted. The privilege will be extended only when (1) the in- 
terest in maintaining confidentiality clearly outweighs the inter- 
est in criminal justice, and (2) an "extraordinary publicity inter- 
est" is involved.46 The court also indicated that, although the 
new law approaches the constitutional limits of the reporter's 
privilege, the Bundestag's formulation must be respected be- 
cause of the judicial principle: "When in doubt decide in favor of 
the freedom of the press."47 
The new "absolute" reporter's privilege is not perfect. The 
most prominent problem that remains is identifying persons 
who qualify for the privilege. The statute requires a journalist to 
participate by profession in the publication or broadcast media 
in order to qualify for protection." Commentators have postu- 
lated that this wording will continue to deny the privilege to 
43. Id. at  247. 
44. Id. at  247-48, 253. 
45. Id. at  244-45. 
46. Id. at  248-49. This standard appears to give courts discretion, but with emphasis 
on the criminal prosecution interest. The court described an extraordinary publicity in- 
terest as being when, a t  least a t  the time of decision, the publication of the article serves 
in the general interest to protect especially major rights and when the publication is an 
appropriate means to protect those rights. Id. at  249. This explanation offers little help 
in understanding what an extraordinary publicity interest is. However, in the case before 
it the court decided that a judicially granted privilege was not appropriate. The case 
involved an article based on an interview with a person who was purported to have par- 
ticipated in a mass murder. The article pointed out that the source, still unknown to 
authorities, was a "Frankfurt chap". The court held that the statutory privilege had been 
waived by this disclosure, and the crime involved weighed against a judicially granted 
privilege. The strictness of this holding has been criticized. See, e.g., Rengier, Die 
Reichweite des J 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des namentlich preisgegebenen, 
aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 J.Z. 797. 
47. Frankfurt, supra note 42, a t  248. See generally Judgment of May 10, 1983, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 1984 EUROPXISCHE GRUNDRECHTE Z ITSCHRIFT 
[EuCRZ] 90 (explanation of the extent of a constitutionally based reporter's privilege). 
48. The German word used in the statute is berufsmiissig. 
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part-time and free-lance journalists.4s A second problem is that 
only those who work on a periodic publication or broadcast are 
granted the privilege. Scholars have contended that the term 
"periodic" is too r e s t r i c t i~e .~~  The term appears to exclude those 
involved in publishing a book based on research done for a peri- 
odical publication, documentary filmmakers, and possibly 
others. However, despite its defects, the new reporter's privilege 
statute gives West German reporters a solid and broad basis for 
protecting confidential sources. 
In Switzerland the reporter's privilege has not received the 
same amount of attention it has in West Germany. Unlike the 
West German Bundestag, the Swiss Bundesversammlung (Fed- 
eral Assembly) has refused to grant a federal reporter's privilege. 
Therefore, much as in the United States, the fate of the privi- 
lege has been left to the individual cantons (the Swiss equivalent 
of states). Some of the Swiss cantons have enacted reporter's 
privilege statutes. However, for purposes of comparison, this sec- 
tion will focus on the canton of Zurich which does not recognize 
the reporter's pri~ilege.~' 
In 1972, the case of Danuser v. Bezirksanwaltschaft Zii- 
rich" came before the highest federal court in Switzerland. Sev- 
eral juveniles who had escaped from a reformatory were inter- 
viewed on television while their whereabouts were unknown to 
law enforcement authorities. The show's producer was ques- 
tioned by the authorities regarding the location of the juveniles, 
but he refused to answer.b3 Although the canton had not enacted 
a statutory reporter's privilege, the producer claimed a privilege 
derived directly from the freedom of the press clause of the 
49. See, e.g., L. HENNEMANN, supra note 25, a t  48-50; Liiffler, supra note 25, a t  913- 
14. 
50. See, e.g., Loffler, supra note 25, at  913-14. 
51. Zurich is emphasized for two reasons. First, the Zurich canton is dealt with in 
the major decision by the highest national court and other informative decisions involv- 
ing reporter's privilege. Second, the purpose for including the Swiss system in this com- 
ment is to compare and contrast how systems with almost identical backgrounds can 
reach totally different results. Zurich, one of the cantons to deny reporter's privilege, is a 
good tool for comparison and contrast. 
52. Judgment of June 28, 1972, Bundesgericht, Switz., 98 Entscheidungen des 
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung [BC] I 418 [hereinafter cited as 
Danuser]. 
53. Id. a t  420. 
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Swiss con~titution.~' The court rejected the producer's claim for 
a reporter's privilege by relying on section 128 of the Zuricher 
Strafprozessordung (Zurich Criminal Procedure Code), which re- 
quires full disclosure, with limited exceptions, to investigating 
authorities. The court held that the producer had to disclose the 
whereabouts of the youths. 
A general reporter's privilege cannot be derived from either the 
freedom of the press or freedom of expression because the 
guaranteed basic rights are not directly affected by the obliga- 
tion to testify. Whether the journalistic worth of anonymous 
informants is of greater importance than the clarification of 
particular fact situations so that the anonymity of the inform- 
ant should be preserved in criminal proceedings, is a question 
whose solution cannot be derived from the constitution, but 
rather should be handled by the proper legi~lature."~ 
The court concluded that because neither the Zurich Criminal 
Procedure Code nor the federal code contained a reporter's priv- 
ilege, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression were not violated by requiring the pro- 
ducer to answer questions about the youths.56 The court reaf- 
firmed this holding in another case in 1981.b7 
The Zuricher Obergericht in Strafkammer (Zurich Superior 
Criminal Court) also confronted the reporter's privilege issue in 
a case involving the seizure of photocopies of arrest warrants 
from a newsroom.b8 Although seizure rather than nondisclosure 
of the identity of news sources was involved, the court discussed 
the reporter's privilege in detail. First, the court reiterated much 
of the Danuser decision and pointed out that only doctors, law- 
yers, and clergy have the privilege not to testify. The court ad- 
mitted that the confidential relationship between the press and 
informants was protected by the freedom of the press clause, but 
held that the Swiss Constitution does not provide an unlimited 
p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~  Freedom of the press is only a part of the general 
freedom of expression that is granted to all citizens and cannot 
be used to avoid obligations that are common to all citizens. 
54. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BVERF] art. 55 (Switz.). 
55. Danuser, supra note 52, at 422 (emphasis added). 
56. Id.  
57. Judgment of July 1, 1981, Bundesgericht, Switz., 1982 EuGRZ 29. 
58. Judgment of Sept. 4, 1979, Obergericht in Strafkammer, Zurich, Switz., 76 
SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 317 [hereinafter cited as Zurich]. 
59. Id .  at 320. 
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Only the legislature can sanction withholding the identity of 
news sources in criminal  investigation^.'^ As a result, the court 
held that reporters have no greater constitutional protection 
from testifying than nonreporters. 
The court did acknowledge that the confidentiality between 
informant and reporter cannot be totally disregarded. Under 
some circumstances the relationship may be considered by the 
court, but the anonymity of sources does not require any special 
prote~tion.~' The court stated: "The press in Switzerland sur- 
vived up until now without a statutory privilege. Despite that, or 
perhaps because of that, the press has prevailed in its important 
a~signment ."~~ The defendant, citing a West German case as au- 
t h ~ r i t y , ~ ~  urged the court to balance the interest in the collection 
of the news against the interest in prosecution in deciding 
whether to grant a reporter's privilege. However, even after con- 
sidering the role of the press the court found that (1) the crimi- 
nal offense involved in the case was no less important than the 
reporter's privilege, and (2) no extraordinary interest in publica- 
tion was present in the case.64 
As this case illustrates, the Swiss have relied on the legisla- 
ture to decide whether or not to grant a reporter's privilege. The 
Swiss constitution does not expressly grant a reporter's privilege 
and the courts in the canton of Zurich have been unwilling to 
interpret the constitution or criminal code as requiring a privi- 
lege. With few cantonal reporter's privileges and no uniform fed- 
eral reporter's privilege, the reporter's position in Switzerland 
remains precarious. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
The federal reporter's privilege accorded the press in West 
Germany is vastly different from that found in the United 
States and Switzerland. In West Germany, journalists for peri- 
odic publications and broadcasts have an absolute privilege to 
protect their sources without regard to the seriousness of the 
crime involved. In contrast, in the United States and Switzer- 
land, although some states and cantons have enacted reporter's 
60. Id.  
61. Id.  To emphasize its point, the court stated that a source should not expect his 
identity to be protected. 
62. Id.  
63. The German case referred to is apparently Frankfurt, supra note 42. 
64. Zurich, supra note 58, at 320-21. 
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privilege statutes, reporters in over half of the states and can- 
tons have no significant privilege to withhold testimony in crimi- 
nal proceedings. This difference is a result of the unique consti- 
tutional and philosophical theories of the three countries. 
A. Constitutional Analysis 
Journalists in all three countries claim a reporter's privilege 
derived directly from a constitutional freedom of the press 
clause.s6 The journalists' argument is based on two premises. 
First, the press has a constitutionally granted function to inform 
the public and stimulate public opinion. Second, a reporter's 
privilege is necessary to carry out the press function. Journalists 
argue that, without a reporter's privilege, sources are hesitant to 
inform and consequently the function of the press is inhibited. 
The journalists' first premise has been accepted in all three 
countr ie~?~ However, the assertion that a reporter's privilege is 
necessary in order to perform the press function has been re- 
jected by the United States Supreme Court in Branzburge7 and 
by the Ziiricher Obergericht in Strafkammer.e8 The West Ger- 
man courts, on the other hand, have been reluctant to reject the 
second argument. 
Two cases that were discussed earlier illustrate the West 
German position. First, in the Hamburg case the Bundesverfas- 
sungsgericht specifically denied the constitutional argument 
while invalidating a state-level reporter's privilege statute, but 
only after weighing the particular facts of the case.69 Second, in 
the Frankfurt decision the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen re- 
65. For the claim of journalists' privilege in the United States see, e.g., Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 US.  665 (1972). In West Germany see, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 35; Frank- 
furt, supra note 42. In Switzerland see, e.g., Danuser, supra note 52; Zurich, supra note 
58. 
66. For the United States see generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 US.  532, 539 (1965). For West Germany see generally P. 
SCHNEIDER. PRESSE- UND MEINUNGSFREIHEIT NACH DEM GRUNDGESETZ 118-29 (1962). For 
Switzerland see generally P. SALADIN, GRUNDRECHTE IM WANDEL: DIE RECHTSPRECHUNG 
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BU DESCERICHTS zu DEN GRUNDRECHTEN IN EINER SICH ANDERNDEN 
UMWELT 43-48 (1970). 
67. 408 US.  a t  698-99. Justice Powell's concurrence appears to  give more weight to 
the second premise than does Justice White's plurality opinion. The Court's handling of 
empirical evidence on the importance of reporter's privilege has also been criticized. See 
supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
68. Zurich, supra note 58, a t  320. The concept is also implied in Danuser, supra 
note 52. 
69. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t  317. 
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fused to apply the federal statute because the journalist had al- 
ready revealed some information about his source.70 However, 
the court held that under some circumstances a journalist may 
refuse further disclosure even when the federal statute is inap- 
pli~able.~' This limited privilege is arguably derived from the 
constitution. 
The reporter's privilege cases in West Germany demon- 
strate a friendliness toward the press not found in the United 
States and Switzerland. This difference cannot be explained by 
the history of the constitutional guarantees of free press in the 
three countries. The history of the press in all three countries is 
filled with struggles against government censorship and control. 
As the governments' awareness for the need of an informed pub- 
lic became more acute, and the efforts of the press to eliminate 
the shackles of government control correspondingly intensified, 
the three countries established constitutional guarantees of a 
free press.72 However, the free press provisions of the Swiss and 
United States constitutions and the West German Basic Law 
have had dissimilar effects on the reporter's privilege. 
In Switzerland and the United States the judiciary has in- 
terpreted the pertinent constitutional guarantees as requiring 
the government to remain neutral in matters dealing with the 
press.73 Despite a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the 
press, the press is granted no more rights or privileges than the 
average citizen, who is guaranteed freedom of expression. Free- 
dom of the press is only a subpart of freedom of speech and 
expression. Therefore, a journalist enjoys no more rights than a 
nonj~urnalist.~' 
70. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
71. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. For 
application of this concept see Advertisement, supra note 47. 
72. US. CONST. amend. I; B. VERF. art. 55 (Switz.); GG art. 5 (W. Ger.). The citation 
for the West German Basic Law is the new version, but varies little from the older ver- 
sions. For a brief history of the press, see, e.g., H. NELSON & D. TEETER. LAW OF MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 26-56 (4th ed. 
1982); M. L~FFLER & R. RICKER. HANDBUCH DES PRESSERECHT 20-28 (1978); C. LUDWIG, 
SCHWEIZERISCHE PR SSERECHT 63-81 (1964). One German commentator has noted that 
the government began compelling disclosure of sources and information once censorship 
was no longer allowed in order to retain some control over the press. In effect, the grant- 
ing of freedom of the press caused a need for reporter's privilege. H. M ~ H L ,  supra note 
26, a t  22-23. 
73. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 761 (1977); see 
also Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. 
CT. REV. 225, 226. 
74. Contra Meiklejohn, The Courts, the Press, and the Public: The Case of Myron 
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The West German Basic Law contains a provision that 
could justify a similar result. The Basic Law states that freedom 
of the press can be limited by general laws, i.e., laws that apply 
to all persons, and not just the press.'& This provision essentially 
gives the legislature constitutional authority to regulate the 
press to the same extent that i t  regulates the rest of society. 
Thus, there is constitutional authority for requiring the press to 
testify as long as the rest of society is also required to do so? 
Although journalists in the United States, West Germany, 
and Switzerland are all guaranteed the right to a free press by 
the constitution or Basic Law, that right can be regulated to the 
same extent the rest of society is regulated. However, in all three 
countries legislative power exists to grant special privileges. 
West Germany is the only country that has legislatively enacted 
a federal statutory privilege. There is nothing notably different 
about the West German concept of freedom of the press that 
explains this more liberal approach with the exception of a pos- 
sible government "friendliness" toward the press. 
B. The Philosophies of the Three Systems and the Effect of 
the ''Performance State" on the Reporter's Privilege 
Although freedom of the press exists in all three countries, 
the enactment of a federal statutory reporter's privilege in West 
Germany may reflect the more encompassing legal theory es- 
poused in that country. Scholars suggest that West Germany has 
developed into a "performance state" that not only formally ac- 
knowledges basic rights by not allowing government interference 
with those rights, but also places an affirmative duty on the 
state to implement programs to secure and protect those 
rights.77 In essence, the performance state extends the concept 
Farber and The New York Times, 30 SYRACUSE L REV. 789 (1979). 
75. GG art. 5 1 2 (W. Ger.). For explanation of "general law" see, e.g., R. GROSS, 
PRESSERECHT: EINFUHRUNG IN GRUNDZ~GE UND SCHWERPUNKTE DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSE- 
RECHTS 50-53 (1982); M. L~FFLER & R. RICKER, HANDBUCH DES PRESSERECHTS 51-53 
(1978). 
76. All three countries allow privileges to be granted to some groups, e.g. doctors 
and clergy, without requiring that the same privilege be given journalists. All three allow 
the press to also receive special treatment from the law, but that special treatment may 
not necessarily be derived from the constitutions or Basic Law. 
77. See Haberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, 30 VEROEFFENTLICHUNCEN DER 
VEREIN~GUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER [VVDSTRL] 43 (1972) (Professor Dr. 
Peter Haberle was one of the instigators of the term "performance state"); see also 
Benda, New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, 11 J .  MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 1 (1977); Kommers, The Jurisprudence 
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of the welfare state beyond the obligation to distribute welfare 
benefits to the poor to include an affirmative duty to the entire 
legal system. 
One West German scholar has stated that in a performance 
state the "performance law" sets the profile of the social consti- 
tutional state and, without such a performance law, basic rights 
would be socially ineffective."' Merely granting freedom of the 
press and formally acknowledging that right offers the journalist 
little protection. However, the performance state brings about 
the maximal actualization of that right by enacting affirmative 
legislation, e.g., a statutory reporter's privilege. 
The reporter's privilege in West Germany is an example of a 
performance state carrying out its affirmative duty to protect 
rights. In contrast, in most areas of the law, the United States 
does little more than not interfere with basic rights.79 The emer- 
gence of a welfare or performance state in the United States or 
Switzerland may bring about changes in the reporter's privilege. 
West Germany has enacted a national statutory reporter's 
privilege that offers extensive protection from compelled disclos- 
ure. In the United States and Switzerland some of the states and 
cantons have enacted reporter's privilege statutes, but there is 
no uniform, nationally applicable law. There are no formal con- 
stitutional interpretations that explain this difference. I t  may re- 
sult from the different legal philosophies of the three nations, in- 
particular the concept of a performance state. Whatever the un- 
derlying differences of the three systems, the West German re- 
porter's privilege can serve as a model for a federal reporter's 
privilege statute in the United States and Switzerland. 
Jeff  V. Nelson 
of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 657, 673-77 (1980). 
78. Haberle, supra note 77, at 47. 
79. In the United States, the performance state concept has apparently only been 
extended in limited economic situations and some areas of civil rights. See generally A. 
MILLER. SOCIAL CHANCE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 
(Contributions in American Studies No. 41, 1979). 
The Swedish Ban of Corporal Punishment 
On July 1, 1979, Sweden became the first nation to prohibit 
corporal punishment of children by their parents. The Swedish 
Parenthood and Guardianship Code was amended to provide: "A 
child may not be subjected to corporal punishment or other in- 
jurious or humiliating treatment."' The new Swedish law is dis- 
tinctive because it allows greater intrusion into family life than 
the laws of other countries that have considered the relationship 
between corporal punishment and child abuse specifically2 and 
children's rights general l~ .~  The law also represents the final 
step in an attempt by lawmakers to change societal views with- 
out coercion. 
This comment explores the history of legislative, judicial, 
and societal attitudes toward corporal punishment in Sweden. I t  
then outlines the legislative process involved in adopting the 
new law. Finally, it examines government proposals aimed a t  
eliminating corporal punishment and explores the prospects of 
using more forceful measures in the future. 
The 1979 law prohibiting corporal punishment reflects the 
major transformation of Swedish attitudes against the punish- 
ment of children that has occurred over the past thirty years. 
Traditionally, the right of parents to use corporal punishment in 
raising their children was wholly accepted in Sweden. Both reli- 
gious and legal codes reiterated the proverbial dictum that spar- 
ing the rod spoils the child.4 
1. Svensk Forfattningssamling [SFS] 1979:122 (Swed.). 
2. A number o f  other countries have had debates about the propriety o f  corporal 
punishment. See Gil, The Social Context of Domestic Violence: Implications for Pre- 
uention, 6 V T  L. REV. 339, 356-58 (1981) (U.S.); Grandke & Stolpe, Zur Rechtsstellnung 
der Kinder in der DDR, 29 STAAT U N D  RECHT 528 (1980) (E. Ger.); Renchon, Attribution 
et exercise de l'autoritt parental, 39 ANNALES DE DROIT, REVUE TRIMESTERELLE DE DROIT 
BELGE 155 (1979) (Belg.); Schroder, "Erzieherpriuileg" i m  Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT 
F U R  RICHARD LANCE Z U M  70. GEBURTSTAG 391 (1976) (W. Ger.). 
3. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972); 
Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations about 
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U L. REV. 605. 
4. Lagutskottets betiinkande [LU] 1978/79:11; see also FONDEN FOR DEN MORALISKA 
RXTTEN I SVERIGE, CAN YOU BRING U P  CHILDREN SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT SMACKING AND 
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When Swedish family law was codified in 1920, it expressly 
gave parents the right to punish their ~h i l d r en .~  This language of 
the statute was extensively criticized6 because it resulted in the 
widespread use of severe corporal punishment.? In an effort to 
discourage the use of harsh punishments, the Parenthood and 
Guardianship Code was amended in 1949 to replace the word 
"punish" with "reprimand."' However, this change in the code 
was not accompanied by comparable changes in the criminal 
law. The Penal Code preserved the parental right to punish chil- 
dren and protected parents from criminal prosecution for ac- 
tions against those under their supervision, as long as the inju- 
ries inflicted were not long-term.9 This exception from criminal 
liability for parents and guardians made child abuse cases diffi- 
cult to prosecute until the exception was eliminated from the 
Penal Code in 1957." 
A. The 1966 Amendment 
In 1965, the rising number of child abuse cases led the jus- 
tice minister to call for stronger statutory condemnation of cor- 
poral punishment. He proposed amending the Parenthood and 
Guardianship Code to expressly state that corporal punishment 
should be avoided." Justice Ministry officials concluded that an 
express disavowal of the parental right to inflict corporal punish- 
ment was the only effective way to deal with the problem. Even 
the 1957 repeal of the criminal assault exemption from the Pe- 
nal Code had not stemmed the tide of child abuse.12 However, 
prevailing societal views made an absolute prohibition of physi- 
SPANKING? (1979) [hereinafter cited as FONDEN]. 
5. See UTREDNINGEN OM BARNENS RATT, JUSTITIEDEPARTEMENTET, BARNETS RAm 1. 
OM FORBUD MOT AGA, STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR [SOU] 1978:10, a t  11 (1978). 
6. SOU 1978:10, a t  15. 
7. Despite the long-standing concern about the rising number of child abuse cases, 
the Swedish government has not kept official statistics on child abuse cases except from 
1969-1970. The government found 777 cases of child abuse in the country during this 
period. FONDEN, supra note 4, a t  4. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. a t  11. 
10. SOU 1978!10, a t  15. The current statute reads: "A person who inflicts bodily 
injury, illness or pain upon another or renders him unconscious or otherwise similarly 
helpless, shall be sentenced for assault to imprisonment for a t  most two years or, in case 
the crime was petty, to pay a fine." THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN, ch. 3, 4 5 (T. Sellin & J. 
Getz trans. 1972). 
11. SOU 1978:10, a t  15-18. 
12. Id. 
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cal punishment, subjecting parents to criminal prosecution for 
all physical intrusions, entirely unenforceable. 
Three bills were introduced in the RiksdagI3 in response to 
the Ministry's proposal to amend the code. One proposal sug- 
gested that corporal punishment was necessary in raising chil- 
dren and that its elimination would interfere with family af- 
fairs.14 This proposal was flatly rejected. A second proposal 
explicitly rejected corporal punishment, asserting that unless 
corporal punishment was expressly banned parents would con- 
tinue to assume the right to use it and government would con- 
tinue to be saddled with the unmanageable task of determining 
when parental reprimands become reprehensible.'This propo- 
sal was also rejected. The Riksdag's Law Committee supported a 
third proposal that incorporated features of the second proposal 
and Justice Ministry  recommendation^.'^ The proposal neither 
called for an acknowledgement of the right to punish nor ex- 
pressly banned physical punishment. Rather, all references to 
corporal punishment were to be extracted from the code. The 
Committee expected this removal to operate, albeit passively, as 
a ban of corporal punishment. A passive ban would clarify the 
government's position on physical punishment without creating 
the risk of frivilous criminal actions against parents." 
The Riksdag adopted the third proposal in 1966. Despite 
the passive nature of simply removing all references to corporal 
punishment from the Code, the Riksdag considered this action a 
ban on corporal punishment. Even later, when the Riksdag ex- 
pressly banned corporal punishment in 1979, it insisted that its 
action was merely a codification of the existing law.18 
The ban of corporal punishment was contrary to the pre- 
vailing public opinion in Sweden concerning corporal punish- 
ment. A public opinion poll in 1965 showed that 53% of all 
adult Swedes considered physical punishment occasionally nec- 
essary in child rearing. However, by 1968 the percentage of per- 
sons supporting physical punishment had fallen from 53% to 
42% while opposition to corporal punishment had increased 
13. The Swedish Parliament. 
14. SOU 1978:10, at 17 (citing, Motionerna 1966:1:723 & Ik888). 
15. SOU 1978:10, at 18 (citing Motionerna 1966:II:78 & II:889). 
16. SOU 1978:10, at 17 (citing Motionerna 1966:k722 & II:887). 
17. SOU 1978:10, at 18 (citing 1LU 1966:32). 
18. LU 1978/79:11. 
450 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
from 35% to 54% .I0 This shift of opinion continued through 
1971 when a survey indicated that support for corporal punish- 
ment had decreased to 35%.20 The 1971 survey also asked 
whether people thought the law prohibited corporal punishment. 
Sixty-one percent of the respondents felt that it was prohibited, 
while the remaining 39% either felt physical punishment was 
permitted by law or had no opinion on the issue.21 
The reasons for this shift in public opinion are difficult to 
pinpoint. The possible effect of the statutory change cannot be 
discounted. However, corporal punishment has also come under 
criticism in other countries that have not legislatively attempted 
to ban corporal p ~ n i s h m e n t . ~ ~  
Despite the change in public opinion and a clear legislative 
intent to prohibit physical punishment, the Swedish legal com- 
munity refused to treat the repeal of the right to reprimand as 
an absolute ban of corporal p~nishment. '~ A leading commenta- 
tor on family law wrote concerning the provision's repeal: "One 
ought to proceed, nonetheless, from the premise that minor 
physical intrusions are entirely permitted if the parent needs 
them to ably guide the A commentary on the criminal 
code concluded: "Although a right to punish as such no longer 
exists, it is clear that a physical correction can be minimally in- 
trusive. Child abuse is not the necessary result. Indictments for 
completely innocent acts can sometimes be an uncalled for inter- 
ference with personal affairs."2b 
Such statements by legal scholars have been blamed for the 
judiciary's failure to recognize the 1966 amendment as a prohibi- 
tion of corporal p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  A 1975 district court case exem- 
plifies the judicial response to the new laws. The court dismissed 
an indictment for abuse of a three-year-old child, stating: "Even 
if such a charge could be supported, it does not prove that the 
19. SWEDISH SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND CHILD 
ABUSE 2 (A. Haeuser trans. 1981). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. See Gil, supra note 2; Grandke & Stolpe, supra note 2; Renchon, supra note 2; 
Schroder, supra note 2. 
23. This seems to be a reflection of the conflict between extra statutory defenses and 
positivism also found in other European systems. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMI- 
NAL LAW 779-84 (1978). 
24. G. WALIN. KOMMENTAR TILL FORXLDRABALKEN 118 (1971). 
25. N. BECKMAN. KOMMENTAR TILL BROTl'SBALKEN 125 (1970). 
26. See SOU 1978:10, at 19. 
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force used by [the defendant] against his daughter has gone be- 
yond the right to punish which parents have against children in 
their care."27 
B. Pressures for Additional Reform 
A legislative response to the judicial failure to implement 
the law was slow in coming. However, in 1972 legislators again 
introduced proposals that explicitly outlawed corporal punish- 
ment.28 These proposals were again rejected.29 The Riksdag's 
Law Committee investigated the proposals and concluded that a 
public information campaign against physical punishment would 
be more appropriate than a statutory p r~h ib i t i on .~~  This deci- 
sion was applauded by many in the justice administration com- 
munity who continued to fear that an express ban would give 
prosecutors the onerous and unrealistic task of prosecuting par- 
ents for spanking their children. 
In preparation for the International Year of the Child, the 
Riksdag established the Commission on Children's Rights on 
February 24, 1977. The Commission was charged with investi- 
gating ways of strengthening the legal position of children.31 In 
1978 the Commission issued its first report, entitled Children's 
Rights: A Ban Against Corporal P u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  The report pro- 
posed the enactment of an explicit ban of physical punishment. 
Corporal punishment was viewed as "a form of degrading treat- 
ment" which results in a "lack of self-esteem and a personality 
change" that could affect the child for life.33 The report found 
that "[clhild psychiatrists and psychologists have long been in 
agreement that physical punishment of children is 
inappr~pr ia te ."~~ 
Influenced by such opinions and the need for society to 
"work against all forms of violence," the Commission found an 
express ban of corporal punishment necessary in order for chil- 
dren to grow up realizing that violence is not socially acceptable 
27. Id. 
28. SOU 1978:10, at 20 (citing Motionerna 1972:19; 1972:434). 
29. SOU 1978:10, at 22 (citing LU 197223). 
30. Id. 
31. SOU 1978:10, at 3. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 11-12. 
34. Id. at 23-24. 
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behavior.3s The Commission noted that, while most Swedes felt 
corporal punishment was prohibited, many people continued to 
violate the law. The Commission felt greater public knowledge 
of the law would result in increased compliance. However, the 
Commission recognized the difficulty of publicizing the mere ab- 
sence of permission to reprimand or punish. Unless the ban were 
explicitly expressed, i t  would be difficult to increase public 
knowledge concerning the illegality of corporal punishment be- 
yond the 1971 
In accordance with Swedish policy, the government3' sent 
the Commission's proposal to a number of interested parties for 
comments prior to legislative action on it. This process is called 
remiss, or r e m i t t a n ~ e . ~ ~  Remittance allows a variety of groups to 
comment on proposed legislation. Over twenty-five different gov- 
ernment agencies, private organizations, and political parties 
(including the law faculty of Uppsala University, the House- 
wives' Home and Society Federation, and the Swedish Save the 
Children Federation) responded to the proposed ban on corporal 
punishment. A majority of the respondents favored the ban.39 
The Circuit Court of Appeals of Southern Sweden wrote to 
35. Id. a t  24. 
36. Id. a t  9. 
37. In Sweden, as in Great Britain, West Germany, and other parliamentary sys- 
tems, the term "the government" refers to the cabinet. 
38. Regeringens proposition 1978/79:67. Although this practice is followed in other 
European countries it has been the subject of little academic work. A limited discussion 
of the Swedish remittance process is found in Dahlen, A Governmental Response to 
Pressure Groups-The Case of Sweden, in PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 148 
(P. Willetts, ed. 1982). An in-depth study of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
remittance process is beyond the scope of this comment. The procedure presents an in- 
teresting addition to the legislative process that parallels the notice and comment re- 
quirements of American administrative law. The wide spectrum of views made available 
to the legislature through the remittance procedure gives a breadth not always achieved 
in the typical legislative hearing process in the United States. 
However, the unanimity of the remittance comments on the corporal punishment 
ban raises doubts about whether the process actually operates to solicit comments from 
known opponents of a measure. Further, the remittance procedure creates substantial 
delays in the legislative process, slowing the government's ability to respond. On the 
other hand, for policy questions not requiring immediate legislative response, submission 
to a diverse and objective expert audience for comment could, a t  least in theory, provide 
legislatures with a variety of innovative and valuable approaches to societal problems. 
39. Regeringens proposition 1978/79:67, a t  3. 
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the legislature reminding the government that in earlier remit- 
tances the court had "asserted the necessity of having state au- 
thorities take a fixed stand rejecting all forms of violence toward 
children."" The court's remittance, focusing on the substance of 
the legislation rather than on the impact of the legislation on the 
judiciary, contrasts with the conventional American concept of 
separation of powers. The Swedish Women's Leftist Alliance 
commented simply, "It is about time that the child's right not to 
be abused was legally settled."41 The Women's League of the 
Moderate Party, Sweden's most conservative political party, 
joined in the clamor of approval stating, "The regulations must 
be so worded that no doubt can exist in courts and among juve- 
nile authorities, guardians, and other involved parties that phys- 
ical or psychological violence cannot be accepted as a method of 
child rearing."42 
The only objections to the proposal came from government 
prosecutors who felt the proposed change would lead to a 
greater frequency of child abuse complaints but no significant 
increase in actual protection for children.43 Surprisingly, no ob- 
jections were made to the potential government intrusion into 
family affairs resulting from the proposed law. 
After the government received the remittance responses, the 
Commission's proposal was introduced in the Rik~dag.~" In a re- 
port of its own, the government emphasized the role of the law 
in changing the attitudes of parents and guardians." The Riks- 
dag's Law Committee proposed slight changes in some sections 
of the law but did not substantively alter the ban.46 A nearly 
unanimous vote of the Riksdag adopted the government 
The law prohibiting corporal punishment of children was 
not intended to include criminal sanctions requiring changes in 
40. Id. at 10. 
41. Id. at 15. 
42. Id. at 14. 
43. Id. at 9, 11. 
44. Id. at 1. 
45. Id. at 6. 
46. LU 1978/79:11. 
47. SWEDISH SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION, THE OMBUDSMAN AND CHILD MAL- 
TREATMENT 7 (1980) (the vote was 259 to 6). 
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the Penal Code. The legislation was consciously designed as a 
prohibition "without teeth." The Commission on Children's 
Rights noted in its first report that no changes in the Penal 
Code were proposed.4s The remittance comments also made ref- 
erence to the noncriminal nature of the bads  and suggested use 
of a strong advertising campaign to increase public awareness 
and obedience to the law.50 The government adopted this sug- 
gestion as part of its own report. 
After the law was passed the government attempted to in- 
crease public knowledge of the ~ t a tu t e .~ '  In 1971, under the old 
law, only 61% of all Swedes thought that the law prohibited cor- 
poral punishment. In 1980, 93% of the population was aware of 
the prohibition, and 96% knew of it by 1981." Nevertheless, this 
increased public awareness of the law has not resulted in its ac- 
ceptance. The number of adults who felt that corporal punish- 
ment is sometimes necessary decreased by 9% between 1971 and 
1979. However, the percentage has remained relatively constant 
since 1979. In 1981, although 96% of Swedish adults knew cor- 
poral punishment was illegal, 26% continued to believe that it 
was not only acceptable but sometimes necessary in child 
rearing.53 
The question of penalties for violation of the law is still un- 
decided.64 Even if additional criminal sanctions are not imposed, 
48. SOU 1978:10, a t  24. 
49. See, e.g., Regeringens proposition 1978/79:67, a t  11-12 (Uppsala University law 
faculty's remittance comments). 
50. Id.  at  16. 
51. See, e.g., FONDEN, supra note 4 (this pamphlet was distributed in ten different 
languages by the Justice Ministry as part of the advertising campaign). 
52. See SWEDISH SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION, supra note 19. 
53. Id .  A 1980 poll by a different pollster showed 93% of the adults knew of the law, 
yet 31% felt corporal punishment is sometimes necessary in child rearing. BURKE MAR- 
KETING RESEARCH, INDEX INFORMATION-"LAG OM ACA" (1980). 
54. Despite claims that the law has no penal sanctions, a recent UP1 newspaper 
story from Stockholm, Sweden stated: 
An 11-year-old boy walked into a police station and reported his parents 
for spanking him, which is against the law in Sweden, authorities said. 
. . . . 
It  was believed to be the first case in which a child has actually used Swe- 
den's 1979 Anti-Spanking Act, which bans any type of spanking or physical 
disciplining of children. 
Police confirmed Monday that the boy, who reported his parents last Sat- 
urday, had been given a spanking. He was taken to a social worker, who con- 
tacted the parents. 
The father and mother could be fined or sent to prison if found guilty of 
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the ban may severely impact child custody hearings. The law 
presently allows parents to retain custody unless they grossly 
abuse or neglect parental responsibilitie~.~~ However, a second 
report issued by the Commission on Children's Rights proposed 
new child custody laws that would remove children from paren- 
tal custody when there is simple, rather than gross abuse or neg- 
lect of parental resp~nsibilities.~~ It  is not clear whether the use 
of corporal punishment constitutes neglect or abuse under the 
proposal. However, the fact that the suggestion for lowering the 
standard for removing children from parental custody came 
from the same commission that proposed the ban of corporal 
punishment may provide justification for a judicial determina- 
tion that corporal punishment is prima facie abuse or neglect 
under the new custody laws. Although the Commission never 
stated that the two reports were related, the combined effect of 
the reports may be to encourage dissolution of the family as 
punishment for parental use of corporal punishment. 
The potential imposition of such harsh sanctions for paren- 
tal use of physical punishment creates doubt about the future of 
the law. Although the remittances raised no direct opposition to 
the ban, they dealt with a law without sanctions or any mention 
of potential implications in child custody disputes. I t  is unclear 
what the government will do if corporal punishment can not be 
eliminated among the 25-30% of the population that continues 
to favor physical punishment despite the advertising campaign. 
The road has already been cleared for the government to remove 
children from homes as a means of eliminating physical punish- 
ment. The ban could also be strengthened by amending the Pe- 
nal Code's assault provisions. This would parallel the govern- 
ment's amendment of the Penal Code in 1957 to strengthen the 
1949 changes in the Parenthood and Guardianship Code. Such 
aggressive governmental attempts to enforce the ban could spur 
active opposition from the presently dormant segment of society 
that uses corporal punishment. 
spanking their child, [public prosecutor] Bjelle said. 
Deseret News, May 1, 1984, at 12A. col. 4. It is unclear whether authorities would have 
prosecuted the parents in this case for child abuse under the pre-1979 statutes. 
55. SWEDISH INFORMATION SERVICE, THE "ANTI-SPANKING'' LAW: TEXT OF THE LAW 
BACKGROUND (1979) (English summary of SOU 1979:63). 
56. Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Swedish ban of corporal punishment provides an inter- 
esting study of the efforts of a legislature to change public opin- 
ion. The ban demonstrates how a democratic government can 
interfere with traditional family relationships without creating 
an explosive public backlash. The Swedish approach to corporal 
punishment also suggests creative strategies for reform when a 
government is satisfied with effecting gradual changes in societal 
attitudes and behavior. The portion of the population that sup- 
ports corporal punishment will not actively oppose the law so 
long as it does not include any penalties. This allows time to 
continue changing the attitudes and behavior of later genera- 
tions. Thus, the strategy of passing an unenforceable ban may 
prove more effective than a sudden and aggressive change in the 
law. However, if the government ever aggressively enforces the 
ban, the issue of family autonomy may still result in a volatile 
political battle over the status of the family in modern Swedish 
society. 
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